security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-03-02 21:11:05 +01:00
Code Activity

scd: Factor out a function to check keyidstr.

Browse Source 
* scd/app-openpgp.c (check_keyidstr): New.
(do_sign, do_auth, do_decipher, do_check_pin): Use check_keyidstr.

Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka 2019-04-22 20:34:36 +09:00
parent ea7d85ff65
commit b0f0791e4a
1 changed files with 59 additions and 126 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

185
scd/app-openpgp.c
View File

@ -4294,6 +4294,50 @@ check_against_given_fingerprint (app_t app, const char *fpr, int key)
}
static int
check_keyidstr (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int keyno)
{
int rc;
const char *s;
int n;
const char *fpr = NULL;
unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* Actually 16 bytes but also for the fpr. */
if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else
{
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
fpr = s + 1;
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
}
/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg
will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
verify-after-signing feature. */
rc = (fpr&&keyno)? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, keyno) : 0;
return rc;
}
/* Compute a digital signature on INDATA which is expected to be the
raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of
@ -4339,10 +4383,6 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
int rc;
unsigned char data[19+64];
size_t datalen;
unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* Actually 16 bytes but also for the fpr. */
const char *s;
int n;
const char *fpr = NULL;
unsigned long sigcount;
int use_auth = 0;
int exmode, le_value;
@ -4387,40 +4427,13 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
;
else if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3"))
use_auth = 1;
else if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else
{
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
fpr = s + 1;
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg
will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
verify-after-signing feature. */
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 1) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Concatenate prefix and digest. */
#define X(a,b,d) \
if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_ ## a && (d) ) \
@ -4537,10 +4550,6 @@ do_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen )
{
int rc;
unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* Actually 16 but we use it also for the fpr. */
const char *s;
int n;
const char *fpr = NULL;
if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
@ -4568,40 +4577,13 @@ do_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
/* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3"))
;
else if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else
{
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
fpr = s + 1;
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 3);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg
will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
verify-after-signing feature. */
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 3) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
if (!rc)
{
@ -4637,11 +4619,8 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen,
unsigned int *r_info)
{
int rc;
unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* actually 16 but we use it also for the fpr. */
const char *s;
int n;
const char *fpr = NULL;
int rc;
int exmode, le_value;
unsigned char *fixbuf = NULL;
int padind = 0;
@ -4653,39 +4632,13 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
/* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.2"))
;
else if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else
{
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
fpr = s + 1;
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 2);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, the
decryption won't produce the right plaintext anyway. */
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 2) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
if (rc)
return rc;
@ -4901,38 +4854,18 @@ do_check_pin (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
void *pincb_arg)
{
unsigned char tmp_sn[20];
const char *s;
int n;
int admin_pin = 0;
int rc;
if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
/* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* No fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
; /* We ignore a fingerprint. */
else if (!strcmp (s, "[CHV3]") )
if (strlen (keyidstr) >= 32+6 && !strcmp (keyidstr+32, "[CHV3]"))
admin_pin = 1;
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
/* Yes, there is a race conditions: The user might pull the card
right here and we won't notice that. However this is not a