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Ported changes from 1.4.

Browse source 
Add copyright notices.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2007-10-25 09:06:21 +00:00
parent eda26e299f
commit cd2d9288aa
40 changed files with 596 additions and 322 deletions
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55
g10/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,3 +1,58 @@
2007-10-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> (wk)
From 1.4 (October):
* gpg.c (main): Add --require-cross-certification to
--openpgp/--rfc4880 mode.
* gpg.c (main): Disable --rfc2440-text and --force-v3-sigs by
default. Enable --require-cross-certification by default.
--openpgp (--rfc4880) is the same as --rfc2440 except with
"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines".
* misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_failure): Minor
cleanup.
* armor.c (is_armor_header): Comment about 4880.
* options.h, gpg.c (main): Add --rfc4880, and make --openpgp an
alias to it. --rfc2440 now stands alone. For now, use the old
2440 defaults for 4880.
* misc.c (compliance_option_string): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use compliance_option_string() instead
of printing the compliance modes here.
2007-10-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> (wk)
From 1.4 (September):
* import.c (collapse_uids): Significant speedup for de-duping user
IDs.
2007-10-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> (wk)
From 1.4 (July):
* armor.c (parse_header_line): Improve test so that the header
test only allows "Hash" in the signed data section.
* armor.c (is_armor_tag): New. Detect if an armor header matches
2440bis-21.
(parse_header_line): Call it here, as bis-21 requires warning the
user (but continuing to process the message) when seeing an
unknown header.
* encode.c (encode_crypt): Missed one call to
setup_plaintext_name(). This is bug#809.
* sign.c (mk_notation_policy_etc): Expect all sigs that this is
called for are >=v4.
(write_signature_packets, make_keysig_packet): Only call it for
>=v4 sigs. This allows --force-v3-sigs and --force-v4-certs to
enable or disable notations, policies, and keyserver URLs. This
is bug#800.
2007-10-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* passphrase.c (passphrase_get): Use new utf8 switching fucntions.

47
g10/armor.c
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* armor.c - Armor flter
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -308,7 +308,19 @@ parse_hash_header( const char *line )
return found;
}
/* Returns true if this is a valid armor tag as per RFC-2440bis-21. */
static int
is_armor_tag(const char *line)
{
if(strncmp(line,"Version",7)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Comment",7)==0
|| strncmp(line,"MessageID",9)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Hash",4)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Charset",7)==0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/****************
* Check whether this is a armor line.
@ -338,7 +350,8 @@ is_armor_header( byte *line, unsigned len )
--rfc2440 is set since 2440 reads "The header lines, therefore,
MUST start at the beginning of a line, and MUST NOT have text
following them on the same line." It is unclear whether "text"
refers to all text or just non-whitespace text. */
refers to all text or just non-whitespace text. 4880 clarified
this was only non-whitespace text. */
if(RFC2440)
{
@ -418,16 +431,32 @@ parse_header_line( armor_filter_context_t *afx, byte *line, unsigned int len )
putc('\n', stderr);
}
if( afx->in_cleartext ) {
if( afx->in_cleartext )
{
if( (hashes=parse_hash_header( line )) )
afx->hashes |= hashes;
afx->hashes |= hashes;
else if( strlen(line) > 15 && !memcmp( line, "NotDashEscaped:", 15 ) )
afx->not_dash_escaped = 1;
else {
afx->not_dash_escaped = 1;
else
{
log_error(_("invalid clearsig header\n"));
return -1;
}
}
}
}
else if(!is_armor_tag(line))
{
/* Section 6.2: "Unknown keys should be reported to the user,
but OpenPGP should continue to process the message." Note
that in a clearsigned message this applies to the signature
part (i.e. "BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE") and not the signed data
("BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE"). The only key allowed in the
signed data section is "Hash". */
log_info(_("unknown armor header: "));
print_string( stderr, line, len, 0 );
putc('\n', stderr);
}
return 1;
}

18
g10/encode.c
View file

@ -598,22 +598,8 @@ encode_crypt( const char *filename, strlist_t remusr, int use_symkey )
if(use_symkey && (rc=write_symkey_enc(symkey_s2k,symkey_dek,cfx.dek,out)))
goto leave;
if (!opt.no_literal) {
/* setup the inner packet */
if( filename || opt.set_filename ) {
char *s = make_basename( opt.set_filename ? opt.set_filename
: filename,
iobuf_get_real_fname( inp ) );
pt = xmalloc( sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
pt->namelen = strlen(s);
memcpy(pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
xfree(s);
}
else { /* no filename */
pt = xmalloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
pt->namelen = 0;
}
}
if (!opt.no_literal)
pt=setup_plaintext_name(filename,inp);
if (!iobuf_is_pipe_filename (filename) && *filename && !opt.textmode )
{

36
g10/gpg.c
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg)
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* 2006, 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
oGnuPG,
oRFC1991,
oRFC2440,
oRFC4880,
oOpenPGP,
oPGP2,
oPGP6,
@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
{ oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", 0, "@"},
{ oRFC1991, "rfc1991", 0, "@"},
{ oRFC2440, "rfc2440", 0, "@" },
{ oRFC4880, "rfc4880", 0, "@" },
{ oOpenPGP, "openpgp", 0, N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")},
{ oPGP2, "pgp2", 0, N_("generate PGP 2.x compatible messages")},
{ oPGP6, "pgp6", 0, "@"},
@ -1902,8 +1904,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
opt.marginals_needed = 3;
opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
opt.pgp2_workarounds = 1;
opt.force_v3_sigs = 1;
opt.escape_from = 1;
opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
opt.import_options=IMPORT_SK2PK;
opt.export_options=EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
opt.keyserver_options.import_options=IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG;
@ -1917,7 +1919,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
opt.min_cert_level=2;
set_screen_dimensions();
opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
opt.rfc2440_text=1;
opt.def_sig_expire="0";
opt.def_cert_expire="0";
set_homedir ( default_homedir () );
@ -2303,11 +2304,34 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
opt.escape_from = 1;
break;
case oOpenPGP:
case oRFC4880:
/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines
--require-cross-certification". */
opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880;
opt.flags.dsa2 = 1;
opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
opt.rfc2440_text = 0;
opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
opt.pgp2_workarounds = 0;
opt.escape_from = 1;
opt.force_v3_sigs = 0;
opt.compress_keys = 0; /* not mandated, but we do it */
opt.compress_sigs = 0; /* ditto. */
opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
opt.compress_algo = -1;
opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
break;
case oRFC2440:
/* TODO: When 2440bis becomes a RFC, set new values for
oOpenPGP. */
opt.rfc2440_text=1;
opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
opt.flags.dsa2 = 0;
opt.rfc2440_text = 1;
opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
opt.pgp2_workarounds = 0;

156
g10/import.c
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -1649,90 +1649,102 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
* We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
* sigs into one.
* Returns: True if the keyblock hash changed.
* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
*/
int
collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock )
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int in_uid;
int any=0;
KBNODE uid1;
int any=0;
restart:
for( n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
for(uid1=*keyblock;uid1;uid1=uid1->next)
{
KBNODE uid2;
if(uid1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
for(uid2=uid1->next;uid2;uid2=uid2->next)
{
if(uid2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
for( n2 = n->next; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( n->pkt->pkt.user_id,
n2->pkt->pkt.user_id ) ) {
/* found a duplicate */
any = 1;
if( !n2->next
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
/* no more signatures: delete the user ID
* and start over */
remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
if(cmp_user_ids(uid1->pkt->pkt.user_id,
uid2->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0)
{
/* We have a duplicated uid */
KBNODE sig1,last;
any=1;
/* Now take uid2's signatures, and attach them to
uid1 */
for(last=uid2;last->next;last=last->next)
{
if(last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
}
else {
/* The simple approach: Move one signature and
* then start over to delete the next one :-( */
move_kbnode( keyblock, n2->next, n->next );
/* Snip out uid2 */
(find_prev_kbnode(*keyblock,uid2,0))->next=last->next;
/* Now put uid2 in place as part of uid1 */
last->next=uid1->next;
uid1->next=uid2;
remove_kbnode(keyblock,uid2);
/* Now dedupe uid1 */
for(sig1=uid1->next;sig1;sig1=sig1->next)
{
KBNODE sig2;
if(sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
if(sig1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
for(sig2=sig1->next,last=sig1;sig2;last=sig2,sig2=sig2->next)
{
if(sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
if(sig2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
if(cmp_signatures(sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
sig2->pkt->pkt.signature)==0)
{
/* We have a match, so delete the second
signature */
remove_kbnode(&uid1,sig2);
sig2=last;
}
}
}
goto restart;
}
}
}
if( !any )
return 0;
restart_sig:
/* now we may have duplicate signatures on one user ID: fix this */
for( in_uid = 0, n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
in_uid = 1;
else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
in_uid = 0;
else if( in_uid ) {
n2 = n;
do {
KBNODE ncmp = NULL;
for( ; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
if( n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
;
else if( !ncmp )
ncmp = n2;
else if( !cmp_signatures( ncmp->pkt->pkt.signature,
n2->pkt->pkt.signature )) {
remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
goto restart_sig;
}
}
n2 = ncmp? ncmp->next : NULL;
} while( n2 );
}
if(any && !opt.quiet)
{
const char *key="???";
if( (uid1=find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )) )
key=keystr_from_pk(uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
else if( (uid1 = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY )) )
key=keystr_from_sk(uid1->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
log_info(_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"),key);
}
if(!opt.quiet)
{
const char *key="???";
if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )) )
key=keystr_from_pk(n->pkt->pkt.public_key);
else if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY )) )
key=keystr_from_sk(n->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
log_info(_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"),key);
}
return 1;
return any;
}
/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not

2
g10/keyedit.c
View file

@ -1803,7 +1803,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
{
tty_printf(
_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
RFC2440?"OpenPGP":PGP2?"PGP2":"RFC-1991");
compliance_option_string());
break;
}
photo=1;

81
g10/misc.c
View file

@ -831,47 +831,64 @@ default_compress_algo(void)
const char *
compliance_option_string(void)
{
switch(opt.compliance)
{
case CO_RFC2440:
return "--openpgp";
case CO_PGP2:
return "--pgp2";
case CO_PGP6:
return "--pgp6";
case CO_PGP7:
return "--pgp7";
case CO_PGP8:
return "--pgp8";
default:
return "???";
}
}
char *ver="???";
static const char *
compliance_string(void)
{
switch(opt.compliance)
{
case CO_RFC2440:
return "OpenPGP";
case CO_PGP2:
return "PGP 2.x";
case CO_PGP6:
return "PGP 6.x";
case CO_PGP7:
return "PGP 7.x";
case CO_PGP8:
return "PGP 8.x";
default:
return "???";
case CO_GNUPG: return "--gnupg";
case CO_RFC4880: return "--openpgp";
case CO_RFC2440: return "--rfc2440";
case CO_RFC1991: return "--rfc1991";
case CO_PGP2: return "--pgp2";
case CO_PGP6: return "--pgp6";
case CO_PGP7: return "--pgp7";
case CO_PGP8: return "--pgp8";
}
return ver;
}
void
compliance_failure(void)
{
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),compliance_string());
char *ver="???";
switch(opt.compliance)
{
case CO_GNUPG:
ver="GnuPG";
break;
case CO_RFC4880:
ver="OpenPGP";
break;
case CO_RFC2440:
ver="OpenPGP (older)";
break;
case CO_RFC1991:
ver="old PGP";
break;
case CO_PGP2:
ver="PGP 2.x";
break;
case CO_PGP6:
ver="PGP 6.x";
break;
case CO_PGP7:
ver="PGP 7.x";
break;
case CO_PGP8:
ver="PGP 8.x";
break;
}
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),ver);
opt.compliance=CO_GNUPG;
}

9
g10/options.h
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* options.h
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ struct
int force_ownertrust;
enum
{
CO_GNUPG=0, CO_RFC2440, CO_RFC1991, CO_PGP2, CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8
CO_GNUPG, CO_RFC4880, CO_RFC2440, CO_RFC1991, CO_PGP2,
CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8
} compliance;
enum
{
@ -290,10 +291,12 @@ EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;
#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG)
#define RFC1991 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC1991 || opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
#define PGP2 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
#define PGP6 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6)
#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
#define PGPX (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8)
/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in

58
g10/sign.c
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* sign.c - sign data
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -66,32 +66,17 @@ mk_notation_policy_etc( PKT_signature *sig,
struct notation *nd=NULL;
struct expando_args args;
assert(sig->version>=4);
memset(&args,0,sizeof(args));
args.pk=pk;
args.sk=sk;
/* It is actually impossible to get here when making a v3 key
signature since keyedit.c:sign_uids will automatically bump a
signature with a notation or policy url up to v4, but it is
good to do these checks anyway. */
/* notation data */
if(IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_notations)
{
if(sig->version<4)
log_error(_("can't put notation data into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
"signatures\n"));
else
nd=opt.sig_notations;
}
nd=opt.sig_notations;
else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_notations )
{
if(sig->version<4)
log_error(_("can't put notation data into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
"key signatures\n"));
else
nd=opt.cert_notations;
}
nd=opt.cert_notations;
if(nd)
{
@ -116,21 +101,9 @@ mk_notation_policy_etc( PKT_signature *sig,
/* set policy URL */
if( IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_policy_url )
{
if(sig->version<4)
log_error(_("can't put a policy URL into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
"signatures\n"));
else
pu=opt.sig_policy_url;
}
pu=opt.sig_policy_url;
else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_policy_url )
{
if(sig->version<4)
log_error(_("can't put a policy URL into v3 key (PGP 2.x style) "
"signatures\n"));
else
pu=opt.cert_policy_url;
}
pu=opt.cert_policy_url;
for(;pu;pu=pu->next)
{
@ -153,12 +126,7 @@ mk_notation_policy_etc( PKT_signature *sig,
/* preferred keyserver URL */
if( IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_keyserver_url )
{
if(sig->version<4)
log_info("can't put a preferred keyserver URL into v3 signatures\n");
else
pu=opt.sig_keyserver_url;
}
pu=opt.sig_keyserver_url;
for(;pu;pu=pu->next)
{
@ -689,8 +657,10 @@ write_signature_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, gcry_md_hd_t hash,
BUG ();
if (sig->version >= 4)
{
build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig);
mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, NULL, sk);
mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, NULL, sk);
}
hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
gcry_md_final (md);
@ -1487,8 +1457,10 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+duration;
sig->sig_class = sigclass;
if( sig->version >= 4 )
{
build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
mk_notation_policy_etc( sig, pk, sk );
mk_notation_policy_etc( sig, pk, sk );
}
/* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt