* common/compliance.c (get_assumed_de_vs_compliance): Also consider a
registry entry.
--
On Windows it is easier to set the registry key than to use an envvar.
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_status_compliance_flag): Fix test.
--
In general the cache is used to query this flag but in this function
it is used directly and we need to adjust the test.
Thanks to Ingo for reporting this.
* common/compliance.c (assumed_de_vs_compliance): New.
(get_compliance_cache): Check envvar and fake compliance.
(gnupg_status_compliance_flag): Return 2023 for de-vs if in faked
mode.
* g10/gpg.c (gpgconf_list): For compliance_de_vs return 23 or 2023.
--
The user visible changes are that
GNUPG_ASSUME_COMPLIANCE=de-vs gpgconf --list-options gpg \
| awk -F: '$1=="compliance_de_vs" {print $8}'
returns 2023 if "compliance de-vs" is found in gpg.conf. If
eventually the software is arpproved the returned value will be 23 and
not 1 as it was before. Consumers should check whether they see value
of true (Kleopatra does this right now) and also check whether the
value is > 2000 and in this case print a beta/non-approved warning.
The envvar is currently used to assume that the underlying libgcrypt
is compliant and approved. This is not yet the case but eventually
libgcrypt will announce this itself and from then on the envvar is not
anymore required for testing.
--
These are non-substantive corrections for minor spelling mistakes
within the GnuPG codebase.
With something like this applied to the codebase, and a judiciously
tuned spellchecker integrated as part of a standard test suite, it
should be possible to keep a uniform orthography within the project.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7116
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Handle EdDSA.
* g10/gpg.c (oOverrideComplianceCheck): Remove.
(opts): Turn --override-compliance-check into a dummy option.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove override_compliance_check.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_key_verify_compliance): Remove use of that
option.
--
The introduction of --override-compliance-check actually hid the real
cause for the signature verification problem in de-vs mode for the
Ed25519 key. The real fix is to handle the EdDSA algorithm in
gnupg_pk_is_allowed.
Fixes-commit: fb26e144adfd93051501d58f5d0d4f8826ddf436
GnuPG-bug-id: 5655
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Also consider the
gcrypt vids for ECDSA et al.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Consider the curve. Print a compliance
notice for a non-compliant key.
* sm/certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Silence the "switching to
chain model".
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_cipher_is_allowed): Allow GCM for gpgsm
in decrypt mode.
* tests/cms/samplemsgs/pwri-sample.gcm.p7m: Remove duplicated authtag
--
We allow GCM in de-vs mode for decryption although this has not been
evaluation. It is decryption and thus no serious harm may happen.
* common/compliance.c (get_compliance_cache): New.
(gnupg_rng_is_compliant): Use per mode cache.
(gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant): Ditto.
--
This addresses the problem tha the check might be called with
different compliance values and thus it should return the
corresponding cached result.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant): New.
(gnupg_rng_is_compliant): Also check library version.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use new function.
(check_sig_and_print): Ditto.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto.
* sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Ditto
--
This will eventually allow us to declare Libgcrypt 1.9 to be de-vs
compliant. GnuPG can use this information then for its own checks.
As of now GnuPG tests the version of the used library but that is a
bit cumbersome to maintain.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* configure.ac: Require at least Libgcrypt 1.9.0. Remove all
GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER dependent code.
--
Only Libgcrypt 1.9 implements EAX which is a mandatory algorithm in
RFC4880bis.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.h (PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS): New.
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add arg alog_flags and
test rsaPSS. Adjust all callers.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto.
* sm/misc.c (gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val): New wrapper function.
(gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval): New.
* sm/certcheck.c (gpgsm_check_cms_signature): Change type of sigval
arg. Add arg pkalgoflags. Use the PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Use the new wrapper and new fucntion to
also get the algo flags. Pass algo flags along.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c: Make --pgp6 an alias for --pgp7.
* common/compliance.h (gnupg_compliance_mode): Remove CO_PGP6.
* g10/options.h (PGP6): Remove. Adjust all users.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Rework to always allow
verification.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a con-compliant warning.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Use log_error instead of
log_info.
--
We should be able to verify all signatures. So we only print a
warning. That is the same beheavour as for untrusted keys etc.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3311
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Remove the Elgamal
signing check. We don't support Elgamal signing at all.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed) <de-vs>: Revert encryption/decryption for RSA.
Check the curvenames for ECDH.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Print only a warning if the key
is not compliant.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto. Use the same string as in gpg
so that we have only one translation.
--
We always allow decryption and print only a note if the key was not
complaint at the encryption site.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3308
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_rng_is_compliant): New.
* g10/call-agent.c (start_agent) [W32]: Check rng compliance.
* sm/call-agent.c (start_agent) [W32]: Ditto.
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_simple, encrypt_crypt): Check that the RNG is
compliant.
* sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto.
* g10/sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
* sm/sign.c (gpgsm_sign): Ditto.
--
Under Windows we need to check that the Jitter RNG is active in de-vs
mode. Under Linux this is not necessary because /dev/random can be
scrutinized and is believed to provide enough entropy.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Swap P and Q for DSA
check. Explicitly check for allowed ECC algos.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Swap P and Q for DSA check.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Simplify SYMKEYS check. Replace
assert by debug message.
--
Note that in mainproc.c SYMKEYS is unsigned and thus a greater than 0
condition is surprising because it leads to the assumption SYMKEYS
could be negative. Better use a boolean test.
The assert could have lead to a regression for no good reason. Not
being compliant is better than breaking existing users.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_{pk,cipher,digest}_is_compliant): Return
false if the module is not initialized.
(gnupg_{pk,cipher,digest}_is_allowed): Return true if the module is
not initialized.
(gnupg_status_compliance_flag): Do not assert that the module is
initialized.
(gnupg_parse_compliance_option): Likewise.
(gnupg_compliance_option_string): Likewise.
--
This implements a default policy for modules not explicitly using the
compliance module. The default policy is to allow all algorithms, but
mark none of them as compliant.
Fixes gpgv.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3210
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_digest_is_allowed): Don't include
GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL because it is not a digest_algo_t.
--
Note that Whirlpool is not used anywhere in gpg or gpgsm.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_parse_compliance_option): New function.
* common/compliance.h (struct gnupg_compliance_option): New type.
(gnupg_parse_compliance_option): New prototype.
* g10/gpg.c (parse_compliance_option): Remove function.
(compliance_options): New variable.
(main): Adapt callsite.
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Use the new common function.
* sm/gpgsm.h (opt): New field 'compliance'.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3191
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add DSA with certain
parameters.
(gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New function.
(gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise.
* common/compliance.h (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New prototype.
(gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise.
* common/status.h (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): New status.
(STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): Likewise.
* doc/DETAILS: Document the new status lines.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS
and report that using the new status line.
(check_sig_and_print): Likewise.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Likewise.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Likewise.
--
When decrypting data and verifying signatures, report whether the
operations are in compliance with the criteria for data classified as
VS-NfD. This information will be picked up by the frontend and
presented to the user.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3059
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
* common/Makefile.am (common_sources): Add new files.
* common/compliance.c: New file. Move 'gnupg_pk_is_compliant' here,
and tweak it to not rely on types private to gpg.
* common/compliance.h: New file. Move the compliance enum here.
* g10/keylist.c (print_compliance_flags): Adapt callsite.
* g10/main.h (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Remove prototype.
* g10/misc.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Remove function.
* g10/options.h (opt): Use the new compliance enum.
* sm/keylist.c (print_compliance_flags): Use the common functions.
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
