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* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Properly handle nonrevocable

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signatures that can expire.  In short, the only thing that can override an
unexpired nonrevocable signature is another unexpired nonrevocable
signature.

* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Always use primary signing key for signatures
when --pgp6 is on since pgp6 and 7 do not understand signatures made by
signing subkeys.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2002-04-18 18:23:22 +00:00
parent 37c268ed6a
commit c07113d265
3 changed files with 59 additions and 21 deletions
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11
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
2002-04-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Properly handle nonrevocable
signatures that can expire. In short, the only thing that can
override an unexpired nonrevocable signature is another unexpired
nonrevocable signature.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Always use primary signing key for
signatures when --pgp6 is on since pgp6 and 7 do not understand
signatures made by signing subkeys.
2002-04-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Never schedule a nextcheck into the

11
g10/getkey.c
View File

@ -1826,7 +1826,10 @@ finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;
#define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
unsigned int req_usage = ( ctx->req_usage & USAGE_MASK );
int req_cert = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
/* Request the primary if we're certifying another key, and also
if --pgp6 is on (since pgp 6 (and 7) do not understand
signatures made by a signing subkey. */
int req_prim = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) | opt.pgp6;
u32 latest_date;
KBNODE latest_key;
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
@ -1877,7 +1880,7 @@ finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
latest_date = 0;
latest_key = NULL;
/* do not look at subkeys if a certification key is requested */
if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_cert) {
if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_prim) {
KBNODE nextk;
/* either start a loop or check just this one subkey */
for (k=foundk?foundk:keyblock; k; k = nextk ) {
@ -1930,9 +1933,9 @@ finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
/* Okay now try the primary key unless we want an exact
* key ID match on a subkey */
if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_cert) {
if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_prim) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_cert )
if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_prim )
log_debug( "\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if ( !pk->is_valid ) {

58
g10/trustdb.c
View File

@ -1057,26 +1057,50 @@ mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
continue;
n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
/* If the current signode is a nonrevocable signature, and
we're checking a revocation, then skip. Note that this
will let more recent signatures replace the nonrevocable
signature. Is that the proper behavior? */
if(IS_UID_REV(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable)
/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
automatically fine. */
if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
continue;
/* A nonrevocable signature n should always replace a
revocation in signode. If n is newer, then there is no
question. If n is older, then it should still replace
signode as the revocation in signode is invalid because n
is nonrevocable. */
/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
automatically fine. */
if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
{
signode = n;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
continue;
}
if ((sig->timestamp >= sigdate) ||
(IS_UID_REV(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable))
/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
their original order. */
if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
{
signode = n;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;