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gpg: Avoid importing secret keys if the keyblock is not valid.

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* g10/keydb.h (struct kbnode_struct): Replace unused field RECNO by
new field TAG.
* g10/kbnode.c (alloc_node): Change accordingly.
* g10/import.c (import_one): Add arg r_valid.
(sec_to_pub_keyblock): Set tags.
(resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock): New.
(import_secret_one): Change return code to gpg_error_t.   Return an
error code if sec_to_pub_keyblock failed.  Resync secret keyblock.
--

When importing an invalid secret key ring for example without key
binding signatures or no UIDs, gpg used to let gpg-agent store the
secret keys anyway.  This is clearly a bug because the diagnostics
before claimed that for example the subkeys have been skipped.
Importing the secret key parameters then anyway is surprising in
particular because a gpg -k does not show the key.  After importing
the public key the secret keys suddenly showed up.

This changes the behaviour of
GnuPG-bug-id: 4392
to me more consistent but is not a solution to the actual bug.

Caution: The ecc.scm test now fails because two of the sample keys
         don't have binding signatures.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2019-03-15 19:50:37 +01:00
parent 8c20a363c2
commit f799e9728b
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
6 changed files with 112 additions and 31 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

122
g10/import.c
View File

@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ static gpg_error_t import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
unsigned int options, int from_sk, int silent,
import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
int origin, const char *url);
static int import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
int origin, const char *url, int *r_valid);
static gpg_error_t import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch,
unsigned int options, int for_migration,
import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg);
@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ import (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct import_stats_s *stats,
if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
rc = import_one (ctrl, keyblock,
stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0, 0,
screener, screener_arg, origin, url);
screener, screener_arg, origin, url, NULL);
else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
rc = import_secret_one (ctrl, keyblock, stats,
opt.batch, options, 0,
@ -1667,7 +1667,9 @@ update_key_origin (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 curtime, int origin, const char *url)
* programs which called gpg. If SILENT is no messages are printed -
* even most error messages are suppressed. ORIGIN is the origin of
* the key (0 for unknown) and URL the corresponding URL. FROM_SK
* indicates that the key has been made from a secret key.
* indicates that the key has been made from a secret key. If R_SAVED
* is not NULL a boolean will be stored indicating whether the keyblock
* has valid parts.
*/
static gpg_error_t
import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
@ -1675,7 +1677,7 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options,
int from_sk, int silent,
import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
int origin, const char *url)
int origin, const char *url, int *r_valid)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk;
@ -1694,6 +1696,9 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
int any_filter = 0;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
if (r_valid)
*r_valid = 0;
/* If show-only is active we don't won't any extra output. */
if ((options & (IMPORT_SHOW | IMPORT_DRY_RUN)))
silent = 1;
@ -1714,7 +1719,7 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
if (opt.verbose && !opt.interactive && !silent && !from_sk)
{
/* Note that we do not print this info in FROM_SK mode
* because import_one already printed that. */
* because import_secret_one already printed that. */
log_info ("pub %s/%s %s ",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
@ -1849,6 +1854,10 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
return 0;
}
/* The keyblock is valid and ready for real import. */
if (r_valid)
*r_valid = 1;
/* Show the key in the form it is merged or inserted. We skip this
* if "import-export" is also active without --armor or the output
* file has explicily been given. */
@ -2463,14 +2472,21 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats,
/* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it.
Returns a new node or NULL on error. */
* Returns a new node or NULL on error. Modifies the tag field of the
* nodes. */
static kbnode_t
sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
{
kbnode_t pub_keyblock = NULL;
kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
kbnode_t secnode, pubnode;
unsigned int tag = 0;
/* Set a tag to all nodes. */
for (secnode = sec_keyblock; secnode; secnode = secnode->next)
secnode->tag = ++tag;
/* Copy. */
while ((secnode = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
{
if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
@ -2500,6 +2516,7 @@ sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
{
pubnode = clone_kbnode (secnode);
}
pubnode->tag = secnode->tag;
if (!pub_keyblock)
pub_keyblock = pubnode;
@ -2510,23 +2527,67 @@ sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
return pub_keyblock;
}
/* Delete all notes in the keyblock at R_KEYBLOCK which are not in
* PUB_KEYBLOCK. Modifies the tags of both keyblock's nodes. */
static gpg_error_t
resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, kbnode_t pub_keyblock)
{
kbnode_t sec_keyblock = *r_keyblock;
kbnode_t node;
unsigned int *taglist;
unsigned int ntaglist, n;
/* Collect all tags in an array for faster searching. */
for (ntaglist = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
ntaglist++;
taglist = xtrycalloc (ntaglist, sizeof *taglist);
if (!taglist)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
for (ntaglist = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
taglist[ntaglist++] = node->tag;
/* Walks over the secret keyblock and delete all nodes which are not
* in the tag list. Those nodes have been delete in the
* pub_keyblock. Sequential search is a bit lazt and could be
* optimized by sorting and bsearch; however secret key rings are
* short and there are easier weaus to DoS gpg. */
for (node = sec_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
for (n=0; n < ntaglist; n++)
if (taglist[n] == node->tag)
break;
if (n == ntaglist)
delete_kbnode (node);
}
xfree (taglist);
/* Commit the as deleted marked nodes and return the possibly
* modified keyblock. */
commit_kbnode (&sec_keyblock);
*r_keyblock = sec_keyblock;
return 0;
}
/****************
* Ditto for secret keys. Handling is simpler than for public keys.
* We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
* that a secret key can not be imported accidentally and thereby tampering
* with the trust calculation.
*/
static int
static gpg_error_t
import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch, unsigned int options,
int for_migration,
struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch,
unsigned int options, int for_migration,
import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
struct seckey_info *ski;
kbnode_t node, uidnode;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int nr_prev;
kbnode_t pub_keyblock;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
@ -2550,7 +2611,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
if (opt.verbose && !for_migration)
{
log_info ("sec %s/%s %s ",
log_info ("sec %s/%s %s ",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));
if (uidnode)
@ -2610,20 +2671,35 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
/* Make a public key out of the key. */
pub_keyblock = sec_to_pub_keyblock (keyblock);
if (!pub_keyblock)
log_error ("key %s: failed to create public key from secret key\n",
keystr_from_pk (pk));
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("key %s: failed to create public key from secret key\n",
keystr_from_pk (pk));
}
else
{
int valid;
/* Note that this outputs an IMPORT_OK status message for the
public key block, and below we will output another one for
the secret keys. FIXME? */
import_one (ctrl, pub_keyblock, stats,
NULL, NULL, options, 1, for_migration,
screener, screener_arg, 0, NULL);
screener, screener_arg, 0, NULL, &valid);
/* Fixme: We should check for an invalid keyblock and
cancel the secret key import in this case. */
release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
/* The secret keyblock may not have nodes which are deleted in
* the public keyblock. Otherwise we would import just the
* secret key without having the public key. That would be
* surprising and clutters out private-keys-v1.d. */
err = resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock (&keyblock, pub_keyblock);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (!valid)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
/* At least we cancel the secret key import when the public key
import was skipped due to MERGE_ONLY option and a new
@ -2631,7 +2707,8 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
if (!(opt.dry_run || (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN))
&& stats->skipped_new_keys <= nr_prev)
{
/* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge. */
/* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge for
* the public key. */
/* Fixme: we should do this based on the fingerprint or
even better let import_one return the merged
keyblock. */
@ -2641,8 +2718,6 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
keystr_from_pk (pk));
else
{
gpg_error_t err;
/* transfer_secret_keys collects subkey stats. */
struct import_stats_s subkey_stats = {0};
@ -2680,6 +2755,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, status);
check_prefs (ctrl, node);
}
release_kbnode (node);
@ -2687,7 +2763,9 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
}
}
return rc;
leave:
release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
return err;
}

2
g10/kbnode.c
View File

@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ alloc_node (void)
n->next = NULL;
n->pkt = NULL;
n->flag = 0;
n->tag = 0;
n->private_flag=0;
n->recno = 0;
return n;
}

13
g10/keydb.h
View File

@ -52,12 +52,13 @@ typedef struct getkey_ctx_s *getkey_ctx_t;
* This structure is also used to bind arbitrary packets together.
*/
struct kbnode_struct {
KBNODE next;
PACKET *pkt;
int flag;
int private_flag;
ulong recno; /* used while updating the trustdb */
struct kbnode_struct
{
kbnode_t next;
PACKET *pkt;
int flag; /* Local use during keyblock processing (not cloned).*/
unsigned int tag; /* Ditto. */
int private_flag;
};
#define is_deleted_kbnode(a) ((a)->private_flag & 1)

2
g10/pubkey-enc.c
View File

@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ get_session_key (ctrl_t ctrl, struct pubkey_enc_list *list, DEK *dek)
* - On-card keys of an active card
* - On-disk keys with protection
* - On-card keys from cards which are not plugged it. Here a
* cancel-all button should stop aksing for other cards.
* cancel-all button should stop asking for other cards.
* Without any anonymous keys the sorting can be skipped.
*/
for (k = list; k; k = k->next)

2
tests/openpgp/ecc.scm
View File

@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Rg==
(display "This is one line\n" (fdopen fd "wb")))
(for-each-p
"Checking ECDSA decryption"
"Checking ECDH decryption"
(lambda (test)
(lettmp (x y)
(call-with-output-file

2
tests/openpgp/samplekeys/README
View File

@ -29,3 +29,5 @@ Notes:
such a file is created which is then directly followed by a separate
armored public key block. To create such a sample concatenate
pgp-desktop-skr.asc and E657FB607BB4F21C90BB6651BC067AF28BC90111.asc
- ecc-sample-2-sec.asc and ecc-sample-3-sec.asc do not have and
binding signatures either. ecc-sample-1-sec.asc has them, though.