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Minor fixes

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2002-08-09 18:13:24 +00:00
parent 850a4d5214
commit ebaf7d6e45
7 changed files with 60 additions and 29 deletions
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12
agent/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
2002-07-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg-agent.c (main): New option --ignore-cache-for-signing.
* command.c (option_handler): New server option
use-cache-for-signing defaulting to true.
(cmd_pksign): handle global and per session option.
* findkey.c (agent_key_from_file, unprotect): New arg
ignore_cache. Changed all callers.
* pksign.c (agent_pksign): Likewise.
2002-06-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* query.c (start_pinentry): Use GNUPG_DERAULT_PINENTRY.
@ -25,7 +35,7 @@
(import_p12_file): Store the new file if requested.
(main): New options --force and --store.
* gpg-agent.c (main): Set a global flag when runing detached.
* gpg-agent.c (main): Set a global flag when running detached.
* query.c (start_pinentry): Pass the list of FD to keep in the
child when not running detached.
* call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto.

6
agent/agent.h
View File

@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct {
int running_detached; /* we are running detached from the tty. */
int ignore_cache_for_signing;
} opt;
@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ void start_command_handler (int, int);
int agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
const void *buffer, size_t length, int force);
GCRY_SEXP agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip,
unsigned char **shadow_info);
unsigned char **shadow_info, int ignore_cache);
int agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip);
/*-- query.c --*/
@ -133,7 +135,7 @@ void agent_unlock_cache_entry (void **cache_id);
/*-- pksign.c --*/
int agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp);
int agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp, int ignore_cache);
/*-- pkdecrypt.c --*/
int agent_pkdecrypt (CTRL ctrl, const char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,

14
agent/command.c
View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
struct server_local_s {
ASSUAN_CONTEXT assuan_ctx;
int message_fd;
int use_cache_for_signing;
};
@ -286,9 +287,15 @@ static int
cmd_pksign (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, char *line)
{
int rc;
int ignore_cache = 0;
CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, assuan_get_data_fp (ctx));
if (opt.ignore_cache_for_signing)
ignore_cache = 1;
else if (!ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing)
ignore_cache = 1;
rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, assuan_get_data_fp (ctx), ignore_cache);
if (rc)
log_error ("command pksign failed: %s\n", gnupg_strerror (rc));
return map_to_assuan_status (rc);
@ -516,7 +523,7 @@ cmd_learn (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, char *line)
static int
option_handler (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
{
/* CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); */
CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
/* FIXME: We should not change opt. here. It is not a problem right
now but as soon as we are allowing concurrent connections we mess
@ -561,6 +568,8 @@ option_handler (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
if (!opt.lc_messages)
return ASSUAN_Out_Of_Core;
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "use-cache-for-signing"))
ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = *value? atoi (value) : 0;
else
return ASSUAN_Invalid_Option;
@ -656,6 +665,7 @@ start_command_handler (int listen_fd, int fd)
ctrl.server_local = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl.server_local);
ctrl.server_local->assuan_ctx = ctx;
ctrl.server_local->message_fd = -1;
ctrl.server_local->use_cache_for_signing = 1;
if (DBG_ASSUAN)
assuan_set_log_stream (ctx, log_get_stream ());

13
agent/findkey.c
View File

@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the
cahing mechanism. */
static int
unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip, int ignore_cache)
{
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi;
struct try_unprotect_arg_s arg;
@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
/* first try to get it from the cache - if there is none or we can't
unprotect it, we fall back to ask the user */
if (!ignore_cache)
{
void *cache_marker;
const char *pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, &cache_marker);
@ -173,10 +174,12 @@ unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp after locating it using the grip.
Returns NULL if key is not available or the operation should be
diverted to a token. In the latter case shadow_info will point to
an allocated S-Expression with the shadow_info part from the
file. */
an allocated S-Expression with the shadow_info part from the file.
With IGNORE_CACHE passed as true the passphrase is not taken from
the cache.*/
GCRY_SEXP
agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info)
agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info,
int ignore_cache)
{
int i, rc;
char *fname;
@ -249,7 +252,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info)
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
break; /* no unprotection needed */
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
rc = unprotect (&buf, grip);
rc = unprotect (&buf, grip, ignore_cache);
if (rc)
log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
gnupg_strerror (rc));

6
agent/gpg-agent.c
View File

@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
oDefCacheTTL,
oDisablePth,
oIgnoreCacheForSigning,
aTest };
@ -113,6 +115,8 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
{ oScdaemonProgram, "scdaemon-program", 2 , "path to SCdaemon program" },
{ oDefCacheTTL, "default-cache-ttl", 4,
"|N|expire cached PINs after N seconds"},
{ oIgnoreCacheForSigning, "ignore-cache-for-signing", 0,
"do not use the PIN cache when signing"},
{0}
};
@ -407,6 +411,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
case oScdaemonProgram: opt.scdaemon_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDefCacheTTL: opt.def_cache_ttl = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
case oIgnoreCacheForSigning: opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 1; break;
default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break;
}
}

2
agent/pkdecrypt.c
View File

@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ agent_pkdecrypt (CTRL ctrl, const char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,
log_printhex ("keygrip:", ctrl->keygrip, 20);
log_printhex ("cipher: ", ciphertext, ciphertextlen);
}
s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info);
s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, 0);
if (!s_skey && !shadow_info)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");

4
agent/pksign.c
View File

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ do_encode_md (const unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int algo,
/* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and write it
back to OUTFP. */
int
agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp)
agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp, int ignore_cache)
{
GCRY_SEXP s_skey = NULL, s_hash = NULL, s_sig = NULL;
GCRY_MPI frame = NULL;
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp)
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
return seterr (No_Secret_Key);
s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info);
s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, ignore_cache);
if (!s_skey && !shadow_info)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");