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Nuked almost all trailing white space.

Browse source 
We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-04 12:57:53 +01:00
parent ffd099eb19
commit b008274afd
305 changed files with 5385 additions and 5592 deletions
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66
agent/findkey.c
View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
#endif
/* Helper to pass data to the check callback of the unprotect function. */
struct try_unprotect_arg_s
struct try_unprotect_arg_s
{
ctrl_t ctrl;
const unsigned char *protected_key;
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
char *fname;
estream_t fp;
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
}
fp = es_fopen (fname, force? "wb,mode=-rw" : "wbx,mode=-rw");
if (!fp)
{
if (!fp)
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("can't create `%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
xfree (fname);
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
if (strcmp (now, tmptime) > 0 )
{
/* Passphrase "expired". */
desc = xtryasprintf
desc = xtryasprintf
(_("This passphrase has not been changed%%0A"
"since %.4s-%.2s-%.2s. Please change it now."),
protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6);
@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ modify_description (const char *in, const char *comment, char **result)
out_len++;
}
}
if (!pass)
{
*result = out = xtrymalloc (out_len + 1);
@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ modify_description (const char *in, const char *comment, char **result)
return 0;
}
/* Unprotect the canconical encoded S-expression key in KEYBUF. GRIP
should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the
@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ modify_description (const char *in, const char *comment, char **result)
passphrase. */
static int
unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip,
unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip,
cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl,
char **r_passphrase)
{
@ -294,14 +294,14 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
if (r_passphrase)
*r_passphrase = NULL;
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
/* Initially try to get it using a cache nonce. */
if (cache_nonce)
{
char *pw;
pw = agent_get_cache (cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE);
if (pw)
{
@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
if (cache_mode != CACHE_MODE_IGNORE)
{
char *pw;
retry:
pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode);
if (pw)
@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
{
/* We need to give the other thread a chance to actually put
it into the cache. */
pth_sleep (1);
pth_sleep (1);
goto retry;
}
/* Timeout - better call pinentry now the plain way. */
@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
{
size_t canlen, erroff;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
assert (arg.unprotected_key);
canlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (arg.unprotected_key, 0, NULL, NULL);
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff,
@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("changing the passphrase failed: %s\n",
log_error ("changing the passphrase failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
wipememory (arg.unprotected_key, canlen);
xfree (arg.unprotected_key);
@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
}
else
{
agent_put_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode, pi->pin,
agent_put_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode, pi->pin,
lookup_ttl? lookup_ttl (hexgrip) : 0);
if (r_passphrase && *pi->pin)
*r_passphrase = xtrystrdup (pi->pin);
@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip, gcry_sexp_t *result)
size_t buflen, erroff;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
*result = NULL;
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip, gcry_sexp_t *result)
xfree (fname);
return rc;
}
if (fstat (es_fileno (fp), &st))
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip, gcry_sexp_t *result)
if (es_fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error reading %zu bytes from `%s': %s\n",
log_error ("error reading %zu bytes from `%s': %s\n",
buflen, fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
es_fclose (fp);
@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
size_t len, buflen, erroff;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
int got_shadow_info = 0;
*result = NULL;
if (shadow_info)
*shadow_info = NULL;
@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
}
gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp);
xfree (desc_text_final);
}
@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ key_parms_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t s_key, gcry_sexp_t *r_list,
if (strlen (algoname) >= algonamesize)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUFFER_TOO_SHORT);
strcpy (r_algoname, algoname);
}
}
if (r_elems)
{
if (strlen (elems) >= elemssize)
@ -765,14 +765,14 @@ key_parms_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t s_key, gcry_sexp_t *r_list,
*r_list = list;
else
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return 0;
}
/* Return the public key algorithm number if S_KEY is a DSA style key.
If it is not a DSA style key, return 0. */
int
int
agent_is_dsa_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key)
{
char algoname[6];
@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ agent_is_dsa_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key)
key database. On failure an error code is returned and NULL stored
at RESULT. */
gpg_error_t
agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
const unsigned char *grip,
gcry_sexp_t *result)
{
@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
if (err)
return err;
err = key_parms_from_sexp (s_skey, &list,
err = key_parms_from_sexp (s_skey, &list,
algoname, sizeof algoname,
elems, sizeof elems);
if (err)
@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
return err;
}
for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ )
for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ )
{
l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1);
if (!l2)
@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
argidx = 0;
p = stpcpy (stpcpy (format, "(public-key("), algoname);
for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ )
for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ )
{
*p++ = '(';
*p++ = *s;
@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
*p = 0;
assert (argidx < DIM (args));
args[argidx] = NULL;
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&list, NULL, format, args);
xfree (format);
for (i=0; array[i]; i++)
@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip)
int result;
char *fname;
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
int keytype;
(void)ctrl;
if (r_keytype)
*r_keytype = PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN;
if (r_shadow_info)
@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
{
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
err = read_key_file (grip, &sexp);
if (err)
{
@ -1012,12 +1012,12 @@ agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
if (err)
return err;
}
keytype = agent_private_key_type (buf);
switch (keytype)
{
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
break;
break;
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
/* If we ever require it we could retrieve the comment fields
from such a key. */