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Ported patches from 1.4.x

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
parent 91a4be3126
commit f081ad529d
10 changed files with 323 additions and 59 deletions
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89
g10/gpg.c
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@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
oPreservePermissions,
oDefaultPreferenceList,
oDefaultKeyserverURL,
oPersonalCipherPreferences,
oPersonalDigestPreferences,
oPersonalCompressPreferences,
@ -659,6 +660,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
{ aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", 256, "@"},
{ oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", 0, "@"},
{ oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", 2, "@"},
{ oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", 2, "@"},
{ oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences", 2, "@"},
{ oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences", 2, "@"},
{ oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-preferences", 2, "@"},
@ -1643,6 +1645,78 @@ parse_trust_model(const char *model)
log_error("unknown trust model `%s'\n",model);
}
/* Make sure that the standard file descriptors are opened. Obviously
some folks close them before an exec and the next file we open will
get one of them assigned and thus any output (i.e. diagnostics) end
up in that file (e.g. the trustdb). Not actually a gpg problem as
this will hapenn with almost all utilities when called in a wrong
way. However we try to minimize the damage here and raise
awareness of the problem.
Must be called before we open any files! */
static void
reopen_std(void)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM)
struct stat statbuf;
int did_stdin=0,did_stdout=0,did_stderr=0;
FILE *complain;
if(fstat(STDIN_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
{
if(open("/dev/null",O_RDONLY)==STDIN_FILENO)
did_stdin=1;
else
did_stdin=2;
}
if(fstat(STDOUT_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
{
if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDOUT_FILENO)
did_stdout=1;
else
did_stdout=2;
}
if(fstat(STDERR_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
{
if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDERR_FILENO)
did_stderr=1;
else
did_stderr=2;
}
/* It's hard to log this sort of thing since the filehandle we would
complain to may be closed... */
if(did_stderr==0)
complain=stderr;
else if(did_stdout==0)
complain=stdout;
else
complain=NULL;
if(complain)
{
if(did_stdin==1)
fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard input reopened\n");
if(did_stdout==1)
fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard output reopened\n");
if(did_stderr==1)
fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard error reopened\n");
if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
fprintf(complain,"gpg: fatal: unable to reopen standard input,"
" output, or error\n");
}
if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
exit(3);
#endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_W32_SYSTEM */
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv )
{
@ -1697,7 +1771,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
when adding any stuff between here and the call to
secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
reopen_std ();
trap_unaligned();
set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
@ -2586,6 +2660,19 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
case oDefaultPreferenceList:
opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
{
struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
keyserver=parse_keyserver_uri(pargs.r.ret_str,1,
configname,configlineno);
if(!keyserver)
log_error(_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
else
free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
}
break;
case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
break;