* cipher/rndunix.c [HAVE_STDINT_H]: Include stdint.h.
(start_gatherer): Detect misbehaving sysconf.
--
See
GnuPG-bug-id: 1778
for the reason of this patch. There is no concrete bug report but this
chnage should not harm.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/options.h: Add weak_digests linked list to opts.
* g10/main.h: Declare weakhash linked list struct and
additional_weak_digest() function to insert newly-declared weak
digests into opts.
* g10/misc.c: (additional_weak_digest): New function.
(print_digest_algo_note): Check for deprecated digests.
* g10/sig-check.c: (do_check): Reject all weak digests.
* g10/gpg.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpg.
* doc/gpg.texi: Document gpg --weak-digest option.
* g10/gpgv.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpgv.
* doc/gpgv.texi: Document gpgv --weak-digest option.
--
gpg and gpgv treat signatures made over MD5 as unreliable, unless the
user supplies --allow-weak-digests to gpg. Signatures over any other
digest are considered acceptable.
Despite SHA-1 being a mandatory-to-implement digest algorithm in RFC
4880, the collision-resistance of SHA-1 is weaker than anyone would
like it to be.
Some operators of high-value targets that depend on OpenPGP signatures
may wish to require their signers to use a stronger digest algorithm
than SHA1, even if the OpenPGP ecosystem at large cannot deprecate
SHA1 entirely today.
This changeset adds a new "--weak-digest DIGEST" option for both gpg
and gpgv, which makes it straightforward for anyone to treat any
signature or certification made over the specified digest as
unreliable.
This option can be supplied multiple times if the operator wishes to
deprecate multiple digest algorithms, and will be ignored completely
if the operator supplies --allow-weak-digests (as before).
MD5 is always considered weak, regardless of any further
--weak-digest options supplied.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
(this is a rough cherry-pick of applying the following commits to
STABLE-BRANCH-1-4:
76afaed65e3b0ddfa4923cb577ada43217dd4b18
b98939812abf6c643c752ce7c325f98039a1a9e2
91015d021b3dcbe21ad0e580a4f34c523abf9e72
)
* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO): Change to AES or CAST5 or 3DES
depending on configure options.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Set opt.s2k_cipher_algo to DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO.
--
(cherry picked from commit 57df1121c18b004dd763b35eabf7b51fc9e8ec38)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/passphrase.c (stdenvnames): Add DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS.
--
pinentry-gnome3 talks to the gcr prompter via dbus. Without this
environment variable, it can't find the correct session to talk to.
* g10/trustdb.c (validate_keys): Call dump_key_array only in debug
mode.
--
I guess that is a left-over from an early attempt to output
information on the trustdb for use by other tools. Maybe related to
the former --list-trust-path command. Sending it to stdout is
probably useful so we do this now only in debug mode.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Backported to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4 from
b03a2647299a6c8764a2574590cbaccdff9e497d by dkg
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_sign): Verify after sign.
* g10/gpg.c (opts): Make --no-sig-create-check a NOP.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove field "no_sig_create_check".
* g10/sign.c (do_sign): Do check only for DSA.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Only allow relevant algorithms for
encryption.
--
(backported from 2.1 commit c771963140cad7c1c25349bcde27e427effc0058)
* g10/getkey.c (get_seckey): Return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY when it's not
exact match.
--
In the situation of corrupted .gnupg/ where only private subkey is
available but no corresponding public key of the subkey, the code
returned public primary key which caused mysterious error (for a
user). This fix detects an error earlier.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1422
Debian-Bug-Id: #638619
* g10/free-packet.c (cmp_public_keys, cmp_secret_keys): Compare opaque
data at the first entry of the array when it's unknown algo.
* mpi/mpi-cmp.c (mpi_cmp): Backport libgcrypt 1.5.0's semantics.
--
(backported from 2.0 commit 43429c7869152f301157e4b24790b3801dce0f0a)
GnuPG-bug-id: 1962
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Check PKTLEN before calling mpi_read
et al.
--
Due to the missing length checks PKTLEN may turn negative. Because
PKTLEN is an unsigned int the malloc in read_rest would try to malloc
a too large number and terminate the process with "error reading rest
of packet: Cannot allocate memory".
Reported-by: Hanno Böck.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(backported from 2.0 commit 0aac920f23fd07e152fdb7385299c92bb9a4ade3)
* util/pka.c: Rewrite.
(get_pka_info): Add arg fprbuflen. Change callers to pass this.
* util/strgutil.c (ascii_strlwr): New.
* configure.ac: Remove option --disable-dns-pka.
(USE_DNS_PKA): Remove ac_define.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Always include PKA.
--
Note that although PKA is now always build, it will only work if
support for looking up via DNS has not been disabled.
The new PKA only works with the IPGP DNS certtype and shall be used
only to retrieve the fingerprint and optional the key for the first
time. Due to the security problems with DNSSEC the former assumption
to validate the key using DNSSEC is not anymore justified. Instead an
additional layer (e.g. Trust-On-First-Use) needs to be implemented to
track change to the key. Having a solid way of getting a key matching
a mail address is however a must have.
More work needs to go into a redefinition of the --verify-options
pka-lookups and pka-trust-increase. The auto-key-locate mechanism
should also be able to continue key fetching with another method once
the fingerprint has been retrieved with PKA.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This is a backport from master.
(backported from commit 2fc27c8696f5cf2ddf3212397ea49bff115d617b)
* include/mpi.h, mpi/mpiutils.c (mpi_set_cond): New.
* mpi/mpi-pow.c (SIZE_PRECOMP): Rename from SIZE_B_2I3.
(mpi_powm): Access all data in the table and use mpi_set_cond.
--
Access to the precomputed table was indexed by a portion of EXPO,
which could be mounted by a side channel attack. This change fixes
this particular data-dependent access pattern.
* g10/seckey-cert.c (do_check): Call BUG for NULL return of
get_opaque.
--
This is the suggested addition from commit 6f03218. We better run
into an fatal error than into a segv.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
