HTML responses.
* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_user_id_printable): Rename to get_user_id_native
and remove the printable stuff since we're print-ifying valid utf8
characters. Change all callers in import.c, sign.c, and encode.c.
backsigs.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Find 0x19 backsigs on subkey selfsigs
and verify they are valid. If DO_BACKSIGS is not defined, fake this as
always valid.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Make parse_signature
non-static so we can parse 0x19s in self-sigs.
* main.h, sig-check.c (check_backsig): Check a 0x19 signature.
(signature_check2): Give a backsig warning if there is no or a bad 0x19
with signatures from a subkey.
which self-sig we actually chose.
* keyedit.c (menu_expire, menu_set_primary_uid, menu_set_preferences): Use
it here to avoid updating non-used self-sigs and possibly promoting an old
self-sig into consideration again.
PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE (set in ./configure).
* getkey.c (get_pubkey): When reading key data into the cache, properly
handle keys that are partially (pk, no UIDs) cached already. This is
Debian bug #176425 and #229549.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Don't bother to check designated revoker
sigs if the key is already revoked.
* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): New "maybe_revoked" flag on
PKs. It is set when there is a revocation signature from a valid
revocation key, but the revocation key is not present to verify the
signature.
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use it here to give a warning when
showing key trust.
* compress-bz2.c: Include stdio.h. Solaris 9 has a very old bzip2 library
and we can at least guarantee that it won't fail because of the lack of
stdio.h.
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
get_seckey_byname2): Disallow use of encrypt-only v3 Elgamal keys for
anything except revocations.
* sign.c (do_sign): Add Elgamal encrypt-only keys to the signature
catchall.
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Disallow signatures to and from
Elgamal encrypt-only keys in the trustdb. Granted, this sounds strange,
but there are historical keys that fit this description.
revocation is generated.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
get_seckey_byname2): Disallow use of sign+encrypt Elgamal keys for
anything except revocations.
* sign.c (do_sign): Catchall for any Elgamal signatures except
revocations.
check_key_signature2): Allow passing NULLs for unused parameters in the x2
form of each function to avoid the need for dummy variables. getkey.c,
mainproc.c: Change all callers.
--with-colons mode. Actually translate "Keyring" string.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have to run a different
hash context for each), but if they are all the same, make an exception.
This is Debian bug #194292.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Make string translatable.
* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Mark real primary uids differently
than assumed primaries.
* keyedit.c (no_primary_warning): Use the differently marked primaries
here in a new function to warn when an --edit-key command might rearrange
the self-sig dates enough to change which uid is primary. (menu_expire,
menu_set_preferences): Use no_primary_warning() here.
* Makefile.am: Use @DLLIBS@ for -ldl.
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, hkp.c, mainproc.c,
parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions
to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but
there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.h, gpgv.c (is_disabled), trustdb.c (is_disabled): Rename to
cache_disabled_value. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to
hit the trustdb more than once.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities),
gpgv.c (is_disabled): is_disabled now takes a pk and not just the keyid.
This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already
have that key handy.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of
PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them.
No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level.
binding packet" a verbose item instead of a !quiet one. There are
too many garbled keys out in the wild.
* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Made "no secret subkey
for" warning a verbose item and translatable.
that the pk selfsigversion member accounts for 1F direct sigs.
* keyring.c (keyring_search): skipfnc didn't work properly with non-keyid
searches. Noted by Stefan Bellon.
(check_key_signature2): Pass the ultimately trusted pk directly to
check_key_signature2 to avoid going through the key selection mechanism.
This prevents a deadly embrace when two keys without selfsigs each sign
the other.
there are no keys to refresh or if there is no keyserver set.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Any valid user ID should make a key
valid, not just the last one. This also fixes Debian bug #174276.
disabled keys. Keys specified via keyid (i.e. 0x...) are always included.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname, get_seckey_byname2, get_seckey_bynames),
keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker): Include disabled keys in these
functions.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Do not include disabled keys for -r or the
key prompt. Do include disabled keys for the default key and
--encrypt-to.
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled): New skipfnc for skipping disabled
keys.
* gpgv.c (is_disabled): Stub.
pkclist.c (algo_available), revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add --pgp8 mode. This
is basically identical to --pgp7 in all ways except that signing subkeys,
v4 data sigs (including expiration), and SK comments are allowed.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Comment.
these facts onto all their subkeys, but only after the subkey has a chance
to be marked valid. This is to fix an incorrect "invalid public key"
error verifying a signature made by a revoked signing subkey, with a valid
unrevoked primary key.
(get_pubkey_fast): this and made extern.
(get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): New.
* import.c (import_one): Use get_pubkey_fast instead of
get_pubkey. We don't need a merged key and actually this might
lead to recursions. --> There is still a problem, though.
(revocation_present): Likewise for search by fingerprint.
* g10.c (main): Try to create the trustdb even for non-colon-mode
list-key operations. This is required because getkey needs to
know whether a a key is ultimately trusted.
function as they may not have all their fields filled in.
* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Use new is_primary flag to check rather
than comparing main_keyid with keyid as this still works in the case of a
not fully filled in pk.
* main.h, sig-check.c (check_revocation_keys): to here. Also return the
signature_check error code rather than 0/1 and cache the sig result.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Divert to check_revocation_keys if a
revocation sig is made by someone other than the pk owner.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Tidy.
even for cached sigs. This also serves to protect against missing a sig
expiring while cached.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Don't check UID self-sigs twice.
chk_self_sigs. This improves efficiency as the same signatures are not
checked multiple times. Clarify when a subkey is revoked (any revocation
signature, even if it is dated before the binding signature).
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Subkey revocation comments.
* keylist.c (list_one): Stats are only for public key listings.
* g10.c (main), options.skel: Default should be include-revoked for
keyserver operations.
(get_user_id_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous
characters. Checked all usages.
(get_user_id_string_native): Renamed to..
(get_user_id_string_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous
characters. Checked all usages.
* keyedit.c (show_basic_key_info): New.
* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): New mode 3.
* import.c (import_one): Use new function to display the user ID.
