* g10/getkey.c (get_best_pubkey_byname): Set new.uid always
to NULL after use.
--
pubkey_cmp is not guranteed to set new.uid.
So if the diff < 0 case is reached best is set to new.
If then diff > 0 is reached without modifying new.uid
e.g. if the key has no matching mboxes. new.uid is
free'd even though the uid is still referenced in
best.
GnuPG-Bug-Id: T4462
(cherry picked from commit e57954ed27)
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_import_wkd): Clear NO_ARMOR.
--
We may even adjust the specs to allow that. It should not be a
problem for any OpenPGP implementation because armored keys are very
common and de-armoring code is de-facto a mandatory feature.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (import): Limit the number of considered keys to 5.
(import_one): Return the first fingerprint in case of WKD.
--
The Web Key Directory should carry only one key. However, some
providers like to put old or expired keys also into the WKD. I don't
thunk that this is a good idea but I heard claims that this is needed
for them to migrate existing key data bases.
This patch puts a limit on 5 on it (we had none right now) and also
fixes the issue that gpg could not work immediately with the requested
key because the code uses the fingerprint of the key to use the
imported key. Now the first key is used. On a second try (w/o
accessing the WKD) the regular key selection mechanism would be in
effect. I think this is the most conservative approach. Let's see
whether it helps.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* dirmngr/domaininfo.c (struct domaininfo_s): Add field keepmark.
(insert_or_update): Implement new update algorithm.
--
The old algorithm limited the length of a bucket chain by purging the
last 50% or the entries. Thus the first domains entered into the
cache were never purged. The new algorithm is a bit better: It also
limits the chain length on overflow to 50% but tries to keep the
entries indicating that a WKD is available in the cache. If there is
still space to keep more, those which clearly do not support WKD are
also kept.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c (send_request): New case for 413.
* dirmngr/ks-engine-http.c (ks_http_fetch): Ditto.
* dirmngr/ocsp.c (do_ocsp_request): Ditto.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/ecdh.c (kek_params_table): Use CIPHER_ALGO_AES192 for
ECC strength 384, according to RFC-6637.
--
Reported-by: Trevor Bentley
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit af3efd149f)
* g10/keygen.c (ask_curve): Change algo ID to ECDSA if it changed from
an EdDSA curve.
--
(cherry picked from commit 4324560b2c)
This change matters when it is called from ask_card_keyattr.
Some-comments-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Add special handling for bad keys in decrypt
mode.
--
The problem can easily be tested by adding --encrypt-to EXPIRED_KEY to
a decryption command. With that patch the errors are printed but
decryption continues and the process returns success unless other
errors occur.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4431
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Call translate_sys2libc_fd_int to
convert the FDs.
--
This is required to actually pass gpgsm an fd on windows
and not a windows handle.
For the passphrase-fd this was already done.
(cherry picked from commit e4e0804ed1)
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Return GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION
instead of invalid packet.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Do not map the unknown version
error to invalid keyring.
(keydb_search): Skip unknown version errors simlar to legacy keys.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Skip keys with unknown
versions.
* g10/import.c (read_block): Handle unknown version.
--
When using gpg 2.3 the local keyring may contain v5 keys. This patch
allows the use of such a keyring also with a 2.2 version which does
not support v5 keys. We will probably need some more tweaking here
but this covers the most common cases of listing keys and also
importing v5 keys.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY): New.
(import): Add attic kludge.
(transfer_secret_keys): Add arg only_marked.
(resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock): Return removed seckeys via new arg
r_removedsecs.
(import_secret_one): New arg r_secattic. Change to take ownership of
arg keyblock. Implement extra secret key import logic. Factor some
code out to ...
(do_transfer): New.
(import_matching_seckeys): New.
--
The PGP desktops exported secret keys are really stupid. And they
even a have kind of exception in rfc4880 which does not rule that
out (section 11.2):
[...] Implementations SHOULD include self-signatures on any user
IDs and subkeys, as this allows for a complete public key to be
automatically extracted from the transferable secret key.
Implementations MAY choose to omit the self-signatures, especially
if a transferable public key accompanies the transferable secret
key.
Now if they would only put the public key before the secret
key. Anyway we now have a workaround for that ugliness.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4392
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5205512fc0)
* g10/keydb.h (struct kbnode_struct): Replace unused field RECNO by
new field TAG.
* g10/kbnode.c (alloc_node): Change accordingly.
* g10/import.c (import_one): Add arg r_valid.
(sec_to_pub_keyblock): Set tags.
(resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock): New.
(import_secret_one): Change return code to gpg_error_t. Return an
error code if sec_to_pub_keyblock failed. Resync secret keyblock.
--
When importing an invalid secret key ring for example without key
binding signatures or no UIDs, gpg used to let gpg-agent store the
secret keys anyway. This is clearly a bug because the diagnostics
before claimed that for example the subkeys have been skipped.
Importing the secret key parameters then anyway is surprising in
particular because a gpg -k does not show the key. After importing
the public key the secret keys suddenly showed up.
This changes the behaviour of
GnuPG-bug-id: 4392
to me more consistent but is not a solution to the actual bug.
Caution: The ecc.scm test now fails because two of the sample keys
don't have binding signatures.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit f799e9728b)
* g10/keyedit.c (show_basic_key_info): New arg 'print_sec'. Remove
useless code for "sub" and "ssb".
* g10/import.c (import_one): Pass FROM_SK to show_basic_key_info. Do
not print the first keyinfo in FROM_SK mode.
printing.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit f64477db86)
* g10/cpr.c (write_status_printf): Escape CR and LF.
* g10/import.c (print_import_check): Simplify by using
write_status_printf and hexfingerprint.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Fixed one conlict in a comment.
* dirmngr/dns.h (dns_quietinit): Remove.
(dns_hints_i_new): Remove.
--
Even before our change, dns_quietinit was questionable macro; There
was no place in dns.c which requires overrides in initializer list.
Only redundant zero were.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit 371ae25f8f)
* dirmngr/dns.h (DNS_OPTS_INIT, dns_opts): Remove.
* dirmngr/dns-stuff.c (libdns_res_open): Use zero-ed, and initialized
automatic variable for opts.
* dirmngr/dns.c (send_query, resolve_query, resolve_addrinfo):
Likewise.
--
In fact, DNS_OPTS_INIT was only needed when args are none. With
partially specified initialization, C99 guarantees zero-ed other
members just like static object.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit d661acd483)
* dirmngr/dns.h (dns_rr_foreach): Don't use dns_rr_i_new.
Call dns_rr_grep with NULL.
* dirmngr/dns.c (dns_rr_grep): Support NULL for error_.
--
Here we still use C99 feature of struct member initialization in
dns_rr_foreach, for struct dns_rr_i. Note that in C99, it guarantees
non-specified member fields are initialized by zero. So, there's no
need to use dns_rr_i_new at all.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit a1ccfe2b37)
* dirmngr/dns.c (dns_inet_pton, dns_so_tcp_keep): Use automatic
variables.
(dns_poll, dns_send_nopipe): Likewise, adding const qualifier.
--
Compound literals is a feature of C99. Because we only use C90 plus
some limited features, in the project, it's better to avoid it.
Besides, we make sure when it's read-only.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1c40549938)
* dirmngr/http.c (same_host_p): Add exception table.
--
Please: Adding entries to this table shall be an exception and not the
rule.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 134c3c1652)
* tools/gpgtar-create.c (gpgtar_create): Switch to the -C directory.
--
The -C option is pretty useful given that pattern are always relative
to the current directory. In contrast to GNU tar, the switching is
done only once.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit b3a7a51407)
* tools/gpgtar.h (struct tarinfo_s): New.
* tools/gpgtar.c (cmd, skip_crypto, files_from, null_names): Move
global vars more to the top.
(set_cmd): Rename 'cmd' to 'c'.
* tools/gpgtar-list.c (parse_header): Add arg 'info' and improve error
messages.
(read_header): Add arg 'info' and update counter.
(skip_data): Ditto.
(gpgtar_list): Pass info object to read functions.
(gpgtar_read_header): Add arg 'info'.
* tools/gpgtar-extract.c (gpgtar_extract): add arg 'info' and pass on.
(extract_regular): Add arg 'info' and update counter.
--
This now prints the block number of a header with error.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 72feb8fa82)
* g10/keylist.c (print_key_line): Print a warning for invalid algos.
--
Non-OpenPGP compliant keys now show a warning flag on the sec or pub
line like in:
gpg: can't encode a 256 bit MD into a 88 bits frame, algo=8
sec cv25519 2019-01-30 [INVALID_ALGO]
4239F3D606A19258E7A88C3F9A3F4F909C5034C5
uid [ultimate] ffffff
Instead of showing the usage flags "[CE]". Without this patch only
the error message is printed and the reason for it was not immediately
obvious (cv25519 is encryption only but we always consider the primary
key as having the "C" flag).
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit db87132b10)
* sm/keylist.c (oidtranstbl): Add Yubikey OIDs.
(OID_FLAG_HEX): New.
(print_hex_extn): New.
(list_cert_raw): Make use of that flag.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86c241a8c9)
* tests/openpgp/defs.scm: Add "disable-scdaemon". Remove
"scdaemon-program".
* tests/gpgme/gpgme-defs.scm, tests/gpgsm/gpgsm-defs.scm: Likewise.
* tests/inittests, tests/pkits/inittests: Add "disable-scdaemon"
--
Before this change, running "make check" accesses USB device by
scdaemon on host computer. If there is any smartcard/token available,
it may affect test results. Because default key choice depends on
smartcard/token availability now and existing tests have nothing about
testing smartcard/token, disabling scdaemon is good.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64b7c6fd19)
* scd/app-openpgp.c (do_setattr): Add new table item to flush a
different tag.
--
For whatever reasons the OpenPGP card reads the 3 CA fingerprints from
one object but sets them individually using 3 different tags. The
cache flushing was not prepared for this and so a changed CA
fingerprint showed only up after a card reset. This patch fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9f4c1f0de)
Fixed conflict by removing the UIF-* entries from the table.
* doc/gpgv.texi: Improve documentation for keyring choices
--
From the existing documentation, it's not clear whether the default
keyring will always be mixed into the set of keyrings, or whether it
will be skipped if a --keyring is present. The updated text here
attempts to describe the keyring selection logic more completely.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* sm/keylist.c (print_compliance_flags): Also check the digest_algo.
Add new arg 'cert'.
--
A certificate with algorithm sha1WithRSAEncryption can be de-vs
compliant (e.g. if the next in the chain used sha256WithRSAEncryption
to sign it and RSA is long enough) but flagging it as such is useless
because that certificate can't be used because it will create
signatures using the non-compliant SHA-1 algorithm.
Well, it could be used for encryption. But also evaluating the
key-usage flags here would make it harder for the user to understand
why certain certificates are listed as de-vs compliant and others are
not.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2c75af9f65)
Reworked to also pass the CERT. Note that 2.2 won't get the PK
Screening feature.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* doc/gpgsm.texi, doc/howto-create-a-server-cert.texi: : update
default to 3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen-ui.c (gpgsm_gencertreq_tty): update default to
3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen.c (proc_parameters): update default to 3072 bits.
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): print correct default_pubkey_algo.
--
3072-bit RSA is widely considered to be 128-bit-equivalent security.
This is a sensible default in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Gbp-Pq: Topic update-defaults
Gbp-Pq: Name 0014-gpgsm-default-to-3072-bit-keys.patch
(cherry picked from commit 7955262151)
