Typo fix and remove of some colloquial terms

doc/gpgsm.texi

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ and to change the default configuration.
 * Certificate Options::     Certificate related options.
 * Input and Output::        Input and Output.
 * CMS Options::             How to change how the CMS is created.
-* Esoteric Options::        Doing things one usually don't want to do.
+* Esoteric Options::        Doing things one usually do not want to do.
 @end menu
 
 
@@ -346,14 +346,14 @@ Change the default name of the policy file to @var{filename}.
 Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations.  The
 default value is the @file{/usr/local/bin/gpg-agent}.  This is only used
 as a fallback when the environment variable @code{GPG_AGENT_INFO} is not
-set or a running agent can't be connected.
+set or a running agent cannot be connected.
 
 @item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
 @opindex dirmnr-program
 Specify a dirmngr program to be used for @acronym{CRL} checks.  The
 default value is @file{/usr/sbin/dirmngr}.  This is only used as a
 fallback when the environment variable @code{DIRMNGR_INFO} is not set or
-a running dirmngr can't be connected.
+a running dirmngr cannot be connected.
 
 @item --prefer-system-dirmngr
 @opindex prefer-system-dirmngr
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.
 
 @item --no-secmem-warning
 @opindex no-secmem-warning
-Don't print a warning when the so called "secure memory" can't be used.
+Do not print a warning when the so called "secure memory" cannot be used.
 
 @item --log-file @var{file}
 @opindex log-file
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ By default the @acronym{CRL} for trusted root certificates are checked
 like for any other certificates.  This allows a CA to revoke its own
 certificates voluntary without the need of putting all ever issued
 certificates into a CRL.  The disable option may be used to switch this
-extra check off.  Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there won't be
+extra check off.  Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there will not be
 any noticeable performance gain.  Note, that this also disables possible
 OCSP checks for trusted root certificates.  A more specific way of
 disabling this check is by adding the ``relax'' keyword to the root CA
@@ -428,12 +428,12 @@ command.  This option should not be used in a configuration file.
 @itemx --disable-ocsp
 @opindex enable-ocsp
 @opindex disable-ocsp
-Be default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled.  The enable option may
+By default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled.  The enable option may
 be used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr.  If @acronym{CRL} checks
 are also enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an
-OCSP request won't succeed.  Note, that you have to allow OCSP
+OCSP request will not succeed.  Note, that you have to allow OCSP
 requests in Dirmngr's configuration too (option
-@option{--allow-ocsp} and configure dirmngr properly.  If you don't do
+@option{--allow-ocsp}) and configure Dirmngr properly.  If you do not do
 so you will get the error code @samp{Not supported}.
 
 @item --auto-issuer-key-retrieve
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ Add @var{oid} to the list of ignored certificate extensions.  The
 @code{2.5.29.3}.  This option may be used more than once.  Critical
 flagged certificate extensions matching one of the OIDs in the list
 are treated as if they are actually handled and thus the certificate
-won't be rejected due to an unknown critical extension.  Use this
+will not be rejected due to an unknown critical extension.  Use this
 option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical
 for a reason.
 
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ Assume the input data is binary encoded.
 PKCS#12 files.  This option may be used to force the passphrase to be
 encoded in the specified encoding @var{name}.  This is useful if the
 application used to import the key uses a different encoding and thus
-won't be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}.  Commonly
+will not be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}.  Commonly
 used values for @var{name} are @code{Latin1} and @code{CP850}.  Note
 that @command{gpgsm} itself automagically imports any file with a
 passphrase encoded to the most commonly used encodings.
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ interoperability problems.
 @c ********  ESOTERIC OPTIONS  ***************
 @c *******************************************
 @node Esoteric Options
-@subsection Doing things one usually don't want to do.
+@subsection Doing things one usually do not want to do.
 
 
 @table @gnupgtabopt
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ of af a transfer error, a program error or tampering with the message).
   @end table
 
 @item Error verifying a signature
-For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it can't be
+For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it cannot be
 decided whether the signature is valid or invalid.  A common reason for
 this is a missing certificate.
 
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ Set the recipient for the encryption.  @var{userID} should be the
 internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way
 of specification.  If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server
 does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why
-the recipient can't be used, the encryption will then not be done for
+the recipient cannot be used, the encryption will then not be done for
 this recipient.  If the policy is not to encrypt at all if not all
 recipients are valid, the client has to take care of this.  All
 @code{RECIPIENT} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} or an
@@ -1204,7 +1204,8 @@ It takes the plaintext from the @code{INPUT} command, writes to the
 ciphertext to the file descriptor set with the @code{OUTPUT} command,
 take the recipients from all the recipients set so far.  If this command
 fails the clients should try to delete all output currently done or
-otherwise mark it as invalid.  @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there won't be any
+otherwise mark it as invalid.  @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there
+will not be any
 security problem with leftover data on the output in this case.
 
 This command should in general not fail, as all necessary checks have
@@ -1272,7 +1273,7 @@ to the signer's key.  @var{userID} should be the
 internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way
 of specification.  If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server
 does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why
-the key can't be used, the signature will then not be created using
+the key cannot be used, the signature will then not be created using
 this key.  If the policy is not to sign at all if not all
 keys are valid, the client has to take care of this.  All
 @code{SIGNER} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} is done.