gpg: Make symmetric + pubkey encryption de-vs compliant.

* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Make symmetric + pubkey encryption
de-vs compliant.

* g10/mainproc.c (struct symlist_item): New.
(struct mainproc_context): Add field symenc_list.
(release_list): Free that list.
(proc_symkey_enc): Record infos from symmetric session packet.
(proc_encrypted): Check symkey packet algos
--

The original check was too strong because it is in fact compliant to
encrypt with a symmetric key and and public key.  Thus decryption
should issue a compliance status.

In addition we now check that the cipher algorithms used to
symmetrically encrypt the session key are all compliant.  This is
similar to our check for all public key encrypted session key packets.

GnuPG-bug-id: 6119
Fixes-commit: b03fab09e1

Backported from 2.2

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>

g10/mainproc.c

@@ -47,6 +47,16 @@
 #define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
 
 
+/* An object to build a list of symkey packet info.  */
+struct symlist_item
+{
+  struct symlist_item *next;
+  int cipher_algo;
+  int cfb_mode;
+  int other_error;
+};
+
+
 /*
  * Object to hold the processing context.
  */
@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ struct mainproc_context
   int trustletter;  /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
   ulong symkeys;    /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys.  */
   struct pubkey_enc_list *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+  struct symlist_item *symenc_list;   /* List of sym. encryption packets. */
   int seen_pkt_encrypted_aead; /* PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD packet seen. */
   int seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc;  /* PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC packet seen. */
   struct {
@@ -136,6 +147,13 @@ release_list( CTX c )
       c->pkenc_list = tmp;
     }
   c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+  while (c->symenc_list)
+    {
+      struct symlist_item *tmp = c->symenc_list->next;
+      xfree (c->symenc_list);
+      c->symenc_list = tmp;
+    }
+  c->symenc_list = NULL;
   c->list = NULL;
   c->any.data = 0;
   c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
@@ -460,6 +478,20 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
     }
 
  leave:
+  /* Record infos from the packet.  */
+  {
+    struct symlist_item  *symitem;
+    symitem = xcalloc (1, sizeof *symitem);
+    if (enc)
+      {
+        symitem->cipher_algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+        symitem->cfb_mode = !enc->aead_algo;
+      }
+    else
+      symitem->other_error = 1;
+    symitem->next = c->symenc_list;
+    c->symenc_list = symitem;
+  }
   c->symkeys++;
   free_packet (pkt, NULL);
 }
@@ -695,8 +727,6 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
 
   /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS.  */
   if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
-      /* Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption voids compliance.  */
-      && (c->symkeys != !!c->pkenc_list )
       /* Overriding session key voids compliance.  */
       && !opt.override_session_key
       /* Check symmetric cipher.  */
@@ -705,14 +735,26 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
                                     GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
     {
       struct pubkey_enc_list *i;
+      struct symlist_item *si;
       int compliant = 1;
       PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc (sizeof *pk);
 
       if ( !(c->pkenc_list || c->symkeys) )
         log_debug ("%s: where else did the session key come from?\n", __func__);
 
-      /* Now check that every key used to encrypt the session key is
+      /* Check that all seen symmetric key packets use compliant
-       * compliant.  */
+       * algos.  This is so that no non-compliant encrypted session
+       * key can be sneaked in.  */
+      for (si = c->symenc_list; si && compliant; si = si->next)
+        {
+          if (!si->cfb_mode
+              || !gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, si->cipher_algo,
+                                             GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
+            compliant = 0;
+        }
+
+      /* Check that every public key used to encrypt the session key
+       * is compliant.  */
       for (i = c->pkenc_list; i && compliant; i = i->next)
         {
           memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
@@ -836,7 +878,7 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
 
 
   /* If we concluded that the decryption was compliant, issue a
-   * compliance status before the thed end of decryption status.  */
+   * compliance status before the end of the decryption status.  */
   if (compliance_de_vs == (4|2|1))
     {
       write_status_strings (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,