* g10/pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Use more specific reasons codes for
INV_RECP.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1650
Note that this patch is a bit more limited than the one in 2.1.
* configure.ac (DOCBOOK_TO_MAN): Remove.
* doc/gpg.ru.sgml: Remove.
* doc/Makefile.am: Remove all gpg.ru related code.
--
The man page is outdated and we do not use docbook for a long time
now. If someone wants to revive such a man page, it would be best to
translate the respective parts of the GnuPG manual in git master.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1652
* g10/compress.c (do_uncompress): Limit the number of extra FF bytes.
--
A packet like (a3 01 5b ff) leads to an infinite loop. Using
--max-output won't help if it is a partial packet. This patch
actually fixes a regression introduced on 1999-05-31 (c34c6769).
Actually it would be sufficient to stuff just one extra 0xff byte.
Given that this problem popped up only after 15 years, I feel safer to
allow for a very few FF bytes.
Thanks to Olivier Levillain and Florian Maury for their detailed
report.
* g10/trustdb.c (clear_ownertrusts): Init trustdb.
--
This is actually a hack to fix a bug introduced with commit 2528178.
Debian uses it and thus we should do too.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1622
* acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_SYS_SYMBOL_UNDERSCORE): Change mingw detection.
--
From: Stephen Kitt <skitt@debian.org>
All MinGW targets require underscores when linking. This patch fixes
acinclude.m4 and the resulting configure so they don't limit the use
of underscores to the old mingw32msvc targets.
Debian-bug-id: 730271
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Move show_session_key code to ...
* g10/decrypt-data.c (decrypt_data): here.
--
This feature can be used to return the session key for just a part of
a file. For example to downloading just the first 32k of a huge file,
decrypting that incomplete part and while ignoring all the errors
break out the session key. The session key may then be used on the
server to decrypt the entire file without the need to have the private
key on the server.
This is the same feature as
commit 101a54add351ff62793cbfbf3877787c4791f833 for 2.1 and
commit 3ae90ff28c500967cb90b1176299d2ca01ef450f for 2.0.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1389
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* checks/Makefile.am: Add a list of test dependencies.
--
We want to keep the tests in a specific order because that helps to
compare tests and some tests rely on others anyway.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher/rsa.c (secret): Normalize the INPUT.
(rsa_decrypt): Pass reduced data to secret.
* cipher/elgamal.c (decrypt): Normalize A and B.
* cipher/dsa.c (sign): Normalize HASH.
--
mpi_normalize is in general not required because extra leading zeroes
do not harm the computation. However, adding extra all zero limbs or
padding with multiples of N may be useful in side-channel attacks. In
particular they are used by the acoustic crypt-analysis. This is an
extra pre-caution which alone would not be sufficient to mitigate the
described attack.
CVE-id: CVE-2013-4576
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher/random.c (randomize_mpi): New.
* g10/gpgv.c (randomize_mpi): New stub.
* cipher/rsa.c (USE_BLINDING): Define macro.
(secret): Implement blinding.
--
GPG 1.x has never used any protection against timing attacks on the
RSA secret operation. The rationale for this has been that there was
no way to mount a remote timing attack on GnuPG. With the turning up
of Acoustic Cryptanalysis (http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic) this
assumption no longer holds true and thus we need to do do something
about it. Blinding seems to be a suitable mitigation to the threat of
key extraction. It does not help against distinguishing used keys,
though.
Note that GPG 2.x uses Libgcrypt which does blinding by default.
The performance penalty is negligible: Modifying the core pubkey_sign
or pubkey_decrypt function to run 100 times in a loop, the entire
execution times for signing or decrypting a small message using a 4K
RSA key on a Thinkpad X220 are
Without blinding: 5.2s (8.9s)
With blinding: 5.6s (9.3s)
The numbers in parentheses give the values without the recently
implemented k-ary exponentiation code. Thus for the next release the
user will actually experience faster signing and decryption. A
drawback of blinding is that we need random numbers even for
decryption (albeit at low quality).
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
CVE-id: CVE-2013-4576
* mpi/mpi-pow.c (USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION): New.
(mul_mod) [!USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION]: New.
(mpi_powm) [!USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION]: New implementation
of left-to-right k-ary exponentiation.
--
This is a backport from Libgcrypt commit
45aa6131e93fac89d46733b3436d960f35fb99b2
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
For the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache side-channel attack, we
changed the code so that it always calls the multiplication
routine (even if we can skip it to get result). This results some
performance regression.
This change is for recovering performance with efficient
algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Add keyid printing.
--
This is backport from GnuPG-2. Note that the --list-packets command
is for debugging only and not part iof the stable API.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Add arg R_NOFILE.
* g10/trustdb.c (trustdb_args): Add field no_trustdb.
(init_trustdb): Set that field.
(revalidation_mark): Take care of a nonexistent trustdb file.
(read_trust_options): Ditto.
(get_ownertrust): Ditto.
(get_min_ownertrust): Ditto.
(update_ownertrust): Ditto.
(update_min_ownertrust): Ditto.
(clear_ownertrusts): Ditto.
(cache_disabled_value): Ditto.
(check_trustdb_stale): Ditto.
(get_validity): Ditto.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Do not create a trustdb with most commands for
trust-model always.
--
This slightly changes the semantics of most commands in that they
won't create a trustdb if --trust-model=always is used. It just does
not make sense to create a trustdb if there is no need for it.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1a0eeaacd1bf09fe5125dbc3f56016bc20f3512e)
Resolved conflicts:
g10/gpg.c
g10/tdbio.h
g10/trustdb.c
(indentation fixes)
* g10/options.h (IMPORT_NO_SECKEY): New.
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn, keyserver_import_cert): Set new
flag.
* g10/import.c (import_secret_one): Deny import if flag is set.
--
By modifying a keyserver or a DNS record to send a secret key, an
attacker could trick a user into signing using a different key and
user id. The trust model should protect against such rogue keys but
we better make sure that secret keys are never received from remote
sources.
Suggested-by: Stefan Tomanek
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7abed3448c1c1a4e756c12f95b665b517d22ebe)
Resolved conflicts:
g10/options.h
* g10/keygen.c (do_add_key_flags): Do not check for empty key flags.
(cherry picked from commit b693ec02c467696bf9d7324dd081e279f9965151)
(cherry picked from commit dd868acb0d13a9f119c0536777350a6c237a66a1)
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE): New.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_key_usage): Set new flag.
--
We do not want to use the default capabilities (derived from the
algorithm) if any key flags are given in a signature. Thus if key
flags are used in any way, the default key capabilities are never
used.
This allows to create a key with key flags set to all zero so it can't
be used. This better reflects common sense.
(cherry picked from commit 4bde12206c5bf199dc6e12a74af8da4558ba41bf)
(cherry picked from commit 0a805ed1604ef3e9b27f3e22a936a2d439300e9f)
Resolved conflicts:
include/cipher.h
* keyserver/gpgkeys_curl.c (main): Set CURLOPT_CAINFO only if a file
has been given.
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (main): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1542
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit e957b9b3f408491f36660499b215aebcf2633a95)
* until/iobuf.c (MAX_NESTING_FILTER): New.
(iobuf_push_filter2): Limit the nesting level.
--
This is a more general fix for the nested compression packet bug. In
particular this helps g10/import.c:read_block to stop pushing
compression filters onto an iobuf stream.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mpi/mpi-internal.h (MPN_COPY_INCR): Make it work.
--
This bug has been with us since the version 0.0.0 of GnuPG.
Fortunately it only affects an optimized code path which is rarely
used in practice: If the shift size matches the size of a
limb (i.e.. 32 or 64); this is is_prime in primegen.c. Over there the
Rabin-Miller test may fail with a probability of 2^-31 (that is if the
to be tested prime - 1 has the low 32 bits cleared). In practice the
probability is even much less because we first do a Fermat test on the
randomly generated candidates which sorts out the majority of
composite numbers.
The bug in MPN_COPY_INCR was found by Sven Bjorn.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(back ported from Libgcrypt
commit 7f7a5ef59962ae1a819b5060f9b781469bfe27d5)
--
Except for a minor change by David Shaw, all code has been written by
me. After termination of my copyright assignment, I change that
notice to reflect the new legal state.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (main): Special case setup_trustdb for --encrypt.
--
(back ported from commit 498b9a95dc65c43240835d64cc92d8fb43014d53)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_ALGO_ECC): New.
* g10/keyid.c (pubkey_letter): Add letter 'C'.
--
ID 22 will be used for generic ECC, i.e. one which can be used for
ECDSA and ECDH. The only support in 1.4 will pretty printing the
algorithm id.
* mpi/mpi-pow.c (mpi_powm): Always perform the mpi_mul for exponents
hold in secure memory.
--
The attack is described in a paper to be pusblished at eprint.iacr.org:
Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel
Attack by Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. 18 July 2013.
Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to
data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the
attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high
resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy
program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a
single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the
attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy
program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of
the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be
used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs
executing in a different VM.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* include/dotlock.h (dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim): New.
(dotlock_destroy, dotlock_remove_lockfiles): Add a flag to reclaim
memory or not.
* util/dotlock.c (dotlock_create): Use
dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim for atexit.
(dotlock_destroy_unix, dotlock_destroy)
(dotlock_remove_lockfiles): Add a reclaim flag.
(dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim): New.
* g10/signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Disable flag of reclaim memory to
avoid non-async-face call.
* g10/keydb.c (maybe_create_keyring): Follow the API change.
* g10/gpgv.c: Follow the API change.
--
signal handler got_fatal_signal should not call non-async-signal-safe
functions. When malloc is interrupted by a signal, it screws up.
This issue is reported:
https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1515http://bugs.debian.org/399904
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (get_key): Use curl_easy_setinfo to get the
HTTP status code so we can tell the difference between a successful
retrieval, a partial retrieval, a not-found, or a server failed.
