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No more warnings for AMD64 (at least when cross-compiling). Thus tehre is a
good chance that gpg2 will now work. Other cleanups. Updated gettext.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch
parent
5885142c83
commit
e50c5f39cc
132 changed files with 7331 additions and 5486 deletions
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@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
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2006-11-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
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* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Print y2038 warning only for 32
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bit time_t.
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(save_unprotected_key_to_card): Made RSA_N_LEN et al a size_t.
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Cast printf args.
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* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Made NBYTES a size_t.
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(do_check): Made NDATA a size_t.
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(protect_secret_key): Made NARR a size_t.
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(protect_secret_key): Made NVYES a size_t.
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* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Made INDATALEN a size_t.
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(get_it): Made NFRAME a size_t.
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* keyid.c (hash_public_key): Made NBITS an unsigned int.
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* misc.c (checksum_mpi): Made NBYTES a size_t.
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(openpgp_pk_test_algo2): Made USE_BUF a size_t.
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* seskey.c (encode_session_key): Made NFRAME a size_t.
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(do_encode_md): Ditto.
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(encode_md_value): Cast size_t argument of printf.
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(encode_md_value): Ditto.
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2006-11-10 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
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* parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Changed NREAD to size_t to match the
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22
g10/keygen.c
22
g10/keygen.c
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@ -1849,12 +1849,12 @@ ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire)
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? _("Key expires at %s\n")
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: _("Signature expires at %s\n"),
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asctimestamp((ulong)(curtime + interval) ) );
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/* FIXME: This check yields warning on alhas: Write a
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configure check and to this check here only for 32 bit
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machines */
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if( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 )
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tty_printf(_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n"
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"However, it will be correctly handled up to 2106.\n"));
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#if SIZEOF_TIME_T <= 4
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if ( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 )
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tty_printf (_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n"
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"However, it will be correctly handled up to"
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" 2106.\n"));
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#endif /*SIZEOF_TIME_T*/
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}
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if( cpr_enabled() || cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.valid.okay",
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@ -3824,7 +3824,7 @@ save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno)
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unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL;
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unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL;
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unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL;
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unsigned int rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
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size_t rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
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unsigned char *sexp = NULL;
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unsigned char *p;
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char numbuf[55], numbuf2[50];
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@ -3849,22 +3849,22 @@ save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno)
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+ 4*sizeof (numbuf) + 25 + sizeof(numbuf) + 20);
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p = stpcpy (p,"(11:private-key(3:rsa(1:n");
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sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", rsa_n_len);
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sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_n_len);
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p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
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memcpy (p, rsa_n, rsa_n_len);
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p += rsa_n_len;
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:e%u:", rsa_e_len);
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:e%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_e_len);
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p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
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memcpy (p, rsa_e, rsa_e_len);
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p += rsa_e_len;
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:p%u:", rsa_p_len);
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:p%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_p_len);
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p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
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memcpy (p, rsa_p, rsa_p_len);
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p += rsa_p_len;
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:q%u:", rsa_q_len);
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sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:q%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_q_len);
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p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
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memcpy (p, rsa_q, rsa_q_len);
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p += rsa_q_len;
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@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ hash_public_key( gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk )
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unsigned int nn[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
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byte *pp[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
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int i;
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size_t nbits, nbytes;
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unsigned int nbits;
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size_t nbytes;
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int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo);
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/* Two extra bytes for the expiration date in v3 */
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@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ checksum_mpi (gcry_mpi_t a)
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{
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u16 csum;
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byte *buffer;
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unsigned int nbytes;
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size_t nbytes;
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if ( gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, a) )
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BUG ();
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@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ openpgp_pk_test_algo( int algo )
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int
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openpgp_pk_test_algo2( int algo, unsigned int use )
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{
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int use_buf = use;
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size_t use_buf = use;
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if (algo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E)
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algo = GCRY_PK_ELG;
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@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
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int rc;
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gcry_mpi_t plain_dek = NULL;
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byte *frame = NULL;
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unsigned n, nframe;
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unsigned int n;
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size_t nframe;
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u16 csum, csum2;
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int card = 0;
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@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
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size_t rbuflen;
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char *snbuf;
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unsigned char *indata = NULL;
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unsigned int indatalen;
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size_t indatalen;
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snbuf = serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, sk);
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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
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byte *buffer;
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u16 csum=0;
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int i, res;
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unsigned int nbytes;
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size_t nbytes;
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if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
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DEK *dek = NULL;
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@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
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for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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byte *p;
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int ndata;
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size_t ndata;
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unsigned int ndatabits;
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assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
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@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
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{
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int i,j, rc = 0;
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byte *buffer;
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unsigned nbytes;
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size_t nbytes;
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u16 csum;
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if( !dek )
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@ -370,8 +370,8 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
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gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen);
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if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
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byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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size_t narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned int nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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int ndata=0;
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byte *p, *data;
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20
g10/seskey.c
20
g10/seskey.c
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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ make_session_key( DEK *dek )
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gcry_mpi_t
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encode_session_key (DEK *dek, unsigned int nbits)
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{
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int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
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size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
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byte *p;
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byte *frame;
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int i,n;
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@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static gcry_mpi_t
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do_encode_md( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
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const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
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{
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int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
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size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
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byte *frame;
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int i,n;
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gcry_mpi_t a;
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@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
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or something like that, which would look correct but allow
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trivial forgeries. Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
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DSA. ;) */
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if(qbytes<160)
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if (qbytes < 160)
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{
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log_error(_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
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pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes);
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log_error (_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
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pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
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(unsigned int)qbytes);
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return NULL;
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}
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@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
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/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
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automatically left-truncate. */
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if(gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
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if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
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{
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log_error(_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
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pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes*8);
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log_error (_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
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pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
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(unsigned int)(qbytes*8));
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return NULL;
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}
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