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Nuked almost all trailing white space.

Browse source 
We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-04 12:57:53 +01:00
parent ffd099eb19
commit b008274afd
305 changed files with 5385 additions and 5592 deletions
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27
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ enum_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
n = *buffer++;
buflen--;
if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
{
{
if (buflen < 4)
goto too_short;
n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ enum_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
buflen -= 4;
}
else if (n >= 192) /* 4 byte special encoded length header. */
{
{
if (buflen < 2)
goto too_short;
n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ parse_revkeys (PKT_signature * sig)
SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,
&len, &seq, NULL)))
{
if (len == sizeof (struct revocation_key)
if (len == sizeof (struct revocation_key)
&& (revkey->class & 0x80)) /* 0x80 bit must be set. */
{
sig->revkey = xrealloc (sig->revkey,
@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
sig->flags.exportable = 1;
sig->flags.revocable = 1;
if (is_v4) /* Read subpackets. */
{
{
n = read_16 (inp);
pktlen -= 2; /* Length of hashed data. */
if (n > 10000)
@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
if (pktlen < 5) /* Sanity check. */
{
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pktlen--;
if (is_v4 && sig->pubkey_algo) /* Extract required information. */
{
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
@ -2164,7 +2164,7 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
}
else /* Old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5. */
{
{
/* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not
erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
way to delete such a key. */
@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
ski->algo, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
}
/* It is really ugly that we don't know the size
* of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm.
* so a
@ -2233,8 +2233,8 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: [v4 protected]\n", npkey);
}
else
{
else
{
/* The v3 method: The mpi length is not encrypted. */
for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++)
{
@ -2300,7 +2300,7 @@ parse_attribute_subpkts (PKT_user_id * uid)
n = *buffer++;
buflen--;
if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
{
{
if (buflen < 4)
goto too_short;
n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
@ -2309,7 +2309,7 @@ parse_attribute_subpkts (PKT_user_id * uid)
buflen -= 4;
}
else if (n >= 192) /* 2 byte special encoded length header. */
{
{
if (buflen < 2)
goto too_short;
n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
@ -2835,4 +2835,3 @@ create_gpg_control (ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte * data, size_t datalen)
return packet;
}