* agent/agent.h (server_control_s): Add field 'client_uid'.
* agent/call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Add uid field to assuan
option "owner" sent to pinentry.
* agent/command-ssh.c (peer_info_s): New static struct.
(get_client_pid): Rename to...
(get_client_info): Here, and extract uid in addition to pid.
(start_command_handler_ssh): Use get_client_info() instead of
get_client_pid().
* agent/command.c (start_command_handler): Try assuan_get_peercred,
and only fall back to assuan_get_pid when assuan_get_peercred fails.
--
This also requires an update to pinentry to handle the new uid field.
Distributing the uid as well as the pid makes it harder for a
different user on the same machine to take advantage of any race
conditions between when a requesting process might ask for something
that needs pinentry, and when pinentry gets around to inspecting the
state of that process.
We put the uid before the nodename because the uid is guaranteed to be
a integer (represented in decimal), which makes it much simpler to
parse past than the potentially arbitrarily structured nodename.
Use a / instead of whitespace to delimit pid/uid at Werner's request.
If we were willing to depend on the nodename being
whitespace-delimited (as the current, unreleased pinentry code does),
then we could add the uid after the nodename. But since no released
pinentry depends on this option anyway, i think we should make the
more conservative, easily-parseable choice and put the user ID first.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/pkclist.c (find_and_check_key): Call get_validity on a specific
keyblock.
--
When we have multiple keyrings, get_validity after
get_best_pubkey_byname should access same keyring. Or else, the
situation of an expired key in keyring A but valid key in keyring B
causes SEGV.
Thanks to Guido Günther for the use case and the log.
Debian-bug-id: 878812
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/keydb.c (keydb_handle): New field 'keep_lock'.
(keydb_release): Clear that flag.
(keydb_lock): New function.
(unlock_all): Skip if KEEP_LOCK is set.
* g10/getkey.c (get_keyblock_byfprint_fast): Call keep_lock if
requested.
--
That change is straightforward. It helps to avoid the race condition
that another gpg process inserts a key while the first process is
between the search and the insert.
A similar change is due for gpgsm.
Note that the key edit operations may still suffer from a race.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3446
* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): Factor most code out to ...
(get_keyblock_byfprint_fast): .. new function.
* g10/import.c (revocation_present): s/int rc/gpg_error_t err/.
(import_one): Use get_keyblock_byfprint_fast to get the keyblock and a
handle. Remove the now surplus keyblock fetch in the merge branch.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (import_keys_internal): Return gpg_error_t instead of
int. Change var names.
(import_keys_es_stream): Ditto.
(import_one): Ditto. Use a single keydb_new and simplify the use of
of keydb_release.
--
Note that this opens a keydb handle before we call
get_pubkey_byfprint_fast which internally uses another key db handle.
A further patch will cleanup this double use. Note that we also
disable the keydb caching for the insert case.
The s/int/gpg_error_t/ has been done while checking the call chains of
the import functions and making sure that gpg_err_code is always used.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/tofu.c (build_conflict_set): Do not assume MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN
is the size of the fingerprint.
--
This problem was exhibited by
commit ecbbafb88d.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/pkscreening.c: New.
* common/pkscreening.h: New.
* common/Makefile.am (common_sources): Add them.
* g10/gpg.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening.
* g10/options.h (struct opt): New field with_key_screening.
* g10/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h.
(print_pk_screening): New.
(list_keyblock_print): Call it.
(print_compliance_flags): Call it.
* sm/gpgsm.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening.
* sm/gpgsm.h (scruct opt): New field with_key_screening.
* sm/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h.
(print_pk_screening): New.
(print_compliance_flags): Call it. Add new arg cert.
(list_cert_colon): Pass arg cert
(list_cert_std): Call print_pk_screening.
* sm/fingerprint.c (gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus): New.
--
This new option can be used to detect ROCA affected keys. To scan an
entire keyring and print the affected fingerprints use this:
gpg -k --with-key-screening --with-colons | gawk -F: \
'$1~/pub|sub|sec|ssb|crt/ && $18~/\<6001\>/ {found=1;next};
$1=="fpr" && found {print $10}; {found=0}'
The same works for gpgsm. Note that we need gawk due to the "\<" in
the r.e.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
It seems people are using --list-sigs instead of --check-sigs and do
not realize that the signatures are not checked at all. We better
highlight the use of --check-sigs to avoid this UI problem.
Suggested-by: Andrew Gallagher
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/card-util.c (change_cafpr): Use MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN.
* g10/cipher.c (write_header): Use snprintf.
* g10/gpg.h (MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN): Change to 32.
(MAX_FORMATTED_FINGERPRINT_LEN): Change to 59
* g10/keyid.c (format_hexfingerprint): Add v5 fingerprint format.
* g10/tofu.c (get_policy): Use MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN for the buffer but
keep the raw length for now.
--
Note that this patch only increases the size of the buffer and adds a
new formatting for v5 fingerprints. Moe work is required to fix
internal data structures like those in trustdb.gpg and the tofu
tables.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* configure.ac (ENABLE_LOG_CLOCK): New ac_define and option.
* common/logging.c (log_clock): Use ENABLE_LOG_CLOCK to enable
timestamp printing.
* g10/call-agent.c (agent_pksign): Time signing.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_end_simple): Time verification.
--
Timing for verification is limited to data signatures because this is
the most common thing to evaluate. We should consider to change
log_clock to printf style so that we could print the signature class
and other info.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* agent/call-scd.c (cancel_inquire): Remove.
(agent_card_pksign, agent_card_pkdecrypt, agent_card_writekey)
(agent_card_scd): Don't call cancel_inquire.
--
Since libassuan 2.1.0, cancellation command "CAN" is handled within
the library, by assuan_transact. So, cancel_inquire just caused
spurious "CAN" command to scdaemon which resulted an error.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* common/gettime.c (isotime_p): Accept the Z suffix.
--
The intention is use for human interface.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3278
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* common/exechelp-posix.c (gnupg_wait_processes): Loop for r_exitcodes
even if we already see an error.
--
The value stored by waitpid for exit code is encoded; It requires
decoded by WEXITSTATUS macro, regardless of an error.
For example, when one of processes is already exited and another is
still running, it resulted wrong value of in r_exitcodes[n].
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* dirmngr/certcache.c (any_cert_of_class): New var.
(put_cert): Set it.
(cert_cache_deinit): Clear it.
(cert_cache_any_in_class): New func.
* dirmngr/http-ntbtls.c (gnupg_http_tls_verify_cb): Add hack to
override empty list of HKP certs.
--
This patch carries the changes for GNUTLS from commit
7c1613d415 over to NTBTLS. NTBTLS works
quite different and thus we need to do it this way.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tools/wks-util.c (list_key_status_cb): Rename to key_status_cb.
(wks_filter_uid): New.
(wks_list_key): Allow FPR to be NULL. Return an error if no
fingerprint was found.
* tools/gpg-wks-server.c (process_new_key)
(check_and_publish): Remove now useless extra check for FPR.
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (command_check): Ditto.
(command_send): Filter out the newest uid.
--
This fixes the case of having several userids with all the the same
mailbox. Now we use the latest user id created. This patch is also a
prerequisite to automatically create a new user id for providers with
the mailbox-only policy.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpgv.c (main): Call gnupg_initialize_compliance.
--
The compliance checker needs to be initialize so that it won't let
spit out a "not suitable" message. We use the module name of gpg.
Because there is no option to change the compliance mode in gpgv we
will always be in the default (CO_GNUPG) mode. It also does not make
much sense to have it here because gpgv expects a "curated" keyring.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3404
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (command_send): Allow sending in draft-1
mode.
--
Obviously Posteo did not implement the current draft and thus it was
not possible to send a request to them. This hack uses the old method
for posteo.de. Not sending it encrypted is okay here because they use
authenticated sending anyway.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* doc/Makefile.am: Move qualified.txt into examples.
* doc/qualified.txt: Move into examples, remove trailing spaces.
* doc/examples/README: Document qualified.txt.
* doc/gpgsm.texi: Move qualified.txt from datadir into sysconfdir.
* sm/qualified.c (read_list): Move qualified.txt from datadir into
sysconfdir.
--
The qualified.txt is maintained by Administrator it is a configuration
file. In the past it was a hybrid, provided by package and controlled
by the Administrator, however, it is no longer maintained by package.
Signed-off-by: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
* tests/openpgp/quick-key-manipulation.scm: Fix expiration time
comparison.
--
This is a bug fix for Amelia Earhart who is probably in UTC-12.
When expiration date is specified, GnuPG interprets it as noon of the
date in local time.
Before this fix, the test compared the value by 2145916800 which is
2038-01-01 00:00:00 in UTC with allowance of 1 day. When the test
was ran in UTC-12 timezone, it failed because of noon in the timezone
is midnight of the next day in UTC.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3393
Reported-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Special case the email only
case.
--
Using a parameter file like
%ask-passphrase
key-type: RSA
key-length: 2048
key-usage: sign
subkey-type: RSA
subkey-length: 2048
subkey-usage: encrypt
name-email: foo@example.org
with "gpg --gen-key --patch" the result was this key
pub rsa2048 2017-09-11 [SC]
63A8C1BA12CC289A0E8072C971C7F8D4A18CE0BE
uid [ultimate] <foo@example.org>
sub rsa2048 2017-09-11 [E]
At least the the extra leading space the left angle bracket is wrong.
Further some mail providers reject keys which consist of more than
just a plain mail address. Using just a mail address is anyway the
new new suggested content for a user id. With this patch the key
will be
pub rsa2048 2017-09-11 [SC]
B302343C20EA6DECDB6A155135352F2520397080
uid [ultimate] foo@example.org
sub rsa2048 2017-09-11 [E]
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO): Prefer AES256 by default.
--
It's 2017, and pretty much everyone has AES-256 available. Symmetric
crypto is also rarely the bottleneck (asymmetric crypto is much more
expensive). AES-256 provides some level of protection against
large-scale decryption efforts, and longer key lengths provide a hedge
against unforseen cryptanalysis.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* agent/command.c (hlp_genkey): update help text to suggest the use of
3072 bits.
* doc/wks.texi: Make example match default generation.
* g10/keygen.c (DEFAULT_STD_KEY_PARAM): update to
rsa3072/cert,sign+rsa3072/encr, and fix neighboring comment,
(gen_rsa, get_keysize_range): update default from 2048 to 3072).
* g10/keyid.c (pubkey_string): update comment so that first example
is the default 3072-bit RSA.
--
3072-bit RSA is widely considered to be 128-bit-equivalent security.
This is a sensible default in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Gbp-Pq: Topic update-defaults
Gbp-Pq: Name 0015-gpg-default-to-3072-bit-RSA-keys.patch
* doc/gpgsm.texi, doc/howto-create-a-server-cert.texi: : update
default to 3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen-ui.c (gpgsm_gencertreq_tty): update default to
3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen.c (proc_parameters): update default to 3072 bits.
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): print correct default_pubkey_algo.
--
3072-bit RSA is widely considered to be 128-bit-equivalent security.
This is a sensible default in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Gbp-Pq: Topic update-defaults
Gbp-Pq: Name 0014-gpgsm-default-to-3072-bit-keys.patch
* tests/openpgp/quick-key-manipulation.scm: Fix expiration time
comparison.
--
This is a bug fix for Amelia Earhart who is probably in UTC-12.
When expiration date is specified, GnuPG interprets it as noon of the
date in local time.
Before this fix, the test compared the value by 2145916800 which is
2038-01-01 00:00:00 in UTC with allowance of 1 day. When the test
was ran in UTC-12 timezone, it failed because of noon in the timezone
is midnight of the next day in UTC.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3393
Reported-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
