* helptext.c, pkclist.c (do_we_trust): It is not possible to get here with

a revoked or expired key, so BUG() that case.  Remove question about
overriding revoked/expired.  Also --keyid-format-ify. (do_we_trust_pre):
Use print_pubkey_info() instead of printing the info ourselves.

* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Improve translatability of user ID
prompts.

* keylist.c (print_pubkey_info): Use the user ID the pk was selected by,
if any.

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
 2004-10-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
 
+	* helptext.c, pkclist.c (do_we_trust): It is not possible to get
+	here with a revoked or expired key, so BUG() that case.  Remove
+	question about overriding revoked/expired.  Also
+	--keyid-format-ify.
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Use print_pubkey_info() instead of printing the
+	info ourselves.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Improve translatability of
+	user ID prompts.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_pubkey_info): Use the user ID the pk was
+	selected by, if any.
+
 	* keyedit.c (sign_uids, ask_revoke_sig): Improve translatability
 	of user ID prompts.
 	(ask_revoke_sig, menu_revsig): Try and use common strings for

g10/helptext.c

@@ -57,10 +57,6 @@ static struct helptexts { const char *key; const char *help; } helptexts[] = {
  "ultimately trusted\n"
 )},
 
-{ "revoked_key.override", N_(
-"If you want to use this revoked key anyway, answer \"yes\"."
-)},
-
 { "untrusted_key.override", N_(
 "If you want to use this untrusted key anyway, answer \"yes\"."
 )},

g10/keylist.c

@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ print_pubkey_info (FILE *fp, PKT_public_key *pk)
   char *p;
 
   keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+
+  /* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, that is the one to
+     print. */
+  if(pk->user_id)
+    p=utf8_to_native(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len,0);
+  else
     p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
 
   if (fp)

g10/passphrase.c

@@ -1133,15 +1133,13 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
        information on that key. */
     if( keyid && !opt.batch && !next_pw && mode!=1 ) {
 	PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	size_t n;
 	char *p;
 
-	tty_printf(_("\nYou need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for\n"
+	p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
-		     "user: \"") );
+	tty_printf("\n");
-	p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
+	tty_printf(_("You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for\n"
-	tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
+		     "user: \"%s\"\n"),p);
 	m_free(p);
-	tty_printf("\"\n");
 
 	if( !get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) ) {
 	    const char *s = pubkey_algo_to_string( pk->pubkey_algo );

g10/pkclist.c

@@ -371,75 +371,37 @@ edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
  * Returns: true if we trust.
  */
 static int
-do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int *trustlevel )
+do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
 {
-    unsigned int trustmask = 0;
+  /* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
+     key */
+  if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
+     || trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
+     || (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
+    BUG();
 
-    /* FIXME: get_pubkey_byname already checks the validity and won't
+  if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
-     * return keys which are either expired or revoked - so these
+    {
-     * question here won't get triggered.  We have to find a solution
-     * for this.  It might make sense to have a function in getkey.c
-     * which does only the basic checks and returns even revoked and
-     * expired keys.  This fnction could then also returhn a list of
-     * keys if the speicified name is ambiguous
-     */
-    if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX: key has been revoked!\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-	if( opt.batch )
-          return 0; /* no */
-
-	if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
-				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
-          return 0; /* no */
-	trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
-    }
-    if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX: subkey has been revoked!\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-	if( opt.batch )
-	    return 0;
-
-	if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
-				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
-	    return 0;
-	trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
-    }
-    *trustlevel &= ~trustmask;
-
-    if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS ) {
       if( opt.verbose )
-	    log_info("No trust check due to --trust-model always option\n");
+	log_info("No trust check due to `--trust-model always' option\n");
       return 1;
     }
 
-    switch( (*trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
+  switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
-      case TRUST_EXPIRED:
+    {
-	log_info(_("%08lX: key has expired\n"),
-				    (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	return 0; /* no */
-
     default:
       log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
-                    *trustlevel);
+		 trustlevel);
       /* fall thru */
     case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
     case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
-        log_info(_("%08lX: There is no assurance this key belongs "
+      log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
-		   "to the named user\n"),(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
+		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
-	return 0; /* no */
-
-	/* No way to get here? */
-      case TRUST_NEVER:
-	log_info(_("%08lX: We do NOT trust this key\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
       return 0; /* no */
 
     case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-	log_info(_("%08lX: There is limited assurance this key belongs "
+      log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
-		   "to the named user\n"),(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL));
+		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
       return 1; /* yes */
 
     case TRUST_FULLY:
@@ -457,7 +419,6 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int *trustlevel )
 }
 
 
-
 /****************
  * wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
  * key anyway.
@@ -467,39 +428,20 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
 {
   int rc;
 
-    rc = do_we_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
+  rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
 
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) && !rc )
+  if( !opt.batch && !rc )
-	return 0;
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) && !rc )
-	return 0;
-
-    if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
-	u32 keyid[2];
-
-	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
-	tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
-		  nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-		  (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-	/* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, this is the
-	   one to ask about. */
-	if(pk->user_id)
-	  tty_print_utf8_string(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len);
-	else
     {
-	    size_t n;
+      print_pubkey_info(NULL,pk);
-	    char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-	    tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
-	    m_free(p);
-	  }
-	tty_printf("\"\n");
       print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
       tty_printf("\n");
 
-	tty_printf(_(
+      tty_printf(
-"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
+	       _("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
 		 "in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
-"you may answer the next question with yes\n\n"));
+		 "you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));
+
+      tty_printf("\n");
 
       if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
 				_("Use this key anyway? "))  )
@@ -509,16 +451,11 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
        *	 his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
        */
     }
-    else if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS && !rc ) {
+
-	if( !opt.quiet )
-	    log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
-	rc = 1;
-    }
   return rc;
 }
 
 
-
 /****************
  * Check whether we can trust this signature.
  * Returns: Error if we shall not trust this signatures.