* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO): Prefer AES256 by default.
--
It's 2017, and pretty much everyone has AES-256 available. Symmetric
crypto is also rarely the bottleneck (asymmetric crypto is much more
expensive). AES-256 provides some level of protection against
large-scale decryption efforts, and longer key lengths provide a hedge
against unforseen cryptanalysis.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* agent/command.c (hlp_genkey): update help text to suggest the use of
3072 bits.
* doc/wks.texi: Make example match default generation.
* g10/keygen.c (DEFAULT_STD_KEY_PARAM): update to
rsa3072/cert,sign+rsa3072/encr, and fix neighboring comment,
(gen_rsa, get_keysize_range): update default from 2048 to 3072).
* g10/keyid.c (pubkey_string): update comment so that first example
is the default 3072-bit RSA.
--
3072-bit RSA is widely considered to be 128-bit-equivalent security.
This is a sensible default in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Gbp-Pq: Topic update-defaults
Gbp-Pq: Name 0015-gpg-default-to-3072-bit-RSA-keys.patch
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Remove useless
condition. Actually free when SIGNER was allocated by us.
--
SIGNER_ALLOCATED never received a value of -1 but that was tested.
IF SIGNER_ALLOCATED was 2 the memory was never freed:
if (signer_allocated == 1)
if (signer_allocated == 2)
free()
Fixes-commit: 44cdb9d73f
This function needs to be audited more thoroughly.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
This is to make those function better readable.
if (foo)
/* Comment */
{
}
is bad style because it requires extra time to notice the begin of the
block and vice versa when noticing the block it is not clear whether
this is an conditioned or unconditioned block.
Having asterisks on the left is better for view impaired people and
for b/w printouts.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (gpgconf_list): Announce "auto-key-retrieve".
(main): Simplify setting of KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE.
* tools/gpgconf-comp.c: Make "no-auto-key-retrieve" invisible. Make
"auto-key-retrieve" an expert option.
--
This basically reverts 9bb13a0e81
because --no-auto-key-retrieve is again the default. Note that we
allow both options for the sake of profiles.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tools/gpgconf-comp.c (gc_options_gpg): Add max-cert-depth,
completes-needed, and marginals-needed options.
* g10/gpg.c (gpgconf_list): Likewise.
--
Some tests to come for the PGP trust model will need to manipulate
these parameters.
Signed-off-by: Damien Goutte-Gattat <dgouttegattat@incenp.org>
* g10/gpg.c (main): remove KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE from the
default keyserver options.
* doc/gpg.texi: document this change.
--
This is a partial reversion of
7e1fe791d1. Werner and i discussed it
earlier today, and came to the conclusion that:
* the risk of metadata leakage represented by a default
--auto-key-retrieve, both in e-mail (as a "web bug") and in other
contexts where GnuPG is used to verified signatures, is quite high.
* the advantages of --auto-key-retrieve (in terms of signature
verification) can sometimes be achieved in other ways, such as when
a signed message includes a copy of its own key.
* when those other ways are not useful, a graphical, user-facing
application can still offer the user the opportunity to choose to
fetch the key; or it can apply its own policy about when to set
--auto-key-retrieve, without needing to affect the defaults.
Note that --auto-key-retrieve is specifically about signature
verification. Decisions about how and whether to look up a key during
message encryption are governed by --auto-key-locate. This change
does not touch the --auto-key-locate default of "local,wkd". The user
deliberately asking gpg to encrypt to an e-mail address is a different
scenario than having an incoming e-mail trigger a potentially unique
network request.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* doc/gpg.texi: Document new option.
* g10/call-dirmngr.c (create_context): Fail if option is given.
* g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): New value.
(opts): New option.
(gpgconf_list): Add new option.
(main): Handle new option.
* g10/options.h (struct opt): New field 'disable_dirmngr'.
* tools/gpgconf-comp.c (gc_options_gpg): New option.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3334
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
* g10/gpg.c (gpgconf_list): Print no-auto-key-retrieve instead of
auto-key-retrieve.
* tools/gpgconf-comp.c (gc_options_gpg): Replace auto-key-retrieve by
no-auto-key-retrieve and chnage level from invisible to advanced.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (main): Add KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE to the default
keyserver options. Set the default for --auto-key-locate to
"local,wkd". Reset that default iff --auto-key-locate has been given
in the option file or in the commandline.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Work on a copy of the arg.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 3324
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/options.h (IMPORT_DRY_RUN): New.
* g10/import.c (parse_import_options): Add "show-only".
(import_one): use that as alternative to opt.dry_run.
--
This is just a convenience thing for
--import-options import-show --dry-run
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/revoke.c (gen_standard_revocation): Set opt.outfile to NULL
temporarily to create certificate in right place.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 3015
* g10/main.h (open_outfile): New parameter NO_OUTFILE.
* g10/openfile.c (open_outfile): New parameter NO_OUTFILE. If given,
never use opt.outfile.
* g10/revoke.c (create_revocation): If FILENAME is true, also set
NO_OUTFILE to true (for standard revocation certificates).
* g10/dearmor.c, g10/encrypt.c, g10/export.c, g10/revoke.c,
g10/sign.c: Adjust all other callers.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 3015
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Bail out if the algo is not
allowed in the current compliance mode.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto.
--
The idea here is that the owner of the key created a non-compliant key
and later receives a mail encrypted to that key. The sender should
have checked this key too but we can't guarantee that. By hard
failing here the owner of the key will notice that he had created a
non-compliant key and thus has a chance to generate a new compliant
key. In case the compliant criteria changes and the owner wants to
decrypt an old message he can still switch gpg to another compliant
mode.
Fixes-commit: a0d0cbee76
GnuPG-bug-id: 3308
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/call-agent.c (warn_version_mismatch): Print a note on how to
restart the servers.
* g10/call-dirmngr.c (warn_version_mismatch): Ditto.
* sm/call-agent.c (warn_version_mismatch): Ditto.
* sm/call-dirmngr.c (warn_version_mismatch): Ditto.
--
We should move this fucntion to common. However, the status output
functions are different and would need to be streamlined too.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3117
Debian-bug-id: 860745
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/getkey.c (get_best_pubkey_byname): Change return type to
gpg_error_t. Use var name err instead of rc. Move a
gpg_error_from_syserror closer to the call.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/getkey.c (get_best_pubkey_byname): Init NEW.
--
We call free_user_id on NEW.uid and thus it needs to be initialized.
This fixes the ref-count or invisible segv bug from
GnuPG-bug-id: 3266
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Rework to always allow
verification.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a con-compliant warning.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Use log_error instead of
log_info.
--
We should be able to verify all signatures. So we only print a
warning. That is the same beheavour as for untrusted keys etc.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3311
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_crypt): Do not abort for a non-compliant key.
* sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 3306
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Remove the Elgamal
signing check. We don't support Elgamal signing at all.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed) <de-vs>: Revert encryption/decryption for RSA.
Check the curvenames for ECDH.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Print only a warning if the key
is not compliant.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto. Use the same string as in gpg
so that we have only one translation.
--
We always allow decryption and print only a note if the key was not
complaint at the encryption site.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3308
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/key-check.c (key_check_all_keysigs): Add arg mode and change all
output calls to use it.
* g10/keyedit.c (keyedit_print_one_sig): Add arg fp and chnage all
output calls to use it.
(keyedit_menu): Adjust for changes.
* g10/gpgcompose.c (keyedit_print_one_sig): Add dummy arg fp.
* g10/import.c (import_one): Call key_check_all_keysigs with output to
the log stream.
--
Fixes-commit: 404fa8211b
GnuPG-bug-id: 3288
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Only set fpr in
list_keyblock_direct invocation if neither --fingerprint nor
--with-fingerprints are given.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 2741
* g10/import.c (update_key_origin): New.
(merge_blocks): Add arg curtime.
(import_one): Pass curtime to merge_blocks. Call update_key_origin.
--
We probably need to refine the rules on how this is done. But it is a
start.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (apply_meta_data): Rename to ...
(insert_key_origin): this. Factor code out to ...
(insert_key_origin_pk, insert_key_origin_uid): new funcs.
(import_one): Move insert_key_origin behind clean_key.
(merge_blocks): Add args options, origin, and url.
(append_uid): Rename to ...
(append_new_uid): this. Add args options, curtime, origin, and url.
Call insert_key_origin_uid for new UIDs.
--
This is a straightforward change to handle new user ids.
How to test:
With an empty keyring run
gpg --with-key-origin --locate-key \
--auto-key-locate clear,nodefault,wkd wk@gnupg.org
and then append a new keyid using
gpg --with-key-origin --locate-key \
--auto-key-locate clear,nodefault,wkd wk@g10code.com
Works with my current key 80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_get_chunk): Use KEYORG_KS if request was
done by fingerprint.
* g10/import.c (apply_meta_data): Implement that.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (apply_meta_data): Remove arg 'merge'. Add arg 'url'.
Implement WKD and DANE key origin.
(import_keys_internal): Add arg 'url' and change all callers.
(import_keys_es_stream): Ditto.
(import): Ditto.
(import_one): Ditto.
* g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Fix update URL printing.
* g10/call-dirmngr.c (gpg_dirmngr_wkd_get): Add arg 'r_url' to return
the SOURCE. Pass ks_status_cb to assuan_transact.
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_import_wkd): Get that URL and pass it to
the import function.
--
Note that this only for new keys. Merging this info will be added
soon.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_import_cert): Use an import filter in
DANE mode.
--
We only want to see the user ids requested via DANE and not any
additional ids. This filter enables this in the same way we do this
in WKD.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): If error code is GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO,
assume the symmetric passphrase was wrong and invalidate the cache.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 2270
* g10/free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Copy fields serialno and
updateurl.
--
The PK->serialno is used to get the version of the card to decide
whether it does support other algorithms than SHA-1. This value is
cached but no deep copy was done when calling copy_public_key.
Bug detected by importing some public keys and then importing a secret
key which led to a double free.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (import_one): If option import-clean is set,
also clean on initial import, not only for merge.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 2401
* g10/keydb.h (MK_DATESTR_SIZE): New.
* g10/keyid.c (mk_datestr): Make public. Add arg bufsize and use
snprintf. Change arg atime to u32.
(datestr_from_pk): Simplify.
(datestr_from_sig): Ditto.
(expirestr_from_pk): Ditto.
(expirestr_from_sig): Ditto.
(revokestr_from_pk): Ditto.
--
Note that this also reduces the size of the static buffers from 16 to
11 which is sufficient for the string. In the past we added the 5
extra bytes to cope for bugs in gmtime which is now handles by
snprintf.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/getkey.c (lookup): Return immediately on any other error than
GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY from agent_probe_any_secret_key.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 2204
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Track key server request via
fingerprint.
--
New signatures carry the fingerprint and thus --auto-key-retrieve tries
to lookup the key by fingerprint. If that failed it used to also ask
the same thing by KEYID - but the keyid is part of the fingerprint and
thus it will either get no response or the wrong key back. We can
easily avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_rng_is_compliant): New.
* g10/call-agent.c (start_agent) [W32]: Check rng compliance.
* sm/call-agent.c (start_agent) [W32]: Ditto.
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_simple, encrypt_crypt): Check that the RNG is
compliant.
* sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto.
* g10/sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
* sm/sign.c (gpgsm_sign): Ditto.
--
Under Windows we need to check that the Jitter RNG is active in de-vs
mode. Under Linux this is not necessary because /dev/random can be
scrutinized and is believed to provide enough entropy.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
