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Nuked almost all trailing white space.

Browse source 
We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-04 12:57:53 +01:00
parent ffd099eb19
commit b008274afd
305 changed files with 5385 additions and 5592 deletions
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20
g13/be-encfs.c
View file

@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ struct encfs_parm_s
typedef struct encfs_parm_s *encfs_parm_t;
static gpg_error_t
static gpg_error_t
send_cmd_bin (runner_t runner, const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
return runner_send_line (runner, data, datalen);
}
static gpg_error_t
static gpg_error_t
send_cmd (runner_t runner, const char *string)
{
log_debug ("sending command -->%s<--\n", string);
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ run_umount_helper (const char *mountpoint)
gpg_error_t err;
const char pgmname[] = FUSERMOUNT;
const char *args[3];
args[0] = "-u";
args[1] = mountpoint;
args[2] = NULL;
@ -126,13 +126,13 @@ handle_status_line (runner_t runner, const char *line,
{
size_t n;
const void *value;
value = find_tuple (tuples, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENCKEY, &n);
if (!value)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SESSION_KEY);
else if ((err = send_cmd_bin (runner, value, n)))
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_BUG
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_BUG
&& gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SESSION_KEY);
}
@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ be_encfs_get_detached_name (const char *fname, char **r_name, int *r_isdir)
/* Create a new session key and append it as a tuple to the memory
buffer MB.
buffer MB.
The EncFS daemon takes a passphrase from stdin and internally
mangles it by means of some KDF from OpenSSL. We want to store a
@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ be_encfs_create_new_keys (membuf_t *mb)
good compromise between security and performance. The
anticipated usage of this tool is the quite often creation of new
containers and thus this should not deplete the system's entropy
tool too much. */
tool too much. */
gcry_randomize (buffer, 32+8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
for (i=j=0; i < 32; i++)
{
@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ be_encfs_create_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, tupledesc_t tuples,
err = run_encfs_tool (ctrl, ENCFS_CMD_CREATE, containername, mountpoint,
tuples, r_id);
/* In any case remove the temporary mount point. */
if (rmdir (mountpoint))
log_error ("error removing temporary mount point `%s': %s\n",
@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ be_encfs_create_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, tupledesc_t tuples,
/* Mount the container described by the filename FNAME and the keyblob
information in TUPLES. On success the runner id is stored at R_ID. */
gpg_error_t
be_encfs_mount_container (ctrl_t ctrl,
be_encfs_mount_container (ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *fname, const char *mountpoint,
tupledesc_t tuples, unsigned int *r_id)
{
@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ be_encfs_mount_container (ctrl_t ctrl,
err = run_encfs_tool (ctrl, ENCFS_CMD_MOUNT, containername, mountpoint,
tuples, r_id);
leave:
xfree (containername);
return err;