Minor fixes

agent/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+2002-07-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* gpg-agent.c (main): New option --ignore-cache-for-signing.
+	* command.c (option_handler): New server option
+	use-cache-for-signing defaulting to true.
+	(cmd_pksign): handle global and per session option.
+	* findkey.c (agent_key_from_file, unprotect): New arg
+	ignore_cache.  Changed all callers.
+	* pksign.c (agent_pksign): Likewise.
+
 2002-06-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* query.c (start_pinentry): Use GNUPG_DERAULT_PINENTRY.
@@ -25,7 +35,7 @@
 	(import_p12_file): Store the new file if requested.
 	(main): New options --force and --store.
 
-	* gpg-agent.c (main): Set a global flag when runing detached.
+	* gpg-agent.c (main): Set a global flag when running detached.
 	* query.c (start_pinentry): Pass the list of FD to keep in the
 	child when not running detached.
 	* call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto.

agent/agent.h

@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct {
 
   int running_detached; /* we are running detached from the tty. */
 
+  int ignore_cache_for_signing;
+
 } opt;
 
 
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ void start_command_handler (int, int);
 int agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
                              const void *buffer, size_t length, int force);
 GCRY_SEXP agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip,
-                               unsigned char **shadow_info);
+                               unsigned char **shadow_info, int ignore_cache);
 int agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip);
 
 /*-- query.c --*/
@@ -133,7 +135,7 @@ void agent_unlock_cache_entry (void **cache_id);
 
 
 /*-- pksign.c --*/
-int agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp);
+int agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp, int ignore_cache);
 
 /*-- pkdecrypt.c --*/
 int agent_pkdecrypt (CTRL ctrl, const char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,

agent/command.c

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 struct server_local_s {
   ASSUAN_CONTEXT assuan_ctx;
   int message_fd;
+  int use_cache_for_signing;
 };
 
 
@@ -286,9 +287,15 @@ static int
 cmd_pksign (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, char *line)
 {
   int rc;
+  int ignore_cache = 0;
   CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
 
-  rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, assuan_get_data_fp (ctx));
+  if (opt.ignore_cache_for_signing)
+    ignore_cache = 1;
+  else if (!ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing)
+    ignore_cache = 1;
+
+  rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, assuan_get_data_fp (ctx), ignore_cache);
   if (rc)
     log_error ("command pksign failed: %s\n", gnupg_strerror (rc));
   return map_to_assuan_status (rc);
@@ -516,7 +523,7 @@ cmd_learn (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, char *line)
 static int
 option_handler (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
 {
-/*    CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); */
+   CTRL ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
 
   /* FIXME: We should not change opt. here.  It is not a problem right
      now but as soon as we are allowing concurrent connections we mess
@@ -561,6 +568,8 @@ option_handler (ASSUAN_CONTEXT ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
       if (!opt.lc_messages)
         return ASSUAN_Out_Of_Core;
     }
+  else if (!strcmp (key, "use-cache-for-signing"))
+    ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = *value? atoi (value) : 0;
   else
     return ASSUAN_Invalid_Option;
 
@@ -656,6 +665,7 @@ start_command_handler (int listen_fd, int fd)
   ctrl.server_local = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl.server_local);
   ctrl.server_local->assuan_ctx = ctx;
   ctrl.server_local->message_fd = -1;
+  ctrl.server_local->use_cache_for_signing = 1;
 
   if (DBG_ASSUAN)
     assuan_set_log_stream (ctx, log_get_stream ());

agent/findkey.c

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
    should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the
    cahing mechanism. */
 static int
-unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
+unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip, int ignore_cache)
 {
   struct pin_entry_info_s *pi;
   struct try_unprotect_arg_s arg;
@@ -129,22 +129,23 @@ unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
 
   /* first try to get it from the cache - if there is none or we can't
      unprotect it, we fall back to ask the user */
-  {
+  if (!ignore_cache)
-    void *cache_marker;
+    {
-    const char *pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, &cache_marker);
+      void *cache_marker;
-    if (pw)
+      const char *pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, &cache_marker);
-      {
+      if (pw)
-        rc = agent_unprotect (*keybuf, pw, &result, &resultlen);
+        {
-        agent_unlock_cache_entry (&cache_marker);
+          rc = agent_unprotect (*keybuf, pw, &result, &resultlen);
-        if (!rc)
+          agent_unlock_cache_entry (&cache_marker);
-          {
+          if (!rc)
-            xfree (*keybuf);
+            {
-            *keybuf = result;
+              xfree (*keybuf);
-            return 0;
+              *keybuf = result;
-          }
+              return 0;
-        rc  = 0;
+            }
-      }
+          rc  = 0;
-  }
+        }
+    }
   
   pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + 100);
   pi->max_length = 100;
@@ -173,10 +174,12 @@ unprotect (unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip)
 /* Return the secret key as an S-Exp after locating it using the grip.
    Returns NULL if key is not available or the operation should be
    diverted to a token.  In the latter case shadow_info will point to
-   an allocated S-Expression with the shadow_info part from the
+   an allocated S-Expression with the shadow_info part from the file.
-   file. */
+   With IGNORE_CACHE passed as true the passphrase is not taken from
+   the cache.*/
 GCRY_SEXP
-agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info)
+agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info,
+                     int ignore_cache)
 {
   int i, rc;
   char *fname;
@@ -249,7 +252,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info)
     case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
       break; /* no unprotection needed */
     case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
-      rc = unprotect (&buf, grip);
+      rc = unprotect (&buf, grip, ignore_cache);
       if (rc)
         log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
                    gnupg_strerror (rc));

agent/gpg-agent.c

@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
   oDefCacheTTL,
   oDisablePth,
 
+  oIgnoreCacheForSigning,
+
 aTest };
 
 
@@ -113,6 +115,8 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
   { oScdaemonProgram, "scdaemon-program", 2 , "path to SCdaemon program" },
   { oDefCacheTTL, "default-cache-ttl", 4,
                                  "|N|expire cached PINs after N seconds"},
+  { oIgnoreCacheForSigning, "ignore-cache-for-signing", 0,
+                                 "do not use the PIN cache when signing"},
 
   {0}
 };
@@ -407,6 +411,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
         case oScdaemonProgram: opt.scdaemon_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
         case oDefCacheTTL: opt.def_cache_ttl = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
 
+        case oIgnoreCacheForSigning: opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 1; break;
+
         default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break;
 	}
     }

agent/pkdecrypt.c

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ agent_pkdecrypt (CTRL ctrl, const char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,
       log_printhex ("keygrip:", ctrl->keygrip, 20);
       log_printhex ("cipher: ", ciphertext, ciphertextlen);
     }
-  s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info);
+  s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, 0);
   if (!s_skey && !shadow_info)
     {
       log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");

agent/pksign.c

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ do_encode_md (const unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int algo,
 /* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and write it
    back to OUTFP. */
 int
-agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp) 
+agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp, int ignore_cache) 
 {
   GCRY_SEXP s_skey = NULL, s_hash = NULL, s_sig = NULL;
   GCRY_MPI frame = NULL;
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ agent_pksign (CTRL ctrl, FILE *outfp)
   if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
     return seterr (No_Secret_Key);
 
-  s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info);
+  s_skey = agent_key_from_file (ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, ignore_cache);
   if (!s_skey && !shadow_info)
     {
       log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");