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Ported patches from 1.4.x
This commit is contained in:
parent
91a4be3126
commit
f081ad529d
@ -1,3 +1,63 @@
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2006-06-27 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
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Applied patches from 1.4.x (2006-05-22 to 2006-06-23) from David:
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* keygen.c (keygen_upd_std_prefs, keygen_add_std_prefs)
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(proc_parameter_file): Add --default-keyserver-url to specify a
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keyserver URL at key generation time, and "Keyserver:" keyword for
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doing the same through a batch file.
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* options.h, gpg.c (main): Ditto.
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* sign.c (do_sign): For now don't accept a truncated hash even
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for DSA1 keys (be liberal in what you accept, etc).
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* import.c (import_one): Add a flag (from_sk) so we don't check
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prefs on an autoconverted public key. The check should only
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happen on the sk side. Noted by Dirk Traulsen.
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* keygen.c (gen_card_key): Add optional argument to return a
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pointer (not a copy) of the stub secret key for the secret key we
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just generated on the card.
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(generate_card_subkeypair): Use it here so that the signing key on
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the card can use the card to generate the 0x19 backsig on the
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primary key. Noted by Janko Heilgeist and Jonas Oberg.
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* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Cap the user ID size at 2048
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bytes. This prevents a memory allocation attack with a very large
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user ID. A very large packet length could even cause the
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allocation (a u32) to wrap around to a small number. Noted by
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Evgeny Legerov on full-disclosure.
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* keygen.c (gen_dsa): Allow generating DSA2 keys. Allow
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specifying sizes > 1024 when --enable-dsa2 is set. The size of q
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is set automatically based on the key size.
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(ask_keysize, generate_keypair): Ask for DSA size when
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--enable-dsa2 is set.
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* exec.c (make_tempdir) [W32]: Fix bug with a temporary directory
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on W32 that is over 256 bytes long. Noted by Israel G. Lugo.
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* gpg.c (reopen_std): New function to reopen fd 0, 1, or 2 if we
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are called with them closed. This is to protect our
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keyring/trustdb files from corruption if they get attached to one
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of the standard fds. Print a warning if possible that this has
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happened, and fail completely if we cannot reopen (should never
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happen).
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(main): Call it here.
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* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_signature): Fix meaning
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of key expiration and sig expiration subpackets - zero means
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"never expire" according to 2440, not "expire instantly".
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* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Ditto.
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* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main)
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(merge_selfsigs_subkey): Ditto.
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* keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Ditto.
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* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname)
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* import.c (import_one): Fix key selection problem when
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auto-key-locate returns a list of keys, not all of which are
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usable (revoked, expired, etc). Noted by Simon Josefsson.
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2006-05-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
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* keyid.c (hash_public_key): Do not double hash the length bytes,
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@ -841,7 +841,8 @@ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig )
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if(sig->expiredate>sig->timestamp)
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u=sig->expiredate-sig->timestamp;
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else
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u=0;
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u=1; /* A 1-second expiration time is the shortest one
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OpenPGP has */
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buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
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buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
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@ -127,8 +127,11 @@ static int make_tempdir(struct exec_info *info)
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if(tmp==NULL)
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{
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#if defined (_WIN32)
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tmp=xmalloc(256);
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if(GetTempPath(256,tmp)==0)
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int err;
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tmp=xmalloc(MAX_PATH+2);
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err=GetTempPath(MAX_PATH+1,tmp);
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if(err==0 || err>MAX_PATH+1)
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strcpy(tmp,"c:\\windows\\temp");
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else
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{
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16
g10/getkey.c
16
g10/getkey.c
@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ get_pubkey_byname (PKT_public_key *pk,
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for(akl=opt.auto_key_locate;akl;akl=akl->next)
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{
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unsigned char *fpr;
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unsigned char *fpr=NULL;
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size_t fpr_len;
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switch(akl->type)
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@ -1507,12 +1507,12 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
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/* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
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uid->help_key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
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/* ditto or the key expiration */
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uid->help_key_expire = 0;
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/* ditto for the key expiration */
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p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
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if ( p ) {
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uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
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}
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if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
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uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
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else
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uid->help_key_expire = 0;
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/* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
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* of them to only have one in our keyblock */
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@ -1724,7 +1724,7 @@ merge_selfsigs_main(KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked, struct revoke_info *rinfo)
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key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
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p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
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if ( p )
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if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
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{
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key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
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key_expire_seen = 1;
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@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
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subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
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p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
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if ( p )
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if ( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
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key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
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else
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key_expire = 0;
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89
g10/gpg.c
89
g10/gpg.c
@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
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oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
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oPreservePermissions,
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oDefaultPreferenceList,
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oDefaultKeyserverURL,
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oPersonalCipherPreferences,
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oPersonalDigestPreferences,
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oPersonalCompressPreferences,
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@ -659,6 +660,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
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{ aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", 256, "@"},
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{ oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", 0, "@"},
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{ oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", 2, "@"},
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{ oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", 2, "@"},
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{ oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences", 2, "@"},
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{ oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences", 2, "@"},
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{ oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-preferences", 2, "@"},
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@ -1643,6 +1645,78 @@ parse_trust_model(const char *model)
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log_error("unknown trust model `%s'\n",model);
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}
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/* Make sure that the standard file descriptors are opened. Obviously
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some folks close them before an exec and the next file we open will
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get one of them assigned and thus any output (i.e. diagnostics) end
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up in that file (e.g. the trustdb). Not actually a gpg problem as
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this will hapenn with almost all utilities when called in a wrong
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way. However we try to minimize the damage here and raise
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awareness of the problem.
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Must be called before we open any files! */
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static void
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reopen_std(void)
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{
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#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM)
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struct stat statbuf;
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int did_stdin=0,did_stdout=0,did_stderr=0;
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FILE *complain;
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if(fstat(STDIN_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
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{
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if(open("/dev/null",O_RDONLY)==STDIN_FILENO)
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did_stdin=1;
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else
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did_stdin=2;
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}
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if(fstat(STDOUT_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
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{
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if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDOUT_FILENO)
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did_stdout=1;
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else
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did_stdout=2;
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}
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if(fstat(STDERR_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
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{
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if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDERR_FILENO)
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did_stderr=1;
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else
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did_stderr=2;
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}
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/* It's hard to log this sort of thing since the filehandle we would
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complain to may be closed... */
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if(did_stderr==0)
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complain=stderr;
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else if(did_stdout==0)
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complain=stdout;
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else
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complain=NULL;
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if(complain)
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{
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if(did_stdin==1)
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fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard input reopened\n");
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if(did_stdout==1)
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fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard output reopened\n");
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if(did_stderr==1)
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fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard error reopened\n");
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if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
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fprintf(complain,"gpg: fatal: unable to reopen standard input,"
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" output, or error\n");
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}
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if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
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exit(3);
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#endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_W32_SYSTEM */
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}
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int
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main (int argc, char **argv )
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{
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@ -1697,7 +1771,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
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/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
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when adding any stuff between here and the call to
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secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
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reopen_std ();
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trap_unaligned();
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set_strusage (my_strusage);
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
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@ -2586,6 +2660,19 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
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case oDefaultPreferenceList:
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opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
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break;
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case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
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{
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struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
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keyserver=parse_keyserver_uri(pargs.r.ret_str,1,
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configname,configlineno);
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if(!keyserver)
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log_error(_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
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else
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free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
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opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
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}
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break;
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case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
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pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
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break;
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34
g10/import.c
34
g10/import.c
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root );
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static void revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock);
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static int import_one(const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,struct stats_s *stats,
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unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
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unsigned int options);
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unsigned int options,int from_sk);
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static int import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
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struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options);
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static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node,
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@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
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while( !(rc = read_block( inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock) )) {
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if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
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rc = import_one( fname, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options );
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rc = import_one( fname, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0);
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else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
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rc = import_secret_one( fname, keyblock, stats, options );
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else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
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@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ check_prefs(KBNODE keyblock)
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*/
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static int
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import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
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unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options )
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unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options,
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int from_sk )
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{
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PKT_public_key *pk;
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PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
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@ -698,9 +699,6 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
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pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
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if(fpr)
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*fpr=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,NULL,fpr_len);
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keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
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uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
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@ -978,13 +976,31 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
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if(mod_key)
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{
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revocation_present(keyblock_orig);
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if(seckey_available(keyid)==0)
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if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
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check_prefs(keyblock_orig);
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}
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else if(new_key)
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{
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/* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
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when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
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fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
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asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
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name). However, in cases where we're importing more than
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one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
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In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not fingerpring
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at all, and we must hope the user ID on the keys are
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useful. */
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if(fpr)
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{
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xfree(*fpr);
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if(stats->imported==1)
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*fpr=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,NULL,fpr_len);
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else
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*fpr=NULL;
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}
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revocation_present(keyblock);
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if(seckey_available(keyid)==0)
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if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
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check_prefs(keyblock);
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}
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@ -1156,7 +1172,7 @@ import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
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if(pub_keyblock)
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{
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import_one(fname,pub_keyblock,stats,
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NULL,NULL,opt.import_options);
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NULL,NULL,opt.import_options,1);
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release_kbnode(pub_keyblock);
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}
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}
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123
g10/keygen.c
123
g10/keygen.c
@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
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#include "trustdb.h"
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#include "status.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "keyserver-internal.h"
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#include "call-agent.h"
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@ -69,7 +70,8 @@ enum para_name {
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pPASSPHRASE_S2K,
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pSERIALNO,
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pBACKUPENCDIR,
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pHANDLE
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pHANDLE,
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pKEYSERVER
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};
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struct para_data_s {
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@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ static void do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
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static int write_keyblock( IOBUF out, KBNODE node );
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static int gen_card_key (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
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KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
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PKT_secret_key **ret_sk,
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u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para);
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static int gen_card_key_with_backup (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
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KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
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@ -224,7 +227,7 @@ keygen_add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
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if(pk->expiredate > pk->timestamp)
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u= pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp;
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else
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u= 0;
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u= 1;
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buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
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buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
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@ -657,6 +660,7 @@ keygen_upd_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
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/* Make sure that the MDC feature flag is set if needed */
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add_feature_mdc (sig,mdc_available);
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add_keyserver_modify (sig,ks_modify);
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keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -675,6 +679,7 @@ keygen_add_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
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do_add_key_flags (sig, pk->pubkey_usage);
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keygen_add_key_expire( sig, opaque );
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keygen_upd_std_prefs (sig, opaque);
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keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -684,6 +689,9 @@ keygen_add_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque)
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{
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const char *url=opaque;
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if(!url)
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url=opt.def_keyserver_url;
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if(url)
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build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,url,strlen(url));
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else
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@ -940,7 +948,6 @@ write_selfsigs( KBNODE sec_root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
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return rc;
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}
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/* sub_sk is currently unused (reserved for backsigs) */
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static int
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write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root,
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PKT_secret_key *pri_sk, PKT_secret_key *sub_sk,
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@ -1224,20 +1231,54 @@ gen_dsa (unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
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PKT_public_key *pk;
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gcry_sexp_t s_parms, s_key;
|
||||
gcry_sexp_t misc_key_info;
|
||||
unsigned int qbits;
|
||||
|
||||
if( nbits > 1024 || nbits < 512 ) {
|
||||
if ( nbits < 512 || (!opt.flags.dsa2 && nbits > 1024))
|
||||
{
|
||||
nbits = 1024;
|
||||
log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if ( nbits > 3072 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
nbits = 3072;
|
||||
log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( (nbits % 64) ) {
|
||||
if( (nbits % 64) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
nbits = ((nbits + 63) / 64) * 64;
|
||||
log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
Figure out a q size based on the key size. FIPS 180-3 says:
|
||||
|
||||
L = 1024, N = 160
|
||||
L = 2048, N = 224
|
||||
L = 2048, N = 256
|
||||
L = 3072, N = 256
|
||||
|
||||
2048/256 is an odd pair since there is also a 2048/224 and
|
||||
3072/256. Matching sizes is not a very exact science.
|
||||
|
||||
We'll do 256 qbits for nbits over 2048, 224 for nbits over 1024
|
||||
but less than 2048, and 160 for 1024 (DSA1).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if (nbits > 2048)
|
||||
qbits = 256;
|
||||
else if ( nbits > 1024)
|
||||
qbits = 224;
|
||||
else
|
||||
qbits = 160;
|
||||
|
||||
if (qbits != 160 )
|
||||
log_info (_("WARNING: some OpenPGP programs can't"
|
||||
" handle a DSA key with this digest size\n"));
|
||||
|
||||
rc = gcry_sexp_build (&s_parms, NULL,
|
||||
"(genkey(dsa(nbits %d)))",
|
||||
(int)nbits);
|
||||
"(genkey(dsa(nbits %d)(qbits %d)))",
|
||||
(int)nbits, (int)qbits);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
log_bug ("gcry_sexp_build failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1253,9 +1294,8 @@ gen_dsa (unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
|
||||
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
|
||||
sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp = make_timestamp();
|
||||
sk->version = pk->version = 4;
|
||||
if( expireval ) {
|
||||
sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (expireval)
|
||||
sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
|
||||
sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = key_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, "public-key", "pqgy");
|
||||
@ -1633,10 +1673,10 @@ ask_keysize( int algo )
|
||||
switch(algo)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
|
||||
if(opt.expert)
|
||||
if(opt.flags.dsa2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
def=1024;
|
||||
max=1024;
|
||||
max=3072;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -2375,6 +2415,25 @@ proc_parameter_file( struct para_data_s *para, const char *fname,
|
||||
/* Set preferences, if any. */
|
||||
keygen_set_std_prefs(get_parameter_value( para, pPREFERENCES ), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set keyserver, if any. */
|
||||
s1=get_parameter_value( para, pKEYSERVER );
|
||||
if(s1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
|
||||
|
||||
spec=parse_keyserver_uri(s1,1,NULL,0);
|
||||
if(spec)
|
||||
{
|
||||
free_keyserver_spec(spec);
|
||||
opt.def_keyserver_url=s1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_error("%s:%d: invalid keyserver url\n", fname, r->lnr );
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set revoker, if any. */
|
||||
if (parse_revocation_key (fname, para, pREVOKER))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@ -2467,6 +2526,7 @@ read_parameter_file( const char *fname )
|
||||
{ "Preferences", pPREFERENCES },
|
||||
{ "Revoker", pREVOKER },
|
||||
{ "Handle", pHANDLE },
|
||||
{ "Keyserver", pKEYSERVER },
|
||||
{ NULL, 0 }
|
||||
};
|
||||
IOBUF fp;
|
||||
@ -2746,12 +2806,12 @@ generate_keypair (const char *fname, const char *card_serialno,
|
||||
sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA );
|
||||
r->next = para;
|
||||
para = r;
|
||||
tty_printf(_("DSA keypair will have %u bits.\n"),1024);
|
||||
r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
|
||||
r->key = pKEYLENGTH;
|
||||
strcpy( r->u.value, "1024" );
|
||||
r->next = para;
|
||||
para = r;
|
||||
nbits = ask_keysize( PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA );
|
||||
r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
|
||||
r->key = pKEYLENGTH;
|
||||
sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", nbits);
|
||||
r->next = para;
|
||||
para = r;
|
||||
r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
|
||||
r->key = pKEYUSAGE;
|
||||
strcpy( r->u.value, "sign" );
|
||||
@ -2791,7 +2851,7 @@ generate_keypair (const char *fname, const char *card_serialno,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
nbits = ask_keysize( algo );
|
||||
r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
|
||||
r->key = both? pSUBKEYLENGTH : pKEYLENGTH;
|
||||
@ -3057,7 +3117,7 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 1, 1, pub_root, sec_root,
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 1, 1, pub_root, sec_root, NULL,
|
||||
get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -3093,7 +3153,7 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!rc && card && get_parameter (para, pAUTHKEYTYPE))
|
||||
{
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 3, 0, pub_root, sec_root,
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 3, 0, pub_root, sec_root, NULL,
|
||||
get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
@ -3129,6 +3189,7 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 2, 0, pub_root, sec_root,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3353,7 +3414,7 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = do_create( algo, nbits, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
|
||||
dek, s2k, &sub_sk, expire, 1 );
|
||||
dek, s2k, &sub_sk, expire, 1 );
|
||||
if( !rc )
|
||||
rc = write_keybinding(pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
|
||||
if( !rc )
|
||||
@ -3387,7 +3448,7 @@ generate_card_subkeypair (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int okay=0, rc=0;
|
||||
KBNODE node;
|
||||
PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL;
|
||||
PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk;
|
||||
int algo;
|
||||
unsigned int use;
|
||||
u32 expire;
|
||||
@ -3467,11 +3528,12 @@ generate_card_subkeypair (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
|
||||
|
||||
if (passphrase)
|
||||
set_next_passphrase (passphrase);
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (algo, keyno, 0, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock, expire, para);
|
||||
rc = gen_card_key (algo, keyno, 0, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
|
||||
&sub_sk, expire, para);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = write_keybinding (pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, NULL, use);
|
||||
rc = write_keybinding (pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = write_keybinding (sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, NULL, use);
|
||||
rc = write_keybinding (sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
okay = 1;
|
||||
@ -3518,7 +3580,7 @@ write_keyblock( IOBUF out, KBNODE node )
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
gen_card_key (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
|
||||
KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
|
||||
KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk,
|
||||
u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
|
||||
@ -3579,6 +3641,9 @@ gen_card_key (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
|
||||
sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ret_sk )
|
||||
*ret_sk = sk;
|
||||
|
||||
pkt = xcalloc (1,sizeof *pkt);
|
||||
pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
||||
pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
|
||||
|
@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ struct
|
||||
unsigned int export_options;
|
||||
unsigned int list_options;
|
||||
unsigned int verify_options;
|
||||
char *def_preference_list;
|
||||
const char *def_preference_list;
|
||||
const char *def_keyserver_url;
|
||||
prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
|
||||
prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
|
||||
prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
|
||||
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
/* parse-packet.c - read packets
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
|
||||
* 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
|
||||
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@ -876,8 +876,13 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
|
||||
if( length >= 4 )
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
|
||||
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
|
||||
{
|
||||
if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
|
||||
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
|
||||
else
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
|
||||
if( length )
|
||||
@ -901,8 +906,13 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
|
||||
if( length >= 4 )
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
|
||||
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
|
||||
{
|
||||
if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
|
||||
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
|
||||
else
|
||||
fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
|
||||
fputs("pref-sym-algos:", listfp );
|
||||
@ -1408,7 +1418,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
|
||||
log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");
|
||||
|
||||
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL);
|
||||
if(p)
|
||||
if(p && buffer_to_u32(p))
|
||||
sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+buffer_to_u32(p);
|
||||
if(sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate<=make_timestamp())
|
||||
sig->flags.expired=1;
|
||||
@ -2027,6 +2037,20 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
|
||||
{
|
||||
byte *p;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
|
||||
that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
|
||||
as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
|
||||
avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be
|
||||
allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
|
||||
allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (pktlen > 2048)
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
|
||||
iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
|
||||
return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
|
||||
packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
|
||||
packet->pkt.user_id->ref=1;
|
||||
|
@ -320,6 +320,12 @@ do_sign( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if 0 /* disabled *.
|
||||
/* Disabled for now. It seems reasonable to accept a
|
||||
truncated hash for a DSA1 key, even though we don't
|
||||
generate it without --enable-dsa2. Be liberal in what you
|
||||
accept, etc. */
|
||||
|
||||
/* If it's a DSA key, and q is 160 bits, it might be an
|
||||
old-style DSA key. If the hash doesn't match the q, fail
|
||||
unless --enable-dsa2 is set. If the q isn't 160 bits, then
|
||||
@ -333,6 +339,7 @@ do_sign( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig,
|
||||
log_error(_("DSA requires the use of a 160 bit hash algorithm\n"));
|
||||
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* disabled */
|
||||
|
||||
frame = encode_md_value( NULL, sk, md, digest_algo );
|
||||
if (!frame)
|
||||
@ -1539,7 +1546,7 @@ update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a
|
||||
duration of 0) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
|
||||
duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
|
||||
detects this case. */
|
||||
|
||||
if( sig->version >= 4 )
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user