fixes for the 1.0.6b bugs David recently posted to gnupg-devel.

ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2001-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	Released 1.0.6b snapshot.
+
 2001-10-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* configure.ac: Fixed for automake 1.5 

NEWS

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 
     * A subkey is never used to sign keys.
 
+    * Read only keyrings are now handled as expected.
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.6 (2001-05-29)
 ------------------------------------------------

THANKS

@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ Nimrod Zimerman 	   zimerman@forfree.at
 N J Doye		   nic@niss.ac.uk
 Oliver Haakert		   haakert@hsp.de
 Oskari Jääskeläinen	   f33003a@cc.hut.fi
+Pascal Scheffers           Pascal@scheffers.net
 Paul D. Smith		   psmith@baynetworks.com
 Per Cederqvist             ceder@lysator.liu.se
 Phil Blundell              pb@debian.org
@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ Ross Golder		   rossigee@bigfoot.com
 Sam Roberts		   sam@cogent.ca
 Sami Tolvanen              sami@tolvanen.com
 Sean MacLennan		   seanm@netwinder.org
+Sebastian Klemke           packet@convergence.de
 Serge Munhoven		   munhoven@mema.ucl.ac.be
 SL Baur 		   steve@xemacs.org
 Stefan Bellon              sbellon@sbellon.de

TODO

@@ -115,11 +115,13 @@
     verification status of the message to the output (i.e. write something to
     the --output file and not only to stderr.
 
+  * The user is asked for a revocation reasons even if this one can't
+    be used with v3 keys.
+
+  * keyflags don't distinguish between {certify,signature}-only.
 
 Things we won't do
 ------------------
 
   * New option --file-remove path-to-wipe-program ? 
 
-
-

acinclude.m4

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-dnl macros to configure g10
+dnl macros to configure gnupg
 dnl Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 dnl
 dnl This file is part of GnuPG.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF,
     fi
   ])
 
-
+w
 dnl GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE
 dnl
 AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE,

cipher/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+2001-11-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* primegen.c (gen_prime): Set 2 high order bits for secret primes.
+	* rsa.c (generate): Loop until we find the exact modulus size.
+	Changed the exponent to 41.
+
 2001-10-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* Makefile.am: Need to use $(EXEEXT) where approriate.

cipher/primegen.c

@@ -327,8 +327,13 @@ gen_prime( unsigned  nbits, int secret, int randomlevel )
 	    m_free(p);
 	}
 
-	/* set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to 1 */
+	/* set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to .
+           if we are generating a secret prime we are most probably
+           doing that for RSA, to make sure that the modulus does have
+           the requested keysize we set the 2 high order bits */
 	mpi_set_highbit( prime, nbits-1 );
+        if (secret)
+          mpi_set_bit (prime, nbits-2);
 	mpi_set_bit( prime, 0 );
 
 	/* calculate all remainders */

cipher/rsa.c

@@ -102,11 +102,27 @@ generate( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
     MPI g;
     MPI f;
 
+    /* make sure that nbits is even so that we generate p, q of equal size */
+    if ( (nbits&1) )
+      nbits++; 
+
+    n = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+
+    p = q = NULL;
+    do {
       /* select two (very secret) primes */
+      if (p)
+        mpi_free (p);
+      if (q)
+        mpi_free (q);
       p = generate_secret_prime( nbits / 2 );
       q = generate_secret_prime( nbits / 2 );
       if( mpi_cmp( p, q ) > 0 ) /* p shall be smaller than q (for calc of u)*/
         mpi_swap(p,q);
+      /* calculate the modulus */
+      mpi_mul( n, p, q );
+    } while ( mpi_get_nbits(n) != nbits );
+
     /* calculate Euler totient: phi = (p-1)(q-1) */
     t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
     t2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
@@ -118,14 +134,27 @@ generate( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
     mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
     mpi_gcd(g, t1, t2);
     mpi_fdiv_q(f, phi, g);
-    /* multiply them to make the private key */
+
-    n = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    /* find an public exponent.
-    mpi_mul( n, p, q );
+       We use 41 as this is quite fast and more secure than the
-    /* find a public exponent  */
+       commonly used 17.  Benchmarking the RSA verify function
-    e = mpi_alloc( (6+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+       with a 1024 bit key yields (2001-11-08): 
-    mpi_set_ui( e, 17); /* start with 17 */
+         e=17    0.54 ms
+         e=41    0.75 ms
+         e=257   0.95 ms
+         e=65537 1.80 ms
+     */
+    e = mpi_alloc( (32+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    mpi_set_ui( e, 41); 
+    if( !mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi) ) {
+      mpi_set_ui( e, 257); 
+      if( !mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi) ) {
+        mpi_set_ui( e, 65537); 
         while( !mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi) ) /* (while gcd is not 1) */
           mpi_add_ui( e, e, 2);
+      }
+    }
+
     /* calculate the secret key d = e^1 mod phi */
     d = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
     mpi_invm(d, e, f );

configure.ac

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ AC_PREREQ(2.52)
 dnl A snapshot release has a letter appended. CVS files before a release
 dnl are suffixed with the string "-cvs", so "1.0.6a-cvs" is a cvs version
 dnl between 1.0.6 and 1.0.6a. 
-AC_INIT(gnupg, 1.0.6b, bug-gnupg@gnu.org)
+AC_INIT(gnupg, 1.0.6c-cvs, bug-gnupg@gnu.org)
 ALL_LINGUAS="da de eo es_ES et fr id it ja nl pl pt_BR pt_PT sv tr"
 static_modules="sha1 md5 rmd160"
 static_random_module=""

doc/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+2001-10-31  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* gpg.sgml: Add a remark on how to get the long key ID.  Suggested
+	by Sebastian Klemke.
+
+2001-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* gpg.sgml: Add missing tag.
+
 2001-09-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* gpg.sgml: Add a note on option parsing.

doc/gpg.sgml

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ You will find a list of HOWTO documents at http://www.gnupg.org/docs.html .
 Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non option is
 encountered, you can explicitly stop option parsing by using the
 special option "--".
+</para>
 </refsect1>
 
 <refsect1>
@@ -1299,6 +1300,19 @@ signatures on data.
 Reset the --force-v3-sigs option.
 </para></listitem></varlistentry>
 
+<varlistentry>
+<term>--force-v4-certs</term>
+<listitem><para>
+Always use v4 key signatures even on v3 version keys.  This make the
+signature unusable for PGP 2.
+</para></listitem></varlistentry>
+
+<varlistentry>
+<term>--no-force-v3-certs</term>
+<listitem><para>
+Reset the --force-v4-certs option.
+</para></listitem></varlistentry>
+
 
 <varlistentry>
 <term>--force-mdc</term>
@@ -1453,7 +1467,7 @@ encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any --charset setting.
 <varlistentry>
 <term>--with-key-data</term>
 <listitem><para>
-Print key listings delimited by colons and print the public key data.
+Print key listings delimited by colons (like --with-colons) and print the public key data.
 </para></listitem></varlistentry>
 
 <varlistentry>
@@ -1617,7 +1631,8 @@ Here the key ID is given in the usual short form.
 <term>01AB3FED1347A5612</term>
 <term>0x234AABBCC34567C4</term>
 <listitem><para>
-Here the key ID is given in the long form as used by OpenPGP.
+Here the key ID is given in the long form as used by OpenPGP
+(you can get the long key ID using the option --with-colons).
 </para></listitem>
 </varlistentry>
 

doc/gpg.texi

@@ -791,6 +791,13 @@ signatures on data.
 @item ---no-force-v3-sigs
 Reset the ---force-v3-sigs option.
 
+@item ---force-v4-certs
+Always use v4 key signatures even on v3 version keys. This make the
+signature unusable for PGP 2.
+
+@item ---no-force-v3-certs
+Reset the ---force-v4-certs option.
+
 @item ---force-mdc
 Force the use of encryption with appended manipulation
 code. This is always used with the newer ciphers (those
@@ -881,7 +888,7 @@ Print key listings delimited by colons. Note, that the output will be
 encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any ---charset setting.
 
 @item ---with-key-data
-Print key listings delimited by colons and print the public key data.
+Print key listings delimited by colons (like ---with-colons) and print the public key data.
 
 @item ---with-fingerprint
 Same as the command ---fingerprint but changes only the format of the output
@@ -979,7 +986,8 @@ Here the key ID is given in the usual short form.
 @itemx 0F323456784E56EAB
 @itemx 01AB3FED1347A5612
 @itemx 0x234AABBCC34567C4
-Here the key ID is given in the long form as used by OpenPGP.
+Here the key ID is given in the long form as used by OpenPGP
+(you can get the long key ID using the option ---with-colons).
 
 @item 1234343434343434C434343434343434
 @itemx 123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,31 @@
+2001-11-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow to skip over keys, the non
+	working "show info" is now assigned to "i" 
+	* trustdb.c (ask_ownertrust, validate_keys): Implement a real quit
+	here.  Both are by David Shaw.
+	
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Make sure next_exipire is initialized.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Use SHA-1 with v4 RSA keys.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h : New option --[no-]froce-v4-certs.
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Create v4 sigs on v4 keys even with
+	a v3 key.  Use new option.  By David Shaw
+
+	* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Allow to select "no reason".
+	By David Shaw.
+
+	* keyid.c (fingerprint_from_sk): Calculation of an v3 fpr was
+	plain wrong - nearly the same code in fingerprint_from_pk is correct.
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Added a few comments to the code.
+
+2001-11-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print a warning when -r is used w/o encryption.
+	Suggested by Pascal Scheffers.
+
 2001-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Changed helptext for showpref

g10/build-packet.c

@@ -340,13 +340,16 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
 {
     int rc = 0;
     int i, nskey, npkey;
-    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp(); /* build in a self-enlarging buffer */
 
+    /* Write the version number - if none is specified, use 3 */
     if( !sk->version )
 	iobuf_put( a, 3 );
     else
 	iobuf_put( a, sk->version );
     write_32(a, sk->timestamp );
+
+    /* v3  needs the expiration time */
     if( sk->version < 4 ) {
 	u16 ndays;
 	if( sk->expiredate )
@@ -355,27 +358,45 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
 	    ndays = 0;
 	write_16(a, ndays);
     }
+
     iobuf_put(a, sk->pubkey_algo );
+
+    /* get number of secret and public parameters.  They are held in
+       one array first the public ones, then the secret ones */
     nskey = pubkey_get_nskey( sk->pubkey_algo );
     npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( sk->pubkey_algo );
+
+    /* If we don't have any public parameters - which is the case if
+       we don't know the algorithm used - the parameters are stored as
+       one blob in a faked (opaque) MPI */
     if( !npkey ) {
 	write_fake_data( a, sk->skey[0] );
 	goto leave;
     }
     assert( npkey < nskey );
 
+    /* Writing the public parameters is easy */
     for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
 	mpi_write(a, sk->skey[i] );
+
+    /* build the header for protected (encrypted) secret parameters */
     if( sk->is_protected ) {
 	if( is_RSA(sk->pubkey_algo) && sk->version < 4
 				    && !sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
+            /* the simple rfc1991 (v3) way */
 	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.algo );
 	    iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
 	}
 	else {
+          /* OpenPGP protection according to rfc2440 */
 	    iobuf_put(a, 0xff );
 	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.algo );
 	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode >= 1000 ) {
+                /* These modes are not possible in OpenPGP, we use them
+                   to implement our extesnsions, 101 can ve views as a
+                   private/experimental extension (this is not
+                   specified in rfc2440 but the same scheme is used
+                   for all other algorithm identifiers) */
 		iobuf_put(a, 101 ); 
 		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
 		iobuf_write(a, "GNU", 3 );
@@ -390,32 +411,40 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
 		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.s2k.salt, 8 );
 	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 )
 		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.count ); 
+
+            /* For out special mode 1001 we do not need an IV */
 	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1001 )
 		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
 	}
     }
     else
 	iobuf_put(a, 0 );
+
     if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
-	;
+        ; /* GnuPG extension - don't write a secret key at all */ 
     else if( sk->is_protected && sk->version >= 4 ) {
+        /* The secret key is protected - write it out as it is */
 	byte *p;
 	assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[npkey] ) );
 	p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[npkey], &i );
 	iobuf_write(a, p, i );
     }
     else {
+        /* v3 way - same code for protected and non- protected key */
 	for(   ; i < nskey; i++ )
 	    mpi_write(a, sk->skey[i] );
 	write_16(a, sk->csum );
     }
 
   leave:
+    /* Build the header of the packet - which we must do after writing all
+       the other stuff, so that we know the length of the packet */
     write_header2(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a), sk->hdrbytes, 1 );
+    /* And finally write it out the real stream */
     if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
 	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
 
-    iobuf_close(a);
+    iobuf_close(a); /* close the remporary buffer */
     return rc;
 }
 

g10/g10.c

@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
     oThrowKeyid,
     oForceV3Sigs,
     oNoForceV3Sigs,
+    oForceV4Certs,
+    oNoForceV4Certs,
     oForceMDC,
     oS2KMode,
     oS2KDigest,
@@ -311,6 +313,8 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
     { oNoTTY, "no-tty", 0, N_("don't use the terminal at all") },
     { oForceV3Sigs, "force-v3-sigs", 0, N_("force v3 signatures") },
     { oNoForceV3Sigs, "no-force-v3-sigs", 0, N_("do not force v3 signatures") },
+    { oForceV4Certs, "force-v4-certs", 0, N_("force v4 key signatures") },
+    { oNoForceV4Certs, "no-force-v4-certs", 0, N_("do not force v4 key signatures") },
     { oForceMDC, "force-mdc", 0, N_("always use a MDC for encryption") },
     { oDryRun, "dry-run",   0, N_("do not make any changes") },
   /*{ oInteractive, "interactive", 0, N_("prompt before overwriting") }, */
@@ -668,6 +672,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
     char *preference_list = NULL;
     int pwfd = -1;
     int with_fpr = 0; /* make an option out of --fingerprint */
+    int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
   #ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
     ulong requested_shm_size=0;
   #endif
@@ -956,6 +961,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case oRFC1991:
 	    opt.rfc1991 = 1;
 	    opt.rfc2440 = 0;
+	    opt.force_v4_certs = 0;
 	    opt.no_comment = 1;
 	    opt.escape_from = 1;
 	    break;
@@ -998,6 +1004,8 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case oThrowKeyid: opt.throw_keyid = 1; break;
 	  case oForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 1; break;
 	  case oNoForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 0; break;
+          case oForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 1; break;
+          case oNoForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 0; break;
 	  case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
 	  case oS2KMode:   opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
 	  case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = m_strdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
@@ -1010,6 +1018,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	    break;
 	  case oRecipient: /* store the recipient */
 	    add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+            any_explicit_recipient = 1;
 	    break;
 	  case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
 	  case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1;  break;
@@ -1279,6 +1288,20 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	log_error(_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
 
 
+    switch (cmd) {
+      case aStore: 
+      case aSym:  
+      case aSign: 
+      case aSignSym: 
+      case aClearsign: 
+        if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
+          log_info ("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
+                    "without using public key encryption");
+	break;
+      default:
+        break;
+    }
+
     switch( cmd ) {
       case aStore: /* only store the file */
 	if( argc > 1 )

g10/keyid.c

@@ -457,10 +457,10 @@ fingerprint_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len )
 
 	md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
 	if( pubkey_get_npkey( sk->pubkey_algo ) > 1 ) {
-	    p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[1], &n, NULL );
+	    p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[0], &n, NULL );
 	    md_write( md, p, n );
 	    m_free(buf);
-	    p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[0], &n, NULL );
+	    p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[1], &n, NULL );
 	    md_write( md, p, n );
 	    m_free(buf);
 	}

g10/options.h

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct {
     int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
     int def_cipher_algo;
     int force_v3_sigs;
+    int force_v4_certs;
     int force_mdc;
     int def_digest_algo;
     int def_compress_algo;

g10/pkclist.c

@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
   keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
   for(;;) {
     /* a string with valid answers */
-    const char *ans = _("sSmMqQ");
+    const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
 
     if( !did_help ) 
       {
@@ -268,15 +268,18 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
         tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
         if (mode)
           tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
-        tty_printf (_(" s = please show me more information\n") );
+        tty_printf (_(" i = please show me more information\n") );
         if( mode )
           tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
         else
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_(" s = skip this key\n"));
 	    tty_printf(_(" q = quit\n"));
+	  }
         tty_printf("\n");
         did_help = 1;
       }
-    if( strlen(ans) != 6 )
+    if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
       BUG();
     p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
     trim_spaces(p);
@@ -319,6 +322,10 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
       {
         break ; /* back to the menu */
       }
+    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
+      {
+	break; /* skip */
+      }
     else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
       {
         quit = 1;
@@ -346,7 +353,7 @@ edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
       switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
         {
         case -1: /* quit */
-          return 0;
+          return -1;
         case -2: /* show info */
           show_paths(pk, 1);
           no_help = 1;
@@ -355,7 +362,7 @@ edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
           trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
           trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
           update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
-          return 0;
+          return 1;
         default:
           return 0;
         }

g10/revoke.c

@@ -240,9 +240,10 @@ gen_revoke( const char *uname )
 struct revocation_reason_info *
 ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint )
 {
-    int code;
+    int code=-1;
     char *description = NULL;
     struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
+    const char *text_0 = _("No reason specified");
     const char *text_1 = _("Key has been compromised");
     const char *text_2 = _("Key is superseded");
     const char *text_3 = _("Key is no longer used");
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint )
 	description = NULL;
 
 	tty_printf(_("Please select the reason for the revocation:\n"));
+	tty_printf(    "  0 = %s\n", text_0 );
 	if( key_rev )
 	    tty_printf("  1 = %s\n", text_1 );
 	if( key_rev )
@@ -262,27 +264,29 @@ ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint )
 	    tty_printf("  3 = %s\n", text_3 );
 	if( cert_rev )
 	    tty_printf("  4 = %s\n", text_4 );
-	tty_printf(    "  0 = %s\n", _("Cancel") );
+	tty_printf(    "  Q = %s\n", _("Cancel") );
 	if( hint )
 	    tty_printf(_("(Probably you want to select %d here)\n"), hint );
 
-	for(code = 0; !code;) {
+	while(code==-1) {
 	    int n;
 	    char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.code",
 						_("Your decision? "));
 	    trim_spaces( answer );
 	    cpr_kill_prompt();
-	    if( *answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q' )
+	    if( *answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q')
-		n = 0;
+	      return NULL; /* cancel */
-	    else if( !isdigit( *answer ) )
+	    if( hint && !*answer )
-		n = -1;
-	    else if( hint && !*answer )
 		n = hint;
+	    else if(!isdigit( *answer ) )
+ 	        n = -1;
 	    else
 		n = atoi(answer);
 	    m_free(answer);
-	    if( !n )
+	    if( n == 0 ) {
-		return NULL; /* cancel */
+	        code = 0x00; /* no particular reason */
+		code_text = text_0;
+	    }
 	    else if( key_rev && n == 1 ) {
 		code = 0x02; /* key has been compromised */
 		code_text = text_1;

g10/sign.c

@@ -982,15 +982,31 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
 	    || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18
 	    || sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 );
 
+    if (opt.force_v4_certs)
+        sigversion = 4;
+
     if (sigversion < sk->version)
         sigversion = sk->version;
 
+    /* If you are making a signature on a v4 key using your v3 key, it
+       doesn't make sense to generate a v3 sig.  After all, no v3-only
+       PGP implementation could understand the v4 key in the first
+       place. */
+    if (sigversion < pk->version)
+        sigversion = pk->version;
+
     if( !digest_algo ) {
 	switch( sk->pubkey_algo ) {
-	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA: digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; break;
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
+            digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; 
+            break;
 	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
-	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA: digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5; break;
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
-	  default:		digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160; break;
+            digest_algo = sk->version < 4? DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 : DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+            break;
+	  default:
+            digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+            break;
 	}
     }
     md = md_open( digest_algo, 0 );

g10/trustdb.c

@@ -846,12 +846,12 @@ enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
  *********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
  ****************************************/
 
-static unsigned int
+static int
 ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid)
 {
   PKT_public_key *pk;
   int rc;
-  unsigned int ot;
+  int ot;
 
   pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
   rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
@@ -862,10 +862,13 @@ ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid)
       return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
     }
  
-  if (edit_ownertrust (pk, 0))
+  ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
+  if(ot>0)
     ot = get_ownertrust (pk);
-  else
+  else if(ot==0)
     ot = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+  else
+    ot = -1; /* quit */
   free_public_key( pk );
   return ot;
 }
@@ -1303,6 +1306,7 @@ static int
 validate_keys (int interactive)
 {
   int rc = 0;
+  int quit=0;
   struct key_item *klist = NULL;
   struct key_item *k;
   struct key_array *keys = NULL;
@@ -1315,6 +1319,7 @@ validate_keys (int interactive)
   KeyHashTable visited;
   u32 next_expire;
 
+  next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
   visited = new_key_hash_table ();
   /* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
    * here when needed */
@@ -1324,7 +1329,6 @@ validate_keys (int interactive)
       goto leave;
     }
 
-  next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
 
   /* mark all UTKs as visited and set validity to ultimate */
   for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
@@ -1377,7 +1381,12 @@ validate_keys (int interactive)
         {
           if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
               k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid);
-          if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+	  if (k->ownertrust == -1)
+	    {
+	      quit=1;
+	      goto leave;
+	    }
+	  else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
             ot_unknown++;
           else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
             ot_undefined++;
@@ -1448,7 +1457,7 @@ validate_keys (int interactive)
   release_key_array (keys);
   release_key_items (klist);
   release_key_hash_table (visited);
-  if (!rc) /* mark trustDB as checked */
+  if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
     {
       if (next_expire == 0xffffffff)
         tdbio_write_nextcheck (0); 

po/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+2001-10-23  gettextize  <bug-gnu-utils@gnu.org>
+
+	* Makefile.in.in: Upgrade to gettext-0.10.40.
+
+2001-10-23  gettextize  <bug-gnu-utils@gnu.org>
+
+	* Makefile.in.in: Upgrade to gettext-0.10.40.
+
 2001-09-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* POTFILES.in: Added new files.

po/Makefile.in.in

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Copyright (C) 1995-1997, 2000, 2001 by Ulrich Drepper <drepper@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
 #
 # This file file be copied and used freely without restrictions.  It can
-# be used in projects which are not available under the GNU Public License
+# be used in projects which are not available under the GNU General Public License
 # but which still want to provide support for the GNU gettext functionality.
 # Please note that the actual code is *not* freely available.
 

tools/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2001-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* Makefile.am (gpgsplit_LDADD): Add ZLIBS.
+
 2001-09-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
 
 	* gpgsplit.c: New option --uncompress.

tools/Makefile.am

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ mpicalc_LDADD =  $(needed_libs)
 bftest_LDADD =	$(needed_libs)
 
 shmtest_LDADD =  $(needed_libs)
-gpgsplit_LDADD =  $(needed_libs)
+gpgsplit_LDADD = @ZLIBS@ $(needed_libs)
 
 mpicalc bftest shmtest gpgsplit: $(needed_libs)
 

util/iobuf.c

@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ fd_cache_close (const char *fname, FILEP_OR_FD fp)
         close(fp);
 #endif
         if( DBG_IOBUF )
-            log_debug ("fd_cache_close (%p) real\n", fp);
+            log_debug ("fd_cache_close (%p) real\n", (void*)fp);
         return;
     }
     /* try to reuse a slot */