* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_fromfile): Add optional arg r_keyblock.
* g10/pkclist.c (find_and_check_key): Also encrypt to RENC subkeys.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_key_usage): Make public.
* g10/misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Take PUBKEY_USAGE_RENC in
account.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_public_key): Change pubkey_usage from byte to u16.
(PKT_user_id): Cosmetic fix: change help_key_usage from int to u16.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_metadata_validity): Handle time
conflict for ADSKs.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6395
This patch handles ADSK keys and encrypts to them. It does not yet
allow the creation of them. We backport this from master early to get
this part of the code out into the field.
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Handle EdDSA.
* g10/gpg.c (oOverrideComplianceCheck): Remove.
(opts): Turn --override-compliance-check into a dummy option.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove override_compliance_check.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_key_verify_compliance): Remove use of that
option.
--
The introduction of --override-compliance-check actually hid the real
cause for the signature verification problem in de-vs mode for the
Ed25519 key. The real fix is to handle the EdDSA algorithm in
gnupg_pk_is_allowed.
Fixes-commit: 773b8fbbe9
GnuPG-bug-id: 5655
* g10/gpg.c (oOverrideComplianceCheck): New.
(opts): Add new option.
(main): Set option and add check for batch mode.
* g10/options.h (opt): Add flags.override_compliance_check.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Factor complaince checking out
to ...
(check_key_verify_compliance): new. Turn error into a warning in
override mode.
--
There is one important use case for this: For systems configured
globally to use de-vs mode, Ed25519 and other key types are not
allowed because they are not listred in the BSI algorithm catalog.
Now, our release signing keys happen to be Ed25519 and thus we need to
offer a way for users to check new versions even if the system is in
de-vs mode. This does on purpose not work in --batch mode so that
scripted solutions won't accidently pass a signature check.
GnuPG-bug-id: 5655
Backported-from-master: fb26e144ad
* g10/misc.c (is_weak_digest): New.
(print_digest_algo_note): Use it here.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_end_simple): Use it.
* g10/sign.c (hash_for): Do not use recipient_digest_algo if it is in
the least of weak digest algorithm.
--
If a message is signed and encrypted to several recipients, the to be
used digest algorithm is deduced from the preferences of the
recipient. This is so that all recipients are able to check the the
signature. However, if the sender has a declared an algorithm as
week, that algorithm shall not be used - in this case we fallback to
the standard way of selecting an algorithm.
Note that a smarter way of selecting the algo is to check this while
figuring out the algorithm - this needs more testing and thus we do it
the simple way.
Reported-by: Phil Pennock
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Backported-from-master: 15746d60d4
* common/compliance.h (PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS): New.
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add arg alog_flags and
test rsaPSS. Adjust all callers.
* common/util.c (pubkey_algo_to_string): New.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto.
* sm/misc.c (gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val): New wrapper function.
(gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval): New.
* sm/certcheck.c (gpgsm_check_cms_signature): Change type of sigval
arg. Add arg pkalgoflags. Use the PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Use the new wrapper and new fucntion to
also get the algo flags. Pass algo flags along. Change some of the
info output to be more like current master.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This backport from master
commit 969abcf40c
also includes some changes taken from
commit a759fa963a
(sm: Improve readability of the data verification output.)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (read_key_from_file): Rename to ...
(read_key_from_file_or_buffer): this and add new parameters. Adjust
callers.
(import_included_key_block): New.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_signature): Add field flags.key_block.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set that flags.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add parm forced_pk and change
all callers.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
(check_sig_and_print): Try the included key block if no key is
available.
--
This is is the second part to support the new Key Block subpacket.
The idea is that after having received a signed mail, it is instantly
possible to reply encrypted - without the need for any centralized
infrastructure.
There is one case where this does not work: A signed mail is received
using a specified signer ID (e.g. using gpg --sender option) and the
key block with only that user ID is thus imported. The next time a
mail is received using the same key but with a different user ID; the
signatures checks out using the key imported the last time. However,
the new user id is not imported. Now when trying to reply to that
last mail, no key will be found. We need to see whether we can update
a key in such a case.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4856
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Backported from master
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Reject cewrtain
SHA-1 based signatures.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from c4f2d9e3e1)
Adjusted for changed added arguments in a function.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_end_simple):
--
Obviously we should not ignore a back signature here.
Fixes-commit: 214b007726
GnuPG-bug-id: 4014
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit b6275f3bda)
* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): New.
(get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): New.
* g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): Give global scope.
(check_sig_and_print): Use get_pubkeyblock_for_sig.
* g10/pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use get_pubkey_for_sig.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Ditto.
(check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4046
The whole getkey stuff is still a mess with way to much duplication
and missing caching of already fetched data.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7526c7bc7)
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_end_simple): Check sign usage.
--
Without this patch the signature verification fails only due to the
missing back signature. This check better explains what went wrong.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4014
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 214b007726)
* g10/keydb.h (IS_BACK_SIG): New.
* g10/sig-check.c: Re-indent and use macros.
--
This makes the code easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Remove useless
condition. Actually free when SIGNER was allocated by us.
--
SIGNER_ALLOCATED never received a value of -1 but that was tested.
IF SIGNER_ALLOCATED was 2 the memory was never freed:
if (signer_allocated == 1)
if (signer_allocated == 2)
free()
Fixes-commit: 44cdb9d73f
This function needs to be audited more thoroughly.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
This is to make those function better readable.
if (foo)
/* Comment */
{
}
is bad style because it requires extra time to notice the begin of the
block and vice versa when noticing the block it is not clear whether
this is an conditioned or unconditioned block.
Having asterisks on the left is better for view impaired people and
for b/w printouts.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Rework to always allow
verification.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a con-compliant warning.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Use log_error instead of
log_info.
--
We should be able to verify all signatures. So we only print a
warning. That is the same beheavour as for untrusted keys etc.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3311
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
For proper operations as a server we need to avoid global variables.
Thus we need to pass the session state CTRL to most functions. Quite
a lot of changes but fortunately straightforward to do.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Replace arg PK by R_PK and
change the semantics. Also clear the other R_ args on function entry,
use gpg_error() and change retturn type to gpg_error_t.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Add arg R_PK.
(list_node): Pass NULL for new arg.
(check_sig_and_print): Rework to make use of the returned PK.
--
The output
gpg: textmode signature, digest algorithm SHA256, key algorithm rsa2048
showed the pubkey algo of the primary key which was surprising.
Changed to print the algo of the subkey used for verification.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Not only subkey, but also primary
key should have flags.valid=1.
--
The tweak of gpgv in e32c575e0f only makes
sense with this change.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): If SIG->CLASS is
unsupported, show some debugging information. Don't use BUG to fail.
Just return GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE.
--
Signed-off-by: Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.com>
* g10/sig-check.c (hash_uid_node): Rename from this...
(hash_uid_packet): ... to this. Take a PKT_user_id instead of a
KBNODE.
(check_key_signature2): Split the basic signature checking
functionality into...
(check_signature_over_key_or_uid): ... this new function.
--
Signed-off-by: Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.com>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_end): Break the basic signature
check into...
(check_signature_end_simple): ... this new function.
--
Signed-off-by: Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.com>
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_metadata_validity): Use days if
useful.
--
Using days instead of a high number of seconds is for the majority of
users a better measurement.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
I am considering some changes and thus better start off by switching
to standard GNU indentation. This patch also changes comment lines
like
if (foo)
/* Comment on foo. */
{
to
if (foo)
{ /* Comment on foo. */
or
if (foo) /* Comment on foo. */
{
to make the brace of the opening block stand out immediately.
Further stars on the left are added to longer comments because that
makes the code easier to read by disabled hackers, when reading
without font locking, and for reading black-white printouts.
* g10/main.h: Add rejection_shown flag to each weakhash struct
* g10/misc.c (print_digest_algo_note, additional_weak_digest): Do not
treat MD5 separately; (print_digest_rejected_note): Use
weakhash.rejection_shown instead of static shown.
* g10/options.h (opt): Change from additional_weak_digests to
weak_digests.
* g10/sig-check.c: Do not treat MD5 separately.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Explicitly set MD5 as weak.
* g10/gpgv.c (main): Explicitly set MD5 as weak.
--
Previously, only one weak digest rejection message was shown, of
whichever was the first type encountered. This meant that if "gpg
--weak-digest SHA224" encountered both an MD5 digest and a SHA224
digest, it would only show the user that the MD5 digest was rejected.
In order to let the user know which algorithms were rejected, we
needed to move the "shown" flag into a per-weak-algorithm location.
Given this additional complication, it made no sense to continue to
treat MD5 specially, so it is added as a default weak algorithm in the
same opt.weak_digests data structure as any other.
Signed-Off-By: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/main.h: Improve function documentation.
* g10/packet.h.h: Improve function documentation.
* g10/sig-check.c: Improve function documentation and some comments.
--
Signed-off-by: Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.com>
* g10/misc.c (print_md5_rejected_note): Rename to ..
(print_digest_rejected_note): this. Parameterize function to take an
enum gcry_md_algos.
* g10/sig-check.c: Use print_digest_rejected_note() when rejecting
signatures.
--
76afaed65e allowed extra --weak-digests,
but removed the one call to print_md5_rejected_note(). This replaces
and generalizes that warning.
Signed-Off-By: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/options.h: Add additional_weak_digests linked list to opts.
* g10/main.h: Declare weakhash linked list struct and
additional_weak_digest() function to insert newly-declared weak
digests into opts.
* g10/misc.c: (additional_weak_digest): New function.
(print_digest_algo_note): Check for deprecated digests; use proper
gcry_md_algos type.
* g10/sig-check.c: (do_check): Reject weak digests in addition to MD5.
* g10/gpg.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpg.
* doc/gpg.texi: Document gpg --weak-digest option.
* g10/gpgv.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpgv.
* doc/gpgv.texi: Document gpgv --weak-digest option.
--
gpg and gpgv treat signatures made over MD5 as unreliable, unless the
user supplies --allow-weak-digests to gpg. Signatures over any other
digest are considered acceptable.
Despite SHA-1 being a mandatory-to-implement digest algorithm in RFC
4880, the collision-resistance of SHA-1 is weaker than anyone would
like it to be.
Some operators of high-value targets that depend on OpenPGP signatures
may wish to require their signers to use a stronger digest algorithm
than SHA1, even if the OpenPGP ecosystem at large cannot deprecate
SHA1 entirely today.
This changeset adds a new "--weak-digest DIGEST" option for both gpg
and gpgv, which makes it straightforward for anyone to treat any
signature or certification made over the specified digest as
unreliable.
This option can be supplied multiple times if the operator wishes to
deprecate multiple digest algorithms, and will be ignored completely
if the operator supplies --allow-weak-digests (as before).
MD5 is still always considered weak, regardless of any further
--weak-digest options supplied.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Capitialized some comments, shorted a line in do_check, and changed
subject to name the option. -wk
* g10/sig-check.c (signature_check2): Avoid copying PK to RET_PK.
Instead, directly use the provided storage. If none is provided
allocate some.
--
Signed-off-by: Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.com>.
* g10/sign.c (sign_file): Use log_printf instead of stderr.
* g10/tdbdump.c (export_ownertrust): Use estream fucntions.
(import_ownertrust): Ditto.
* g10/tdbio.c (tdbio_dump_record): Ditto. Change arg to estream_t.
--
Reported-by: Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@fripost.org>
Needed for unattended key edits with --status-fd, because since 2.1
status prompts are preceded by es_fflush (in cpr.c:do_get_from_fd)
not fflush(3), so the standard output may not be flushed before each
prompt. (Which breaks scripts using select(2) to multiplex between
the standard and status outputs.)
His patch only affected print_and_check_one_sig_colon() but there are
many more places where stdio and estream are mixed. This patch now
replaces most of them in g10/. At some places stdio is still used,
but that is local to a function and should not have side effects.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.h (g10_errstr): Remove macro and change all occurrences by
gpg_strerror.
(G10ERR_): Remove all macros and change all occurrences by their
GPG_ERR_ counterparts.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (do_check): Move some code to ...
* g10/misc.c (print_md5_rejected_note): new function.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_tree, proc_plaintext): Enable MD5 workaround
only if option --allow-weak-digest-algos is used.
