* sm/gpgsm.h (FIND_CERT_ALLOW_AMBIG): New.
(FIND_CERT_WITH_EPHEM): New.
* sm/certlist.c (gpgsm_find_cert): Replace arg allow_ambiguous by a
generic flags arg. Implement the new flag FIND_CERT_WITH_EPHEM.
* sm/call-dirmngr.c (inq_certificate): Return also ephemeral marked
certs.
--
The dirmngr may need to get a certificate from gpgsm's store in the
course of verifying a CRL. In some cases the certificate is still
marked as epehemeral - this needs to be returned as well.
This _may_ also fix
GnuPG-bug-id: 4436
* sm/certchain.c (find_up): Get rid of the legacy return code -1 and
chnage var name rc to err.
(gpgsm_walk_cert_chain): Change var name rc to err.
(do_validate_chain): Get rid of the legacy return code -1.
* sm/keydb.c (keydb_search): Replace return code -1 by
GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND.
(keydb_set_cert_flags): Replace return code -1 by GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND.
* sm/certchain.c (find_up_search_by_keyid): Ditto.
(find_up_external, find_up, find_up_dirmngr): Ditto.
(gpgsm_walk_cert_chain): Ditto.
(get_regtp_ca_info): Ditto.
* sm/certlist.c (gpgsm_add_to_certlist): Ditto.
(gpgsm_find_cert): Ditto.
* sm/delete.c (delete_one): Ditto.
* sm/export.c (gpgsm_export): Ditto.
(gpgsm_p12_export): Ditto.
* sm/import.c (gpgsm_import_files): Ditto.
* sm/keylist.c (list_cert_colon): Ditto.
(list_internal_keys): Ditto.
* sm/sign.c (add_certificate_list): Ditto.
--
This bug was detected while fixing
GnuPG-bug-id: 4757
Backported-from-master: 473b83d1b9efe51fcca68708580597dddf3f50b7
Some extra code has been taken from
commit ed6ebb696e4063dc664d7ee74fc492025881c459
* sm/certlist.c (cert_usage_p): Allow keyAgreement for ECC.
* sm/fingerprint.c (gpgsm_is_ecc_key): New.
--
For ECC encryption keys keyAgreement is the keyUsage we want.
GnuPG-bug-id: 6253
* sm/gpgsm.c (oCompatibilityFlags): New option.
(compatibility_flags): new.
(main): Parse and print them in verbose mode.
* sm/gpgsm.h (opt): Add field compat_glags.:
(COMPAT_ALLOW_KA_TO_ENCR): New.
* sm/keylist.c (print_capabilities): Take care of the new flag.
* sm/certlist.c (cert_usage_p): Ditto.
* common/miscellaneous.c (parse_compatibility_flags): New.
* common/util.h (struct compatibility_flags_s): New.
--
Backported-from-master: f0b373cec93bb01f02b9c0a3ab1f3e242b381c3f
Backported-from-master: ce63eaa4f8f3f41aafcaddd8d658dacd522334a8
* sm/certlist.c (cert_usage_p): Add arg 'silent' and change all
callers.
(gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p): Add arg 'silent' and pass to cert_usage_p.
Change all callers.
* sm/sign.c (gpgsm_get_default_cert): Set SILENT when calling
gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4535
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sm/certlist.c (gpgsm_find_cert): Add arg allow_ambiguous and use it.
* sm/call-dirmngr.c (inq_certificate): Pass true to ALLOW_AMBIGUOUS
(run_command_inq_cb): Ditto.
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Pass false.
* sm/server.c (cmd_passwd): Pass false.
--
As described in my report T1644, it is possible that multiple
certificates exist with the same Distinguished Name and the same key.
In this case, verifying S/MIME signatures and other actions fail with
"certificate not found: Ambiguous name". For details see the bug
report.
To circumvent the problem, I am patching GnuPG since 2014 so that in
this case the newest of the ambiguous certificates is used.
This is not an ultimate solution of the problem: You should try every
certificate with the same DN until verification succeeds or until all
certificates fail, and if multiple certificates of a chain are
ambiguous you even have to check every combination. You may even
consider checking the keyUsage attributes of the ambiguous certificates
to reduce the number of combinations.
But in the existing case of the certificates in the German Research
Network (DFN) PKI where the newest one is the valid one and all
ambiguous certificates have the same keyUsage attributes, this patch
has proven to be sufficient over the last three years.
With every GnuPG update, I have adapted the patch, luckily I never
needed to change anything except line numbers.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1644
ChangeLog log written by wk, comment taken from mail. Signed-off line
was missing in the plain diff. However the mail with the patch and
the DCO posted as reply to that mail were both signed.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Make ANY_REGISTERED
file-global. Write a STATUS_ERROR.
(maybe_create_keyring_or_box): Check for non-accessible but existant
file.
(keydb_search): Write a STATUS_ERROR if no keyring has been registered
but continue to return NOT_FOUND.
* sm/keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Rename ANY_PUBLIC to ANY_REGISTERED
and make file-global. Write a STATUS_ERROR.
(keydb_search): Write a STATUS_ERROR if no keyring has been registered
but continue to return NOT_FOUND. Also add new arg CTRL and change
all callers to pass it down.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sm/gpgsm.h (VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED): New.
* sm/gpgsm.c (gpgsm_parse_validation_model): Add model "steed".
* sm/server.c (option_handler): Allow validation model "steed".
* sm/certlist.c (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key): New.
* sm/certchain.c (do_validate_chain): Handle the
well-known-private-key attribute. Support the "steed" model.
(gpgsm_validate_chain): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Return "steed" in the trust status line.
* sm/keylist.c (list_cert_colon): Print the new 'w' flag.
--
This is the first part of changes to implement the STEED proposal as
described at http://g10code.com/steed.html . The idea for X.509 is
not to use plain self-signed certificates but certificates signed by a
dummy CA (i.e. one for which the private key is known). Having a
single CA as an indication for the use of STEED might help other X.509
implementations to implement STEED.
Since 2009-12-08 gpg was not able to find email addresses indicated
by a leading '<'. This happened when I merged the user id
classification code of gpgsm and gpg.
We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces. In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much. For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.
sm/
* call-dirmngr.c (inq_certificate): Add new inquire SENDCERT_SKI.
* certlist.c (gpgsm_find_cert): Add new arg KEYID and implement
this filter. Changed all callers.
* certchain.c (find_up_search_by_keyid): New helper.
(find_up): Also try using the AKI.keyIdentifier.
(find_up_external): Ditto.
(gpgsm_agent_genkey, gpgsm_agent_istrusted)
(gpgsm_agent_marktrusted, gpgsm_agent_havekey)
(gpgsm_agent_passwd): Add new arg CTRL and changed all callers.
(start_agent): New arg CTRL. Send progress item when starting a
new agent.
* sign.c (gpgsm_get_default_cert, get_default_signer): New arg
CTRL to be passed down to the agent function.
* decrypt.c (prepare_decryption): Ditto.
* certreqgen.c (proc_parameters, read_parameters): Ditto.
* certcheck.c (gpgsm_create_cms_signature): Ditto.
* certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain) <gpgsm_cert_use_cer_p>: Do
not just warn if a cert is not suitable; bail out immediately.
* call-dirmngr.c (isvalid_status_cb): New.
(unhexify_fpr): New. Taken from ../g10/call-agent.c
(gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid): Add new arg CTRL, changed caller to pass
it thru. Detect need to check the respondert cert and do that.
* certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Add new arg FLAGS. Changed
all callers.
* keylist.c (list_cert_std): Print MD5 fpr.
* gpgsm.c: New options --with-validation.
* server.c (option_handler): New option "with-validation".
* keylist.c (list_cert_std, list_internal_keys): New args CTRL and
WITH_VALIDATION. Changed callers to set it.
(list_external_cb, list_external_keys): Pass CTRL to the callback.
(list_cert_colon): Add arg CTRL. Check validation if requested.
* certchain.c (unknown_criticals, allowed_ca, check_cert_policy)
(gpgsm_validate_chain): New args LISTMODE and FP.
(do_list): New helper for info output.
(find_up): New arg FIND_NEXT.
(gpgsm_validate_chain): After a bad signature try again with other
CA certificates.
* import.c (print_imported_status): New arg NEW_CERT. Print
additional STATUS_IMPORT_OK becuase that is what gpgme expects.
(check_and_store): Always call above function after import.
* server.c (get_status_string): Added STATUS_IMPORT_OK.
(cmd_encrypt): Add all enrypt-to marked certs to the list.
* encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Check that real recipients are
available.
* gpgsm.c (main): Make the --encrypt-to and --no-encrypt-to
options work. Pass the list of recients to gpgsm_server.
* gpgsm.h (certlist_s): Add field IS_ENCRYPT_TO.
(opt): Add NO_ENCRYPT_TO.
* certlist.c (gpgsm_add_to_certlist): New arg IS_ENCRYPT_TO.
Changed all callers and ignore duplicate entries.
(is_cert_in_certlist): New.
(gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist): New.
certificate with the required key usage.
* gpgsm.c (main): Fixed a segv when using --outfile without an
argument.
* keylist.c (print_capabilities): Also check for non-repudiation
and data encipherment.
* certlist.c (cert_usage_p): Test for signing and encryption was
swapped. Add a case for certification usage, handle
non-repudiation and data encipherment.
(gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p): New.
(gpgsm_add_to_certlist): Added a CTRL argument and changed all
callers to pass it.
* certpath.c (gpgsm_validate_path): Use it here to print a status
message. Added a CTRL argument and changed all callers to pass it.
* decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Print a status message for wrong key
usage.
* verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Ditto.
* keydb.c (classify_user_id): Allow a colon delimited fingerprint.
