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See ChangeLog: Tue Mar 2 10:38:42 CET 1999 Werner Koch

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1999-03-02 09:41:49 +00:00
parent 0f5bb383b5
commit c27c7416d5
9 changed files with 60 additions and 128 deletions
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12
BUGS
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@ -52,17 +52,7 @@ an "info standards" to find out why a disclaimer is needed for GNU.)
PGP decrypts 6416k out of 6424k, then complains with "PGP Warning",
"The keyring contains a bad (corrupted) PGP packet". The resulting
file is missing information from the front.
[26.02.99: temporary fix in encrypt_simple()
[26.02.99: temporary fix in encrypt_simple()]
[ ] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net> 0.9.3
%gpg --encrypt -r kazu@iijlab.net --batch foo
gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
gpg: 11C23F61: no info to calculate a trust probability
This creates a symmetrically encrypted message WITHOUT a session key
encrypted with public cryptographic(i.e. foo.gpg). This is probably
[26.02.99 fixed]
[ ] #9 1999-02-25
Misalignment in md5.c#md5_write.
[26.02.99 fixed]

16
OBUGS
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@ -10,3 +10,19 @@
gpg:[stdin]: key A6A59DB9: secret key not found: public key not found
FIX: 1999-02-22 wk
[ *] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net> 0.9.3
%gpg --encrypt -r kazu@iijlab.net --batch foo
gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
gpg: 11C23F61: no info to calculate a trust probability
This creates a symmetrically encrypted message WITHOUT a session key
encrypted with public cryptographic(i.e. foo.gpg). This is probably
FIX: 199-02-26 wk
[ **] #9 1999-02-25
Misalignment in md5.c#md5_write.
FIX: 1999-02-26 wk
[ **] #10 1999-03-01
Armor detection code is broken. Direct import of keyrings is not possible.
FIX: 1999-03-02 wk

3
TODO
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@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
* when decryptiong multiple key: print a warning only if no usable pubkey
encrypt package was found. Extension: display a list of all recipients.
* Can't import ring1.pgp. Compressed keys? Should print a warning.
Nice to have
------------
@ -33,7 +32,5 @@ Nice to have
* Burn the buffers used by fopen(), or use read(2). Does this
really make sense?
* change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque
* How about letting something like 'gpg --version -v', list the
effective options. [Too much work.]
* Stats about used random numbers.

10
doc/DETAILS
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@ -65,10 +65,12 @@ more arguments in future versions.
status lines ere emitted for a good signature.
SIG_ID <radix64_string>
This is emitted only for DSA or ElGamal signatures which
have been verified okay. The strings is a signature id
and maybe used in applications to detect replay attacks
of signed messages.
This is emitted only for signatures which
have been verified okay. The string is a signature id
and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks
of signed messages. Note that only DLP algorithms give
unique ids - others may yoild duplicated ones when they
have been created in the same second.
TRUST_UNDEFINED
TRUST_NEVER

6
g10/ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
Tue Mar 2 10:38:42 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* sig-check.c (signature_check): sig-id now works for all algos.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed armor bypassing.
Sun Feb 28 19:11:00 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Don't change the case of email addresses.

2
g10/armor.c
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@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
else if( !afx->inp_checked ) {
rc = check_input( afx, a );
if( afx->inp_bypass ) {
for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; n++ )
for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; )
buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
afx->buffer_len = 0;

21
g10/sig-check.c
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@ -65,17 +65,26 @@ signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
free_public_key( pk );
if( !rc && is_status_enabled()
&& ( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) ) {
/* If we are using these public key algorithms we can
* calculate an unique signature id, which may be useful
* in an application to prevent replac attacks */
if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
/* This signature id works best with DLP algorithms because
* they use a random parameter for every signature. Instead of
* this sig-id we could have also used the hash of the document
* and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is
* not possible to sign more than one identical document within
* one second. Some remote bacth processing applications might
* like this feature here */
MD_HANDLE md;
u32 a = sig->timestamp;
int i, nsig = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
byte *p;
md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
md_putc( digest, sig->pubkey_algo );
md_putc( digest, sig->digest_algo );
md_putc( digest, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
md_putc( digest, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
md_putc( digest, (a >> 8) & 0xff );
md_putc( digest, a & 0xff );
for(i=0; i < nsig; i++ ) {
unsigned n = mpi_get_nbits( sig->data[i]);

100
g10/sign.c
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@ -455,106 +455,6 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
}
#if 0
/****************
* Note: We do not calculate the hash over the last CR,LF
*/
static int
write_dash_escaped( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, MD_HANDLE md )
{
int c;
int lastlf = 1;
int state = 0;
if( opt.not_dash_escaped ) {
lastlf = 0;
while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 ) {
md_putc(md, c );
iobuf_put( out, c );
lastlf = c;
}
if( lastlf != '\n' ) {
/* add a missing trailing LF */
md_putc(md, '\n' );
iobuf_put( out, '\n' );
}
return 0;
}
while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 ) {
if( lastlf ) {
if( c == '-' ) {
iobuf_put( out, c );
iobuf_put( out, ' ' );
}
else if( c == 'F' && opt.escape_from ) {
int i;
if( state >= 1 )
md_putc(md, '\r');
if( state >= 2 )
md_putc(md, '\n');
state = 0;
for( i=1; i < 5 && (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1; i++ ) {
if( "From "[i] != c )
break;
}
if( i < 5 ) {
iobuf_write( out, "From", i );
md_write( md, "From", i );
if( c == -1 )
break;
}
else {
iobuf_writestr( out, "- From" );
md_write( md, "From", 4 );
}
}
}
again:
switch( state ) {
case 0:
if( c == '\r' )
state = 1;
else
md_putc(md, c );
break;
case 1:
if( c == '\n' )
state = 2;
else {
md_putc(md, '\r');
state = 0;
goto again;
}
break;
case 2:
md_putc(md, '\r');
md_putc(md, '\n');
state = 0;
goto again;
default: BUG();
}
iobuf_put( out, c );
lastlf = c == '\n';
}
if( state == 1 )
md_putc(md, '\r');
else if( state == 2 ) { /* file ended with a new line */
md_putc(md, '\r');
md_putc(md, '\n');
iobuf_put( out, '\n');
}
if( !lastlf )
iobuf_put( out, '\n' );
return 0; /* fixme: add error handling */
}
#endif
/****************
* make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed

18
g10/trustdb.c
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@ -996,6 +996,10 @@ collect_paths( int depth, int max_depth, int all, TRUSTREC *drec,
typedef struct {
ulong lid;
ulong uid;
byte uid_flags;
byte uid_validity;
byte dir_flags;
byte ownertrust;
} CERT_ITEM;
/* structure to hold certification chains. Item[nitems-1] is the
@ -1033,7 +1037,7 @@ add_cert_items_to_set( CERT_CHAIN *set_head, CERT_ITEM *items, int nitems )
/****************
* Find all certification paths of a given LID.
* Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH. stack is a helper variable which
* Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH. stack is a helper variable which
* should have been allocated with size max_depth, stack[0] should
* be setup to the key we are investigating, so the minimal depth
* we should ever see in this function is 1.
@ -1076,6 +1080,9 @@ find_cert_chain( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth,
/* Performance hint: add stuff to ignore this one when the
* assigned validity of the key is bad */
stack[depth].dir_flags = dirrec.r.dir.dirflags;
stack[depth].ownertrust = dirrec.r.dir.ownertrust;
/* loop over all user ids */
for( uidrno = dirrec.r.dir.uidlist; uidrno; uidrno = uidrec.r.uid.next ) {
TRUSTREC sigrec;
@ -1083,6 +1090,8 @@ find_cert_chain( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth,
stack[depth].uid = uidrno;
read_record( uidrno, &uidrec, RECTYPE_UID );
stack[depth].uid_flags = uidrec.r.uid.uidflags;
stack[depth].uid_validity = uidrec.r.uid.validity;
if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED) )
continue; /* user id has not been checked */
@ -1562,13 +1571,16 @@ list_trust_path( const char *username )
find_cert_chain( lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, stack, &chains);
m_free( stack );
/* dump chains */
printf("lid/uid(ownertrust,validity):\n");
for(r=chains; r ; r = r->next ) {
printf("chain:" );
for(i=0; i < r->nitems; i++ )
printf(" %4lu/%-4lu", r->items[i].lid, r->items[i].uid );
printf(" %lu/%lu(%d,%d)", r->items[i].lid, r->items[i].uid,
r->items[i].ownertrust,
(r->items[i].uid_flags & UIDF_VALVALID )?
r->items[i].uid_validity : 0 );
putchar('\n');
}
}
#endif
}