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Fixed memory allocation bug and typos.

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2006-07-26 11:25:36 +00:00
parent c45f73774d
commit ccd5fc4758
34 changed files with 2784 additions and 2984 deletions
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12
g10/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
2006-07-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* keygen.c (gen_card_key_with_backup): Initialize sk_{un}protected.
* import.c (import): Init KEYBLOCK.
* pkclist.c (edit_ownertrust): Intialize trust to avoid ggc
warning.
* parse-packet.c (parse_comment): Cap comments at 65k.
(parse_gpg_control): Skip too large control packets.
2006-06-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs, algo_available):

8
g10/import.c
View file

@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options )
{
PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
KBNODE keyblock;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
int rc = 0;
getkey_disable_caches();
@ -566,10 +566,8 @@ check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"),
keystr_from_pk(pk));
/* TRANSLATORS: This string is belongs to the previous one. They are
only split up to allow printing of a common prefix. The
check_prefs_warning tag is a hack to make this string unique. */
log_info(_(" algorithms on these user IDs:\n"
"\0" "check_prefs_warning"));
only split up to allow printing of a common prefix. */
log_info(_(" algorithms on these user IDs:\n"));
}
static void

2
g10/keygen.c
View file

@ -3495,6 +3495,8 @@ gen_card_key_with_backup (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
size_t n;
int i;
sk_unprotected = NULL;
sk_protected = NULL;
rc = generate_raw_key (algo, 1024, make_timestamp (),
&sk_unprotected, &sk_protected);
if (rc)

20
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -2088,6 +2088,16 @@ parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
/* Cap comment packet at a reasonable value to avoid an integer
overflow in the malloc below. Comment packets are actually not
anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our
private comment packet. */
if (pktlen>65536)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
packet->pkt.comment = xmalloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1);
packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.comment->data;
@ -2097,7 +2107,7 @@ parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
if( list_mode ) {
int n = packet->pkt.comment->len;
fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT?
"OpenPGP draft " : "" );
"OpenPGP draft " : "GnuPG " );
for(p=packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n-- ) {
if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
putc (*p, listfp);
@ -2161,6 +2171,7 @@ parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
mode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
namelen = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
/* Note that namelen will never exceeds 255 byte. */
pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext = xmalloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen -1);
pt->new_ctb = new_ctb;
pt->mode = mode;
@ -2311,10 +2322,10 @@ parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
/*
* This packet is internally generated by PGG (by armor.c) to
* This packet is internally generated by GPG (by armor.c) to
* transfer some information to the lower layer. To make sure that
* this packet is really a GPG faked one and not one comming from outside,
* we first check that tehre is a unique tag in it.
* we first check that there is a unique tag in it.
* The format of such a control packet is:
* n byte session marker
* 1 byte control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx
@ -2340,6 +2351,9 @@ parse_gpg_control( IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
if ( sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof(inp) )
goto skipit;
}
if (pktlen > 4096)
goto skipit; /* Definitely too large. We skip it to avoid an
overflow in the malloc. */
if ( list_mode )
puts ("- gpg control packet");

2
g10/pkclist.c
View file

@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
int
edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
unsigned int trust;
unsigned int trust = 0; /* Needs to be initialized to avoid gcc warning. */
int no_help = 0;
for(;;)