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gpg: Fix the encrypt+sign hash algo preference selection for ECDSA.
* g10/keydb.h (pref_hint): Change from union to struct and add field 'exact'. Adjust callers. * g10/pkclist.c (algo_available): Take care of the exact hint. * g10/sign.c (sign_file): Fix indentation. Rework the hash from recipient prefs. -- This fixes a encrypt+sign case like: One recipient key has SHA512 as highest ranked hash preference but the the signing key is a 256 bit curve. Because we don't want to use a truncated hash with ECDSA, we need to have an exact match - this is in particular important for smartcard which check that the hash matches the curves. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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@ -128,9 +128,10 @@ struct pubkey_find_info {
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/* Helper type for preference functions. */
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union pref_hint
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struct pref_hint
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{
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int digest_length;
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int digest_length; /* We want at least this digest length. */
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int exact; /* We need to use exactly this length. */
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};
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@ -262,9 +263,9 @@ gpg_error_t find_and_check_key (ctrl_t ctrl,
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pk_list_t *pk_list_addr);
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int algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo,
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const union pref_hint *hint );
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const struct pref_hint *hint );
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int select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
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int request, const union pref_hint *hint);
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int request, const struct pref_hint *hint);
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int select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
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void warn_missing_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
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void warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
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@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ build_pk_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list)
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preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
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int
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algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
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algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const struct pref_hint *hint)
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{
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if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
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{
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@ -1395,16 +1395,26 @@ algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
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{
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if (hint && hint->digest_length)
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{
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if (hint->digest_length!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
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unsigned int n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
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if (hint->exact)
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{
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/* For example ECDSA requires an exact hash value so
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* that we do not truncate. For DSA we allow truncation
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* and thus exact is not set. */
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if (hint->digest_length != n)
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return 0;
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}
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else if (hint->digest_length!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
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{
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/* If --enable-dsa2 is set or the hash isn't 160 bits
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(which implies DSA2), then we'll accept a hash that
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is larger than we need. Otherwise we won't accept
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any hash that isn't exactly the right size. */
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if (hint->digest_length > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
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if (hint->digest_length > n)
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return 0;
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}
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else if (hint->digest_length != gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
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else if (hint->digest_length != n)
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return 0;
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}
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@ -1441,7 +1451,7 @@ algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
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*/
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int
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select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
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int request, const union pref_hint *hint)
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int request, const struct pref_hint *hint)
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{
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PK_LIST pkr;
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u32 bits[8];
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65
g10/sign.c
65
g10/sign.c
@ -905,7 +905,8 @@ write_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl,
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* and ignore the detached mode. Sign the file with all secret keys
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* which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one
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* If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the
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* signed data for these users.
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* signed data for these users. If ENCRYPTFLAG is 2 symmetric encryption
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* is also used.
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* If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function
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* does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always
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* uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode.
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@ -1035,17 +1036,16 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
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select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
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opt.def_digest_algo,
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NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo)
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log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)"
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" violates recipient preferences\n"),
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gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
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opt.def_digest_algo );
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log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)"
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" violates recipient preferences\n"),
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gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
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opt.def_digest_algo );
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}
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else
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{
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int algo, smartcard=0;
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union pref_hint hint;
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hint.digest_length = 0;
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int algo;
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int conflict = 0;
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struct pref_hint hint = { 0 };
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/* Of course, if the recipient asks for something
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unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then
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@ -1073,31 +1073,40 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
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(sk_rover->pk->pkey[1]));
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if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
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temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen);
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temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8;
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{
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temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen);
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if (!temp_hashlen)
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conflict = 1; /* Better don't use the prefs. */
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temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8;
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/* Fixup for that funny nistp521 (yes, 521)
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* were we need to use a 512 bit hash algo. */
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if (temp_hashlen == 66)
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temp_hashlen = 64;
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}
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else
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temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8;
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/* Pick a hash that is large enough for our
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largest q */
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largest q or matches our Q but if tehreare
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several of them we run into a conflict and
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don't use the preferences. */
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if (hint.digest_length<temp_hashlen)
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hint.digest_length=temp_hashlen;
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if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen)
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{
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if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
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{
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if (hint.exact)
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conflict = 1;
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hint.exact = 1;
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}
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hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen;
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}
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}
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/* FIXME: need to check gpg-agent for this. */
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/* else if (sk_rover->pk->is_protected */
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/* && sk_rover->pk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */
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/* smartcard = 1; */
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}
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/* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes. If we have
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to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the
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recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the
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same time and recipient prefs currently require a
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single hash for all signatures. All this may well have
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to change as the cards add algorithms. */
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if ((!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20))
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&& (algo = select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
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-1,&hint)) > 0)
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if (!conflict
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&& (algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
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-1,&hint)) > 0)
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{
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/* Note that we later check that the algo is not weak. */
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recipient_digest_algo = algo;
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