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Nuked almost all trailing white space.

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We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-04 12:57:53 +01:00
parent ffd099eb19
commit b008274afd
305 changed files with 5385 additions and 5592 deletions
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20
g10/sig-check.c
View file

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ signature_check (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest)
}
int
signature_check2 (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
signature_check2 (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ signature_check2 (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
* and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is
* not possible to sign more than one identical document within
* one second. Some remote batch processing applications might
* like this feature here.
*
* like this feature here.
*
* Note that before 2.0.10, we used RIPE-MD160 for the hash
* and accidently didn't include the timestamp and algorithm
* information in the hash. Given that this feature is not
@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ check_revocation_keys(PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_signature *sig)
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_fingerprint(pk->revkey[i].fpr,MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
if(keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1])
{
gcry_md_hd_t md;
if (gcry_md_open (&md, sig->digest_algo, 0))
BUG ();
hash_public_key(md,pk);
@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ check_revocation_keys(PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_signature *sig)
busy=0;
return rc;
}
}
/* Backsigs (0x19) have the same format as binding sigs (0x18), but
this function is simpler than check_key_signature in a few ways.
@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
cache refresh detects and clears these cases. */
if ( !opt.no_sig_cache ) {
if (sig->flags.checked) { /*cached status available*/
if( is_selfsig ) {
u32 keyid[2];
if( is_selfsig ) {
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
return rc;
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { /* key revocation */
u32 keyid[2];
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
/* is it a designated revoker? */