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* g10.c (main): Add --no-throw-keyid.

Browse source 
* keydb.h, encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list), g10.c (main), pkclist.c
(build_pk_list): Add --hidden-recipient (-R) and --hidden-encrypt-to,
which do a single-user variation on --throw-keyid.  The "hide this key"
flag is carried in bit 0 of the pk_list flags field.

* keyserver.c (parse_keyrec): Fix shadowing warning.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2002-11-01 16:15:45 +00:00
parent 7b4ad0f64c
commit bdf0e306df
6 changed files with 69 additions and 12 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

40
g10/pkclist.c
View file

@ -808,7 +808,21 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
* list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them) */
for( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next ) {
if( !(rov->flags & 1) )
{
any_recipients = 1;
if((rov->flags&2) && (opt.pgp2 || opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-recipient",
opt.pgp2?"--pgp2":opt.pgp6?"--pgp6":"--pgp7");
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),
opt.pgp2?"PGP 2.x":opt.pgp6?"PGP 6.x":"PGP 7.x");
opt.pgp2=opt.pgp6=opt.pgp7=0;
}
}
else if( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) {
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = use;
@ -832,8 +846,20 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
r->flags = (rov->flags&2)?1:0;
pk_list = r;
if(r->flags&1 && (opt.pgp2 || opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-encrypt-to",
opt.pgp2?"--pgp2":opt.pgp6?"--pgp6":"--pgp7");
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),
opt.pgp2?"PGP 2.x":opt.pgp6?"PGP 6.x":"PGP 7.x");
opt.pgp2=opt.pgp6=opt.pgp7=0;
}
}
}
else {
@ -896,7 +922,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
r->flags = 0; /* no throwing default ids */
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
@ -936,7 +962,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
r->flags = 0; /* no throwing interactive ids */
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
@ -970,7 +996,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
r->flags = 0; /* no throwing default ids */
pk_list = r;
}
}
@ -1030,7 +1056,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
r->flags = (remusr->flags&2)?1:0;
pk_list = r;
}
}
@ -1266,7 +1292,7 @@ select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
* algorithm 1 is also available (the ordering is not relevant
* in this case). */
if( bits[0] & (1<<1) )
i = 1; /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
i = 1; /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
}
/* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
@ -1274,7 +1300,7 @@ select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the
recipient requests it." RFC2440:13. If we settle on MD5, and
SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead. Of course, if the
user intentinally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
user intentionally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
prefs), then we should do what they say. */
if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH &&