revocation is generated.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
get_seckey_byname2): Disallow use of sign+encrypt Elgamal keys for
anything except revocations.
* sign.c (do_sign): Catchall for any Elgamal signatures except
revocations.
--quiet is set. Suggested by Duncan Harris. Also don't fail with BUG()
when processing a --symmetric message with a cipher we don't have.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Revert last change. There are too many side
effects for stable.
* g10.c (main): Add read-only warning.
* compress.c (compress_filter): Make static to help force the use of
push_compress_filter. Remove default algorithm setting since that is done
in push_compress_filter now.
* main.h: Use named algorithm.
* filter.h, compress.c (push_compress_filter, push_compress_filter2): New.
Figure out which is the appropriate compression filter to use, and push it
into place.
* compress.c (handle_compressed), encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt),
sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), import.c (read_block), export.c
(do_export): Use push_compress_filter instead of pushing the compression
filter ourselves.
* compress-bz2.c: New. Bzlib versions of the compression filter routines.
* Makefile.am: Include compress-bz2.c if bz2lib is available.
difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we
don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual
list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error
if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a
mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting
via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate
when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a
passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
* encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically
encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather
than --cipher-algo. This code is never actually called in stable, but
better to fix it here in case we branch in the future.
* parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Call it a "symmetrically encrypted
session key" since "session key decryption key" is just baffling. Neaten
--list-packets output.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless
--quiet is set.
--encrypt-files (plus --verify-files, --decrypt-files).
* encode.c (use_mdc), g10.c (main): Use RFC1991 and RFC2440 directly to
check for MDC usability. Do not set the force_mdc or disable_mdc flags
since there is no point any longer.
explain the roundrobin a bit better.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2), import.c (import_one,
import_revoke_cert, chk_self_sigs, delete_inv_parts, collapse_uids,
merge_blocks): Make much quieter during import of slightly munged, but
recoverable, keys. Use log_error for unrecoverable import failures.
* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Making a v3 signature with notations or
policy urls is an error, not an info (i.e. increment the errorcount).
Don't print the notation or policy url to stdout since it can be mixed
into the output stream when piping and munge the stream.
Provide a signing-key-is-revoked flag. Change all callers.
* status.h, status.c (get_status_string): New REVKEYSIG status tag for a
good signature from a revoked key.
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig, check_sig_and_print): Use it here.
* import.c (import_revoke_cert, merge_blocks, merge_sigs): Compare actual
signatures on import rather than using keyid or class matching. This does
not change actual behavior with a key, but does mean that all sigs are
imported whether they will be used or not.
check_key_signature2): Allow passing NULLs for unused parameters in the x2
form of each function to avoid the need for dummy variables. getkey.c,
mainproc.c: Change all callers.
the primary key if the key making the signature is the primary key.
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the
unhashed signature cache any longer.
and signer's primary fingerprint (%p).
* tdbio.h, tdbio.c (create_version_record, tdbio_write_nextcheck,
tdbio_read_record, tdbio_write_record): Force a 0 into the trust_model
field. This is to help smooth the 1.2->1.4 switchover, as otherwise a 1.4
trustdb could be rebuilt as classic on 1.2 while still claiming to be a
non-classic trust model.
question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace
selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them.
There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181.
* g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months,
they won't be the same thing.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not allow signing a user ID without a
self-signature. --expert overrides.
* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.
* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired
uids do not count in the web of trust.
listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This
is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0.
* signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use
sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have
struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define
only the function call half of the two pairs by default.
(pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and
sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG,
and if we can't, fail with an explanation.
