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MDC feature support and other stuff

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2001-08-30 16:39:23 +00:00
parent 64d586ef17
commit bab40b52cd
24 changed files with 404 additions and 331 deletions
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70
g10/getkey.c
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@ -542,55 +542,8 @@ get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
int
seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
{
#if 0
int rc;
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
KBNODE kb = NULL;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = 11;
ctx.items[0].keyid[0] = keyid[0];
ctx.items[0].keyid[1] = keyid[1];
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
get_seckey_end( &ctx );
release_kbnode ( kb );
return rc;
#endif
int rc;
int found = 0;
int oldmode = set_packet_list_mode (0);
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBPOS kbpos;
rc = enum_keyblocks ( 5, &kbpos, NULL );
if ( !rc ) {
while ( !(rc = enum_keyblocks (1, &kbpos, &keyblock)) ) {
KBNODE k;
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 aki[2];
keyid_from_sk (k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki );
if( aki[1] == keyid[1] && aki[0] == keyid[0] ) {
found = 1;
goto leave;
}
}
}
release_kbnode (keyblock); keyblock = NULL;
}
}
if( rc && rc != -1 )
log_error ("enum_keyblocks failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
enum_keyblocks ( 2, &kbpos, NULL );
set_packet_list_mode (oldmode);
return found? 0 : G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
KBPOS dummy_kbpos;
return find_secret_keyblock_direct (&dummy_kbpos, keyid)? G10ERR_NO_SECKEY:0;
}
@ -1458,7 +1411,7 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
* from the hashed list but if there are no such preferences, we
* try to get them from the unhashed list. There is no risk with
* that, because our implementation comes only with strong
* algorithms and it woulkd be fruitless for an attacker to insert
* algorithms and it would be fruitless for an attacker to insert
* an weak algorithm. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
@ -1490,6 +1443,18 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
}
/* see whether we have the MDC feature */
uid->mdc_feature = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
if (!p)
n=0;
for (; n; n--, p++) {
if (*p == 1) {
uid->mdc_feature = 1;
break;
}
}
}
static void
@ -1846,6 +1811,7 @@ merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
int revoked;
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
prefitem_t *prefs;
int mdc_feature;
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
@ -1890,12 +1856,15 @@ merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
* use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
* FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of
* all preferences.
* Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag.
*/
prefs = NULL;
mdc_feature = 0;
for (k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next) {
if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) {
prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->mdc_feature;
break;
}
}
@ -1906,6 +1875,7 @@ merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
if (pk->prefs)
m_free (pk->prefs);
pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
pk->mdc_feature = mdc_feature;
}
}