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Ported patches from 1.4.x

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
parent 91a4be3126
commit f081ad529d
10 changed files with 323 additions and 59 deletions
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38
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* parse-packet.c - read packets
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
* 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -876,8 +876,13 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
if( length >= 4 )
fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
{
if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
else
fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
if( length )
@ -901,8 +906,13 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
if( length >= 4 )
fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
{
if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
else
fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
fputs("pref-sym-algos:", listfp );
@ -1408,7 +1418,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL);
if(p)
if(p && buffer_to_u32(p))
sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+buffer_to_u32(p);
if(sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate<=make_timestamp())
sig->flags.expired=1;
@ -2027,6 +2037,20 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
/* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be
allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
if (pktlen > 2048)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
packet->pkt.user_id->ref=1;