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Exporting secret keys via gpg-agent is now basically supported.

A couple of forward ported changes.
Doc updates.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2010-10-01 20:33:53 +00:00
parent aeb31977ec
commit bfbd80feb9
72 changed files with 1930 additions and 546 deletions

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* export.c
/* export.c - Export keys in the OpenPGP defined format.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
* 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* 2005, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "call-agent.h"
/* An object to keep track of subkeys. */
struct subkey_list_s
@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ struct subkey_list_s
typedef struct subkey_list_s *subkey_list_t;
static int do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options );
static int do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret,
KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options,
int *any );
static int do_export (ctrl_t ctrl,
strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options );
static int do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out,
strlist_t users, int secret,
kbnode_t *keyblock_out, unsigned int options,
int *any);
static int build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent);
@ -63,8 +65,6 @@ parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
N_("export attribute user IDs (generally photo IDs)")},
{"export-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,
N_("export revocation keys marked as \"sensitive\"")},
{"export-reset-subkey-passwd",EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD,NULL,
N_("remove the passphrase from exported subkeys")},
{"export-clean",EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
N_("remove unusable parts from key during export")},
{"export-minimal",EXPORT_MINIMAL|EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
* options are defined in main.h.
* If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported. */
int
export_pubkeys( strlist_t users, unsigned int options )
export_pubkeys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t users, unsigned int options )
{
return do_export( users, 0, options );
return do_export (ctrl, users, 0, options );
}
/****************
@ -103,35 +103,41 @@ export_pubkeys( strlist_t users, unsigned int options )
* been exported
*/
int
export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users,
KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options )
export_pubkeys_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users,
kbnode_t *keyblock_out, unsigned int options )
{
int any, rc;
rc = do_export_stream( out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any );
if( !rc && !any )
rc = -1;
return rc;
int any, rc;
rc = do_export_stream (ctrl, out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any);
if (!rc && !any)
rc = -1;
return rc;
}
int
export_seckeys( strlist_t users )
export_seckeys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t users )
{
/* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */
unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT);
return do_export( users, 1, options );
return do_export (ctrl, users, 1, options);
}
int
export_secsubkeys( strlist_t users )
export_secsubkeys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t users )
{
/* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */
unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT);
return do_export( users, 2, options );
return do_export (ctrl, users, 2, options);
}
/* Export the keys identified by the list of strings in USERS. If
Secret is false public keys will be exported. With secret true
secret keys will be exported; in this case 1 means the entire
secret keyblock and 2 only the subkeys. OPTIONS are the export
options to apply. */
static int
do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options )
do_export (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options )
{
IOBUF out = NULL;
int any, rc;
@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options )
push_compress_filter (out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
}
rc = do_export_stream ( out, users, secret, NULL, options, &any );
rc = do_export_stream (ctrl, out, users, secret, NULL, options, &any );
if ( rc || !any )
iobuf_cancel (out);
@ -275,11 +281,324 @@ exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node)
}
/* If keyblock_out is non-NULL, AND the exit code is zero, then it
contains a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported. No
other keyblocks are exported. The caller must free it. */
/* Return a canonicalized public key algoithms. This is used to
compare different flavors of algorithms (e.g. ELG and ELG_E are
considered the same). */
static int
do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
canon_pubkey_algo (int algo)
{
switch (algo)
{
case GCRY_PK_RSA:
case GCRY_PK_RSA_E:
case GCRY_PK_RSA_S: return GCRY_PK_RSA;
case GCRY_PK_ELG:
case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: return GCRY_PK_ELG;
default: return algo;
}
}
/* Use the key transfer format given in S_PGP to create the secinfo
structure in PK and chnage the parameter array in PK to include the
secret parameters. */
static gpg_error_t
transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t top_list;
gcry_sexp_t list = NULL;
const char *value;
size_t valuelen;
char *string;
int idx;
int is_v4, is_protected;
int pubkey_algo;
int protect_algo = 0;
char iv[16];
int ivlen = 0;
int s2k_mode = 0;
int s2k_algo = 0;
byte s2k_salt[8];
u32 s2k_count = 0;
size_t npkey, nskey;
gcry_mpi_t skey[10]; /* We support up to 9 parameters. */
u16 desired_csum;
int skeyidx = 0;
struct seckey_info *ski;
top_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_pgp, "openpgp-private-key", 0);
if (!top_list)
goto bad_seckey;
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "version", 0);
if (!list)
goto bad_seckey;
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 1, &valuelen);
if (!value || valuelen != 1 || !(value[0] == '3' || value[0] == '4'))
goto bad_seckey;
is_v4 = (value[0] == '4');
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "protection", 0);
if (!list)
goto bad_seckey;
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 1, &valuelen);
if (!value)
goto bad_seckey;
if (valuelen == 4 && !memcmp (value, "sha1", 4))
is_protected = 2;
else if (valuelen == 3 && !memcmp (value, "sum", 3))
is_protected = 1;
else if (valuelen == 4 && !memcmp (value, "none", 4))
is_protected = 0;
else
goto bad_seckey;
if (is_protected)
{
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 2);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
protect_algo = gcry_cipher_map_name (string);
xfree (string);
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 3, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen || valuelen > sizeof iv)
goto bad_seckey;
memcpy (iv, value, valuelen);
ivlen = valuelen;
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 4);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
s2k_mode = strtol (string, NULL, 10);
xfree (string);
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 5);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
s2k_algo = gcry_md_map_name (string);
xfree (string);
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 6, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen || valuelen > sizeof s2k_salt)
goto bad_seckey;
memcpy (s2k_salt, value, valuelen);
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 7);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
s2k_count = strtoul (string, NULL, 10);
xfree (string);
}
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "algo", 0);
if (!list)
goto bad_seckey;
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 1);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
pubkey_algo = gcry_pk_map_name (string);
xfree (string);
if (gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NPKEY, NULL, &npkey)
|| gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY, NULL, &nskey)
|| !npkey || npkey >= nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
goto bad_seckey;
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "skey", 0);
if (!list)
goto bad_seckey;
for (idx=0;;)
{
int is_enc;
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, ++idx, &valuelen);
if (!value && skeyidx >= npkey)
break; /* Ready. */
/* Check for too many parameters. Note that depending on the
protection mode and version number we may see less than NSKEY
(but at least NPKEY+1) parameters. */
if (idx >= 2*nskey)
goto bad_seckey;
if (skeyidx >= DIM (skey)-1)
goto bad_seckey;
if (!value || valuelen != 1 || !(value[0] == '_' || value[0] == 'e'))
goto bad_seckey;
is_enc = (value[0] == 'e');
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, ++idx, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen)
goto bad_seckey;
if (is_enc)
{
void *p = xtrymalloc (valuelen);
if (!p)
goto outofmem;
memcpy (p, value, valuelen);
skey[skeyidx] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, p, valuelen*8);
if (!skey[skeyidx])
goto outofmem;
}
else
{
if (gcry_mpi_scan (skey + skeyidx, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD,
value, valuelen, NULL))
goto bad_seckey;
}
skeyidx++;
}
skey[skeyidx++] = NULL;
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "csum", 0);
if (list)
{
string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 1);
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
desired_csum = strtoul (string, NULL, 10);
xfree (string);
}
else
desired_csum = 0;
gcry_sexp_release (list); list = NULL;
gcry_sexp_release (top_list); top_list = NULL;
/* log_debug ("XXX is_v4=%d\n", is_v4); */
/* log_debug ("XXX pubkey_algo=%d\n", pubkey_algo); */
/* log_debug ("XXX is_protected=%d\n", is_protected); */
/* log_debug ("XXX protect_algo=%d\n", protect_algo); */
/* log_printhex ("XXX iv", iv, ivlen); */
/* log_debug ("XXX ivlen=%d\n", ivlen); */
/* log_debug ("XXX s2k_mode=%d\n", s2k_mode); */
/* log_debug ("XXX s2k_algo=%d\n", s2k_algo); */
/* log_printhex ("XXX s2k_salt", s2k_salt, sizeof s2k_salt); */
/* log_debug ("XXX s2k_count=%lu\n", (unsigned long)s2k_count); */
/* for (idx=0; skey[idx]; idx++) */
/* { */
/* int is_enc = gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE); */
/* log_info ("XXX skey[%d]%s:", idx, is_enc? " (enc)":""); */
/* if (is_enc) */
/* { */
/* void *p; */
/* unsigned int nbits; */
/* p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (skey[idx], &nbits); */
/* log_printhex (NULL, p, (nbits+7)/8); */
/* } */
/* else */
/* gcry_mpi_dump (skey[idx]); */
/* log_printf ("\n"); */
/* } */
if (!is_v4 || is_protected != 2 )
{
/* We only support the v4 format and a SHA-1 checksum. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
goto leave;
}
/* Do some sanity checks. */
if (s2k_count <= 1024)
{
/* The count must be larger so that encode_s2k_iterations does
not fall into a backward compatibility mode. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
if (canon_pubkey_algo (pubkey_algo) != canon_pubkey_algo (pk->pubkey_algo))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO);
goto leave;
}
err = openpgp_cipher_test_algo (protect_algo);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = openpgp_md_test_algo (s2k_algo);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Check that the public key parameters match. */
for (idx=0; idx < npkey; idx++)
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
|| gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
|| gcry_mpi_cmp (pk->pkey[idx], skey[idx]))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
goto leave;
}
/* Check that the first secret key parameter in SKEY is encrypted
and that there are no more secret key parameters. The latter is
guaranteed by the v4 packet format. */
if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
goto bad_seckey;
if (npkey+1 < DIM (skey) && skey[npkey+1])
goto bad_seckey;
/* Check that the secret key parameters in PK are all set to NULL. */
for (idx=npkey; idx < nskey; idx++)
if (pk->pkey[idx])
goto bad_seckey;
/* Now build the protection info. */
pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
if (!ski)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ski->is_protected = 1;
ski->sha1chk = 1;
ski->algo = protect_algo;
ski->s2k.mode = s2k_mode;
ski->s2k.hash_algo = s2k_algo;
assert (sizeof ski->s2k.salt == sizeof s2k_salt);
memcpy (ski->s2k.salt, s2k_salt, sizeof s2k_salt);
ski->s2k.count = encode_s2k_iterations (s2k_count);
assert (ivlen <= sizeof ski->iv);
memcpy (ski->iv, iv, ivlen);
ski->ivlen = ivlen;
/* Store the protected secret key parameter. */
pk->pkey[npkey] = skey[npkey];
skey[npkey] = NULL;
/* That's it. */
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (list);
gcry_sexp_release (top_list);
for (idx=0; idx < skeyidx; idx++)
gcry_mpi_release (skey[idx]);
return err;
bad_seckey:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto leave;
outofmem:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
goto leave;
}
/* Export the keys identified by the list of strings in USERS to the
stream OUT. If Secret is false public keys will be exported. With
secret true secret keys will be exported; in this case 1 means the
entire secret keyblock and 2 only the subkeys. OPTIONS are the
export options to apply. If KEYBLOCK_OUT is not NULL, AND the exit
code is zero, a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported
will be stored at this address; no other keyblocks are exported in
this case. The caller must free it the returned keyblock. If any
key has been exported true is stored at ANY. */
static int
do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
kbnode_t *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, int *any)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
@ -292,6 +611,7 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
strlist_t sl;
int indent = 0;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
*any = 0;
init_packet (&pkt);
@ -330,21 +650,51 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
if (secret)
{
log_error (_("exporting secret keys not allowed\n"));
err = G10ERR_GENERAL;
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto leave;
}
#endif
/* For secret key export we need to setup a decryption context. */
if (secret)
{
void *kek = NULL;
size_t keklen;
err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 1, &kek, &keklen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Prepare a cipher context. */
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error setting up an encryption context: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
xfree (kek);
kek = NULL;
}
while (!(err = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex)))
{
int sha1_warned = 0;
int skip_until_subkey = 0;
u32 keyid[2];
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (!users)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
/* Read the keyblock. */
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keyblock = NULL;
err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
if (err)
{
@ -352,60 +702,57 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
goto leave;
}
if ((node=find_kbnode(keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
log_error ("public key packet not found in keyblock - skipped\n");
continue;
}
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
/* If a secret key export is required we need to check whether
we have a secret key at all and if so create the seckey_info
structure. */
if (secret)
{
if (agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock))
continue; /* No secret key (neither primary nor subkey). */
/* We can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key. */
if( secret == 2
&& pk->seckey_info && !pk->seckey_info->is_protected )
/* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */
if (secret == 2 && pk->version == 3)
{
log_info (_("key %s: not protected - skipped\n"),
log_info (_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"),
keystr (keyid));
continue;
}
/* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */
if( secret == 2 && pk->version == 3 )
/* The agent does not yet allow to export v3 packets. It is
actually questionable whether we should allow them at
all. */
if (pk->version == 3)
{
log_info(_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"),
keystr (keyid));
log_info ("key %s: PGP 2.x style key (v3) export "
"not yet supported - skipped\n", keystr (keyid));
continue;
}
}
/* It does not make sense to export a key with a primary
key on card using a non-key stub. We simply skip those
keys when used with --export-secret-subkeys. */
if (secret == 2
&& pk->seckey_info && pk->seckey_info->is_protected
&& pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002 )
{
log_info(_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"),
keystr (keyid));
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* It's a public key export, so do the cleaning if
requested. Note that both export-clean and
export-minimal only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11, 0x12,
and 0x13). A designated revocation is never stripped,
even with export-minimal set. */
if ( (options & EXPORT_CLEAN) )
clean_key (keyblock, opt.verbose, options&EXPORT_MINIMAL,
NULL, NULL);
}
/* Always do the cleaning on the public key part if requested.
Note that we don't yet set this option if we are exporting
secret keys. Note that both export-clean and export-minimal
only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11, 0x12, and 0x13). A
designated revocation is never stripped, even with
export-minimal set. */
if ((options & EXPORT_CLEAN))
clean_key (keyblock, opt.verbose, (options&EXPORT_MINIMAL), NULL, NULL);
/* And write it. */
for (kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0)); )
{
if (skip_until_subkey)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
skip_until_subkey = 0;
else
continue;
@ -425,8 +772,7 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
(plus the primary key, if the user didn't specifically
request it). */
if (desc[descindex].exact
&& (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
if (!exact_subkey_match_p (desc+descindex, node))
{
@ -440,9 +786,9 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
skip in any case if the key is in that list.
We need this whole mess because the import
function is not able to merge secret keys and
thus it is useless to output them as two separate
keys and have import merge them. */
function of GnuPG < 2.1 is not able to merge
secret keys and thus it is useless to output them
as two separate keys and have import merge them. */
if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */
else
@ -508,88 +854,181 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
continue;
}
if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
if (secret && (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
{
/* We don't want to export the secret parts of the
* primary key, this is done by temporary switching to
* GNU protection mode 1001. */
int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.public_key->seckey_info->s2k.mode;
node->pkt->pkt.public_key->seckey_info->s2k.mode = 1001;
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
u32 subkidbuf[2], *subkid;
char *hexgrip, *serialno;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
subkid = NULL;
else
err = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
node->pkt->pkt.public_key->seckey_info->s2k.mode = save_mode;
}
else if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& (opt.export_options&EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD))
{
/* If the subkey is protected reset the passphrase to
export an unprotected subkey. This feature is useful
in cases of a subkey copied to an unattended machine
where a passphrase is not required. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
goto leave;
#warning We need to implement this
/* PKT_secret_key *sk_save, *sk; */
{
keyid_from_pk (pk, subkidbuf);
subkid = subkidbuf;
}
/* sk_save = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; */
/* sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk_save); */
/* node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk; */
if (pk->seckey_info)
{
log_error ("key %s: oops: seckey_info already set"
" - skipped\n", keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid));
skip_until_subkey = 1;
continue;
}
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
{
log_error ("key %s: error computing keygrip: %s"
" - skipped\n", keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid),
gpg_strerror (err));
skip_until_subkey = 1;
err = 0;
continue;
}
/* log_info (_("about to export an unprotected subkey\n")); */
/* switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk)) */
/* { */
/* case -1: */
/* err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); */
/* break; */
/* case 0: */
/* break; */
/* default: */
/* if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001) */
/* ; /\* No secret parts. *\/ */
/* else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) */
/* ; /\* Card key stub. *\/ */
/* else */
/* { */
/* /\* err = check_secret_key( sk, 0 ); *\/ */
/* } */
/* break; */
/* } */
/* if (err) */
/* { */
/* node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save; */
/* free_secret_key (sk); */
/* log_error (_("failed to unprotect the subkey: %s\n"), */
/* g10_errstr (rc)); */
/* goto leave; */
/* } */
if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
/* We are asked not to export the secret parts of
the primary key. Make up an error code to create
the stub. */
err = GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
serialno = NULL;
}
else
err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno);
/* if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT)) */
/* err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent); */
/* else */
/* err = build_packet (out, node->pkt); */
if ((!err && serialno)
&& secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
/* It does not make sense to export a key with its
primary key on card using a non-key stub. Thus
we skip those keys when used with
--export-secret-subkeys. */
log_info (_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"),
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid));
skip_until_subkey = 1;
}
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND
|| (!err && serialno))
{
/* Create a key stub. */
struct seckey_info *ski;
const char *s;
pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
if (!ski)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (hexgrip);
goto leave;
}
/* node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save; */
/* free_secret_key (sk); */
ski->is_protected = 1;
if (err)
ski->s2k.mode = 1001; /* GNU dummy (no secret key). */
else
{
ski->s2k.mode = 1002; /* GNU-divert-to-card. */
for (s=serialno; sizeof (ski->ivlen) && *s && s[1];
ski->ivlen++, s += 2)
ski->iv[ski->ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
err = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
}
else if (!err)
{
/* FIXME: Move this spaghetti code into a separate
function. */
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
unsigned char *key = NULL;
size_t keylen, realkeylen;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("key %s: asking agent for the secret parts\n",
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid));
err = agent_export_key (ctrl, hexgrip, "Key foo", NULL,
&wrappedkey, &wrappedkeylen);
if (err)
goto unwraperror;
if (wrappedkeylen < 24)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
goto unwraperror;
}
keylen = wrappedkeylen - 8;
key = xtrymalloc_secure (keylen);
if (!key)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto unwraperror;
}
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipherhd, key, keylen,
wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
if (err)
goto unwraperror;
realkeylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, keylen, NULL, &err);
if (!realkeylen)
goto unwraperror; /* Invalid csexp. */
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, NULL, key, realkeylen);
xfree (key);
key = NULL;
if (err)
goto unwraperror;
err = transfer_format_to_openpgp (s_skey, pk);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
if (err)
goto unwraperror;
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
err = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
goto unwraperror_leave;
unwraperror:
xfree (wrappedkey);
xfree (key);
if (err)
{
log_error ("key %s: error receiving key from agent:"
" %s%s\n",
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid),
gpg_strerror (err),
gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED?
"":_(" - skipped"));
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
goto leave;
skip_until_subkey = 1;
err = 0;
}
unwraperror_leave:
;
}
else
{
log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s"
" - skipped\n", keystr_with_sub (keyid, subkid),
gpg_strerror (err));
skip_until_subkey = 1;
err = 0;
}
xfree (pk->seckey_info);
pk->seckey_info = NULL;
xfree (hexgrip);
}
else
{
/* Warn the user if the secret key or any of the secret
subkeys are protected with SHA1 and we have
simple_sk_checksum set. */
if (!sha1_warned && opt.simple_sk_checksum &&
(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
&& node->pkt->pkt.public_key->seckey_info->sha1chk)
{
/* I hope this warning doesn't confuse people. */
log_info(_("WARNING: secret key %s does not have a "
"simple SK checksum\n"), keystr (keyid));
sha1_warned = 1;
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
@ -602,6 +1041,9 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
node->pkt->pkttype, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (!skip_until_subkey)
*any = 1;
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent)
@ -611,10 +1053,9 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
iobuf_put (out, '\n');
}
++*any;
if(keyblock_out)
if (keyblock_out)
{
*keyblock_out=keyblock;
*keyblock_out = keyblock;
break;
}
}
@ -624,10 +1065,11 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
iobuf_put (out, ')');
iobuf_put (out, '\n');
}
if( err == -1 )
if (err == -1)
err = 0;
leave:
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
release_subkey_list (subkey_list);
xfree(desc);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
@ -672,6 +1114,10 @@ do_export_stream (iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
static int
build_sexp_seckey (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
{
(void)out;
(void)pkt;
(void)indent;
/* FIXME: Not yet implemented. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
/* PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key; */
@ -759,4 +1205,3 @@ build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
}
return rc;
}