See ChangeLog: Tue Mar 2 10:38:42 CET 1999 Werner Koch

BUGS

@@ -52,17 +52,7 @@ an "info standards" to find out why a disclaimer is needed for GNU.)
     PGP decrypts 6416k out of 6424k, then complains with "PGP Warning",
     "The keyring contains a bad (corrupted) PGP packet".  The resulting
     file is missing information from the front.
-    [26.02.99: temporary fix in encrypt_simple()
+    [26.02.99: temporary fix in encrypt_simple()]
 
-[   ] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net> 0.9.3
-    %gpg --encrypt -r kazu@iijlab.net --batch foo
-    gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
-    gpg: 11C23F61: no info to calculate a trust probability
-    This creates a symmetrically encrypted message WITHOUT a session key
-    encrypted with public cryptographic(i.e. foo.gpg). This is probably
-    [26.02.99 fixed]
 
-[   ] #9 1999-02-25
-    Misalignment in md5.c#md5_write.
-    [26.02.99 fixed]
 

OBUGS

@@ -10,3 +10,19 @@
     gpg:[stdin]: key A6A59DB9: secret key not found: public key not found
     FIX: 1999-02-22 wk
 
+[  *] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net> 0.9.3
+    %gpg --encrypt -r kazu@iijlab.net --batch foo
+    gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
+    gpg: 11C23F61: no info to calculate a trust probability
+    This creates a symmetrically encrypted message WITHOUT a session key
+    encrypted with public cryptographic(i.e. foo.gpg). This is probably
+    FIX: 199-02-26 wk
+
+[ **] #9 1999-02-25
+    Misalignment in md5.c#md5_write.
+    FIX: 1999-02-26 wk
+
+[ **] #10 1999-03-01
+    Armor detection code is broken.  Direct import of keyrings is not possible.
+    FIX: 1999-03-02 wk
+

TODO

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
   * when decryptiong multiple key: print a warning only if no usable pubkey
     encrypt package was found.	Extension: display a list of all recipients.
 
-  * Can't import ring1.pgp. Compressed keys? Should print a warning.
 
 Nice to have
 ------------
@@ -33,7 +32,5 @@ Nice to have
   * Burn the buffers used by fopen(), or use read(2). Does this
     really make sense?
   * change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque
-  * How about letting something like 'gpg --version -v', list the
-    effective options. [Too much work.]
   * Stats about used random numbers.
 

doc/DETAILS

@@ -65,10 +65,12 @@ more arguments in future versions.
 	status lines ere emitted for a good signature.
 
     SIG_ID  <radix64_string>
-	This is emitted only for DSA or ElGamal signatures which
+	This is emitted only for signatures which
-	have been verified okay.  The strings is a signature id
+	have been verified okay.  The string is a signature id
-	and maybe used in applications to detect replay attacks
+	and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks
-	of signed messages.
+	of signed messages.  Note that only DLP algorithms give
+	unique ids - others may yoild duplicated ones when they
+	have been created in the same second.
 
     TRUST_UNDEFINED
     TRUST_NEVER

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+Tue Mar  2 10:38:42 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): sig-id now works for all algos.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed armor bypassing.
+
 Sun Feb 28 19:11:00 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Don't change the case of email addresses.

g10/armor.c

@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 	else if( !afx->inp_checked ) {
 	    rc = check_input( afx, a );
 	    if( afx->inp_bypass ) {
-		for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; n++ )
+		for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; )
 		    buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
 		if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
 		    afx->buffer_len = 0;

g10/sig-check.c

@@ -65,17 +65,26 @@ signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
 
     free_public_key( pk );
 
-    if( !rc && is_status_enabled()
+    if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
-	&& (   sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	/* This signature id works best with DLP algorithms because
-	    || sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL	) ) {
+	 * they use a random parameter for every signature.  Instead of
-	/* If we are using these public key algorithms we can
+	 * this sig-id we could have also used the hash of the document
-	 * calculate an unique signature id, which may be useful
+	 * and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is
-	 * in an application to prevent replac attacks */
+	 * not possible to sign more than one identical document within
+	 * one second.	Some remote bacth processing applications might
+	 * like this feature here */
 	MD_HANDLE md;
+	u32 a = sig->timestamp;
 	int i, nsig = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
 	byte *p;
 
 	md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+	md_putc( digest, sig->pubkey_algo );
+	md_putc( digest, sig->digest_algo );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >>	8) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest,  a	   & 0xff );
 	for(i=0; i < nsig; i++ ) {
 	    unsigned n = mpi_get_nbits( sig->data[i]);
 

g10/sign.c

@@ -455,106 +455,6 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
 }
 
 
-#if 0
-/****************
- * Note: We do not calculate the hash over the last CR,LF
- */
-static int
-write_dash_escaped( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, MD_HANDLE md )
-{
-    int c;
-    int lastlf = 1;
-    int state = 0;
-
-    if( opt.not_dash_escaped ) {
-	lastlf = 0;
-	while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 ) {
-	    md_putc(md, c );
-	    iobuf_put( out, c );
-	    lastlf = c;
-	}
-	if( lastlf != '\n' ) {
-	    /* add a missing trailing LF */
-	    md_putc(md, '\n' );
-	    iobuf_put( out, '\n' );
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-    }
-
-    while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 ) {
-	if( lastlf ) {
-	    if( c == '-' ) {
-		iobuf_put( out, c );
-		iobuf_put( out, ' ' );
-	    }
-	    else if( c == 'F' && opt.escape_from ) {
-		int i;
-
-		if( state >= 1 )
-		    md_putc(md, '\r');
-		if( state >= 2 )
-		    md_putc(md, '\n');
-		state = 0;
-
-		for( i=1; i < 5 && (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1; i++ ) {
-		    if( "From "[i] != c )
-			break;
-		}
-		if( i < 5 ) {
-		    iobuf_write( out, "From", i );
-		    md_write( md, "From", i );
-		    if( c == -1 )
-			break;
-		}
-		else {
-		    iobuf_writestr( out, "- From" );
-		    md_write( md, "From", 4 );
-		}
-	    }
-	}
-
-      again:
-	switch( state ) {
-	  case 0:
-	    if( c == '\r' )
-		state = 1;
-	    else
-		md_putc(md, c );
-	    break;
-	  case 1:
-	    if( c == '\n' )
-		state = 2;
-	    else {
-		md_putc(md, '\r');
-		state = 0;
-		goto again;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	  case 2:
-	    md_putc(md, '\r');
-	    md_putc(md, '\n');
-	    state = 0;
-	    goto again;
-	  default: BUG();
-	}
-	iobuf_put( out, c );
-	lastlf = c == '\n';
-    }
-    if( state == 1 )
-	md_putc(md, '\r');
-    else if( state == 2 ) {  /* file ended with a new line */
-	md_putc(md, '\r');
-	md_putc(md, '\n');
-	iobuf_put( out, '\n');
-    }
-
-    if( !lastlf )
-	iobuf_put( out, '\n' );
-
-    return 0; /* fixme: add error handling */
-}
-#endif
 
 /****************
  * make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed

g10/trustdb.c

@@ -996,6 +996,10 @@ collect_paths( int depth, int max_depth, int all, TRUSTREC *drec,
 typedef struct {
     ulong lid;
     ulong uid;
+    byte uid_flags;
+    byte uid_validity;
+    byte dir_flags;
+    byte ownertrust;
 } CERT_ITEM;
 
 /* structure to hold certification chains. Item[nitems-1] is the
@@ -1033,7 +1037,7 @@ add_cert_items_to_set( CERT_CHAIN *set_head, CERT_ITEM *items, int nitems )
 
 /****************
  * Find all certification paths of a given LID.
- * Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH. stack is a helper variable which
+ * Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH.  stack is a helper variable which
  * should have been allocated with size max_depth, stack[0] should
  * be setup to the key we are investigating, so the minimal depth
  * we should ever see in this function is 1.
@@ -1076,6 +1080,9 @@ find_cert_chain( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth,
     /* Performance hint: add stuff to ignore this one when the
      *			 assigned validity of the key is bad   */
 
+    stack[depth].dir_flags = dirrec.r.dir.dirflags;
+    stack[depth].ownertrust = dirrec.r.dir.ownertrust;
+
     /* loop over all user ids */
     for( uidrno = dirrec.r.dir.uidlist; uidrno; uidrno = uidrec.r.uid.next ) {
 	TRUSTREC sigrec;
@@ -1083,6 +1090,8 @@ find_cert_chain( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth,
 
 	stack[depth].uid = uidrno;
 	read_record( uidrno, &uidrec, RECTYPE_UID );
+	stack[depth].uid_flags = uidrec.r.uid.uidflags;
+	stack[depth].uid_validity = uidrec.r.uid.validity;
 
 	if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED) )
 	    continue; /* user id has not been checked */
@@ -1562,13 +1571,16 @@ list_trust_path( const char *username )
 	find_cert_chain( lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, stack, &chains);
 	m_free( stack );
 	/* dump chains */
+	printf("lid/uid(ownertrust,validity):\n");
 	for(r=chains; r ; r = r->next ) {
 	    printf("chain:" );
 	    for(i=0; i < r->nitems; i++ )
-		printf(" %4lu/%-4lu", r->items[i].lid, r->items[i].uid );
+		printf("  %lu/%lu(%d,%d)", r->items[i].lid, r->items[i].uid,
+			r->items[i].ownertrust,
+			(r->items[i].uid_flags & UIDF_VALVALID )?
+					       r->items[i].uid_validity : 0 );
 	    putchar('\n');
 	}
-
     }
   #endif
 }