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gpg: Make use of the included key block in a signature.
* g10/import.c (read_key_from_file): Rename to ... (read_key_from_file_or_buffer): this and add new parameters. Adjust callers. (import_included_key_block): New. * g10/packet.h (PKT_signature): Add field flags.key_block. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set that flags. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add parm forced_pk and change all callers. * g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto. (check_sig_and_print): Try the included key block if no key is available. -- This is is the second part to support the new Key Block subpacket. The idea is that after having received a signed mail, it is instantly possible to reply encrypted - without the need for any centralized infrastructure. There is one case where this does not work: A signed mail is received using a specified signer ID (e.g. using gpg --sender option) and the key block with only that user ID is thus imported. The next time a mail is received using the same key but with a different user ID; the signatures checks out using the key imported the last time. However, the new user id is not imported. Now when trying to reply to that last mail, no key will be found. We need to see whether we can update a key in such a case. GnuPG-bug-id: 4856 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> Backported from master Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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11 changed files with 254 additions and 56 deletions
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@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ typedef struct
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unsigned policy_url:1; /* At least one policy URL is present */
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unsigned notation:1; /* At least one notation is present */
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unsigned pref_ks:1; /* At least one preferred keyserver is present */
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unsigned key_block:1; /* A key block subpacket is present. */
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unsigned expired:1;
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unsigned pka_tried:1; /* Set if we tried to retrieve the PKA record. */
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} flags;
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@ -873,9 +874,10 @@ int check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest);
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* R_PK is not NULL, it is stored at RET_PK.) DIGEST contains a
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* valid hash context that already includes the signed data. This
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* function adds the relevant meta-data to the hash before finalizing
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* it and verifying the signature. */
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* it and verifying the signature. FOCRED_PK is usually NULL. */
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gpg_error_t check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl,
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PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest,
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PKT_public_key *forced_pk,
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u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired, int *r_revoked,
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PKT_public_key **r_pk);
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