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No more warnings for AMD64 (at least when cross-compiling). Thus tehre is a

good chance that gpg2 will now work. 
Other cleanups.
Updated gettext.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2006-11-21 11:00:14 +00:00
parent 5885142c83
commit e50c5f39cc
132 changed files with 7331 additions and 5486 deletions

View file

@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ make_session_key( DEK *dek )
gcry_mpi_t
encode_session_key (DEK *dek, unsigned int nbits)
{
int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *p;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static gcry_mpi_t
do_encode_md( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
{
int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
gcry_mpi_t a;
@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
or something like that, which would look correct but allow
trivial forgeries. Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
DSA. ;) */
if(qbytes<160)
if (qbytes < 160)
{
log_error(_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes);
log_error (_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
(unsigned int)qbytes);
return NULL;
}
@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate. */
if(gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
{
log_error(_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes*8);
log_error (_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
(unsigned int)(qbytes*8));
return NULL;
}