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Code Activity

* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...

Browse source 
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations.  This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).

* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.

* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG().  The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary.  All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2003-12-11 01:07:42 +00:00
parent 888a6c2980
commit db5ab5e730
7 changed files with 108 additions and 143 deletions
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79
g10/build-packet.c
View file

@ -254,85 +254,6 @@ do_public_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk )
}
/****************
* Make a hash value from the public key certificate
*/
void
hash_public_key( MD_HANDLE md, PKT_public_key *pk )
{
PACKET pkt;
int rc = 0;
int ctb;
ulong pktlen;
int c;
IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
#if 0
FILE *fp = fopen("dump.pk", "a");
int i=0;
fprintf(fp, "\nHashing PK (v%d):\n", pk->version);
#endif
/* build the packet */
init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
pkt.pkt.public_key = pk;
if( (rc = build_packet( a, &pkt )) )
log_fatal("build public_key for hashing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
if( !(pk->version == 3 && pk->pubkey_algo == 16) ) {
/* skip the constructed header but don't do this for our very old
* v3 ElG keys */
ctb = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
pktlen = 0;
if( (ctb & 0x40) ) {
c = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
if( c < 192 )
pktlen = c;
else if( c < 224 ) {
pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
c = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
pktlen += c + 192;
}
else if( c == 255 ) {
pktlen = iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 24;
pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 16;
pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 8;
pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
}
}
else {
int lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
for( ; lenbytes; lenbytes-- ) {
pktlen <<= 8;
pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
}
}
/* hash a header */
md_putc( md, 0x99 );
pktlen &= 0xffff; /* can't handle longer packets */
md_putc( md, pktlen >> 8 );
md_putc( md, pktlen & 0xff );
}
/* hash the packet body */
while( (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 ) {
#if 0
fprintf( fp," %02x", c );
if( (++i == 24) ) {
putc('\n', fp);
i=0;
}
#endif
md_putc( md, c );
}
#if 0
putc('\n', fp);
fclose(fp);
#endif
iobuf_cancel(a);
}
static int
do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
{