See ChangeLog: Tue Dec 8 13:15:16 CET 1998 Werner Koch

NEWS

@@ -3,6 +3,14 @@
       other GnuPG processes won't damage these files. You
       may want to put the option --lock-once into your options file.
 
+    * The latest self-signatures are now used; this enables --import
+      to see updated preferences etc.
+
+    * import of subkeys should now work.
+
+    * Random gathering modules may now be loaded as extensions. Add
+      such a module for most Unices but it is very experimental!
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.4
 -----------------------------------

PROJECTS

@@ -25,3 +25,5 @@
     Can "--dump-options" be used for this or should we place the
     options in a special ELF segment?
 
+  * Split key support (n-out-of-m)
+

THANKS

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-GNUPG was originally written by Werner Koch.  Other people contributed by
+GnuPG was originally written by Werner Koch.  Other people contributed by
 reporting problems, suggesting various improvements or submitting actual
 code.  Here is a list of those people.	Help me keep it complete and free of
 errors.
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Frank Heckenbach	heckenb@mi.uni-erlangen.de
 Gaël Quéri		gqueri@mail.dotcom.fr
 Greg Louis		glouis@dynamicro.on.ca
 Gregory Steuck		steuck@iname.com
+Geoff Keating		geoffk@ozemail.com.au
 Hendrik Buschkamp	buschkamp@rheumanet.org
 Holger Schurig		holger@d.om.org
 Hugh Daniel		hugh@toad.com

TODO

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
     * preferences of hash algorithms are not yet used.
 
-    * Check Berkeley BD - it is in glibc -any licensing problems?
+    * Check Berkeley BD - it is in glibc - any licensing problems?
 
     * I noticed, that we sometimes have only 3 items in a trustrecord, but
       a next pointer ro more records - check wehther the reuse code really
@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@
     * clearsig: keep lineendings as they are. Remember that trailings
       blanks are not hashed.
 
-    * Always use the latest key signature (import).  This is needed, so
-      that we are able to chnage the expiration time or other info in the
-      selfsignature
-
     * OpenBSD: dynamic loading with dlopen works on OpenBSD, but:
 	OpenBSD binaries are a.out, so every symbol begins with "_"
 

configure.in

@@ -300,3 +300,4 @@ zlib/Makefile
 checks/Makefile
 ])
 
+dnl *-*wedit:notab*-*  Please keep this as the last line.

doc/DETAILS

@@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ Record type 1:
 --------------
     Version information for this TrustDB.  This is always the first
     record of the DB and the only one with type 1.
-     1 byte value 2
+     1 byte value 1
      3 bytes 'gpg'  magic value
-     1 byte Version of the TrustDB
+     1 byte Version of the TrustDB (2)
      1 byte marginals needed
      1 byte completes needed
      1 byte max_cert_depth

doc/gpg.1pod

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 =head1 NAME
 
-gpg - GNU Privacy Guard
+gpg, gpgm - GNU Privacy Guard
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ B<gpgm> [--homedir name] [--options file] [options] command [args]
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-B<gpg> is the main program for the GNUPG system. B<gpgm> is a maintenance
+B<gpg> is the main program for the GnuPG system. B<gpgm> is a maintenance
 tool which has some commands B<gpgm> does not have; it is there because
 it does not handle sensitive data and therefore has no need to allocate
 secure memory.
@@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ B<--default-key>  I<name>
     is not used the default user-id is the first user-id
     from the secret keyring.
 
+B<--trusted-key>  I<keyid>
+    Assume that the key with the I<keyid> (which must be
+    a full (8 byte) keyid) is as trustworthy as one of
+    your own secret keys.  This may be used to make keys
+    valid which are not directly ceritified by you but
+    by a CA you trust.	The advantage of this option is
+    that it shortens the path of certification.
+
+    You may also use this option to skip the verification
+    of your own secret keys which is normally done every
+    time GnuPG starts up:  Use for I<keyid> the one of
+    your key.
+
 B<-r>  I<name>, B<--remote-user>  I<name>
     Use I<name> as the user-id for encryption.
     This option is silently ignored for the list commands,
@@ -252,7 +265,7 @@ B<-t>, B<--textmode>
     B<--textmode>) is used together with armoring
     and signing, this enables clearsigned messages.
     This kludge is needed for PGP compatibility;
-    normally you would use B<--sign> or b<--clearsign>
+    normally you would use B<--sign> or B<--clearsign>
     to selected the type os signatures.
 
 B<-n>, B<--dry-run>
@@ -480,7 +493,7 @@ a signature was bad and other errorcode for fatal errors.
 =head1 ENVIRONMENT
 
 C<HOME>       Used to locate the default home directory.
-C<GNUPGHOME>  If set, direcory used instead of F<~/.gnupg>.
+C<GNUPGHOME>  If set directory used instead of F<~/.gnupg>.
 
 =head1 FILES
 

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+Tue Dec  8 13:15:16 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (upd_uid_record): Now uses the newest self-signature
+	(insert_trust_record): Now calls update with recheck set to true.
+	(register_trusted_key): New.
+	(verify_own_keys): Enhanced by list of trusted keys.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print a warning when a devel version is used.
+	(main): New option --trusted-key
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks): Fixed merging of new user ids and
+	added merging of subkeys.
+	(append_uid): Ditto.
+	(merge_keysig): New.
+	(append_key): New.
+	* getkey.c (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Get the expiration time
+	from the newest self-signature.
+	(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Ditto.
+
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_secret_key): New.
+
+
 Fri Nov 27 21:37:41 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* g10.c: New option --lock-once

g10/free-packet.c

@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ free_packet( PACKET *pkt )
 }
 
 /****************
- * Returns 0 if they match.
+ * returns 0 if they match.
  */
 int
 cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b )
@@ -370,6 +370,33 @@ cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b )
     return 0;
 }
 
+/****************
+ * Returns 0 if they match.
+ * We only compare the public parts.
+ */
+int
+cmp_secret_keys( PKT_secret_key *a, PKT_secret_key *b )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( a->timestamp != b->timestamp )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->expiredate != b->expiredate )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( b->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( a->skey[i], b->skey[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /****************
  * Returns 0 if they match.
  */

g10/g10.c

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #define MAINTAINER_OPTIONS
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
     oKeyring,
     oSecretKeyring,
     oDefaultKey,
+    oTrustedKey,
     oOptions,
     oDebug,
     oDebugAll,
@@ -224,7 +226,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
     { oKeyring, "keyring"   ,2, N_("add this keyring to the list of keyrings")},
     { oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring" ,2, N_("add this secret keyring to the list")},
     { oDefaultKey, "default-key" ,2, N_("|NAME|use NAME as default secret key")},
-    { oCharset, "charset"   , 2, N_("|NAME| set terminal charset to NAME") },
+    { oCharset, "charset"   , 2, N_("|NAME|set terminal charset to NAME") },
     { oOptions, "options"   , 2, N_("read options from file")},
 
     { oDebug, "debug"     ,4|16, N_("set debugging flags")},
@@ -234,6 +236,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
     { oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", 1, N_("(default is 1)")},
     { oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", 1, N_("(default is 3)")},
     { oMaxCertDepth,	"max-cert-depth", 1, "@" },
+    { oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", 2, N_("|KEYID|ulimately trust this key")},
     { oLoadExtension, "load-extension" ,2, N_("|FILE|load extension module FILE")},
     { oRFC1991, "rfc1991",   0, N_("emulate the mode described in RFC1991")},
     { oS2KMode, "s2k-mode",  1, N_("|N|use passphrase mode N")},
@@ -706,6 +709,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
 	  case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
 	  case oDefaultKey: opt.def_secret_key = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;
 	  case oNoOptions: break; /* no-options */
 	  case oHomedir: opt.homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
 	  case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;
@@ -837,6 +841,13 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
     }
 
+    {	const char *p = strusage(13);
+	for( ; *p && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); p++ )
+	    ;
+	if( p )
+	    log_info("NOTE: This is a development version!\n");
+    }
+
     if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
 	g10_exit(2);
 

g10/getkey.c

@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ classify_user_id( const char *name, u32 *keyid, byte *fprint,
 	else if( i == 32 || ( i == 33 && *s == '0' ) ) { /* md5 fingerprint */
 	    if( i==33 )
 		s++;
+	    if( fprint ) {
 		memset(fprint+16, 4, 0);
 		for(j=0; j < 16; j++, s+=2 ) {
 		    int c = hextobyte( s );
@@ -390,17 +391,20 @@ classify_user_id( const char *name, u32 *keyid, byte *fprint,
 			return 0;
 		    fprint[j] = c;
 		}
+	    }
 	    mode = 16;
 	}
 	else if( i == 40 || ( i == 41 && *s == '0' ) ) { /* sha1/rmd160 fprint*/
 	    if( i==33 )
 		s++;
+	    if( fprint ) {
 		for(j=0; j < 20; j++, s+=2 ) {
 		    int c = hextobyte( s );
 		    if( c == -1 )
 			return 0;
 		    fprint[j] = c;
 		}
+	    }
 	    mode = 20;
 	}
 	else
@@ -693,6 +697,7 @@ merge_one_pk_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE knode )
     PKT_signature *sig;
     KBNODE k;
     u32 kid[2];
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
 
     assert(    knode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
 	    || knode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
@@ -709,6 +714,7 @@ merge_one_pk_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE knode )
     }
     else
 	keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
+
     for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
 	if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
 	    && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
@@ -716,16 +722,22 @@ merge_one_pk_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE knode )
 	    && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0]
 	    && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1]
 	    && sig->version > 3 ) {
-	    /* okay this is (the first) self-signature which can be used
+	    /* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
+	     * We use the latest self-signature.
 	     * FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
 	     *	      but this is time consuming - we must provide another
 	     *	      way to handle this
 	     */
 	    const byte *p;
+	    u32 ed;
+
 	    p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
-	    pk->expiredate = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+	    ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+	    if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		pk->expiredate = ed;
+		sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+	    }
 	    /* fixme: add usage etc. to pk */
-	    break;
 	}
     }
 }
@@ -742,6 +754,7 @@ merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
     PKT_signature *sig;
     KBNODE k;
     u32 kid[2] = { 0, 0 };
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
 
     for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
 	if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
@@ -764,21 +777,28 @@ merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
 		 && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
 		 && sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
 		 && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
-	    /* okay this is (the first) self-signature which can be used
+	    /* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
 	     * FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
 	     *	      but this is time consuming - we must provide another
 	     *	      way to handle this
 	     */
 	    const byte *p;
+	    u32 ed;
+
 	    p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
 	    if( pk ) {
-		pk->expiredate = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
-		/* fixme: add usage etc. */
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
-		pk = NULL; /* use only the first self signature */
+		    pk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
 	    }
 	    else {
-		sk->expiredate = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
-		sk = NULL; /* use only the first self signature */
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		    sk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
 	    }
 	}
     }

g10/import.c

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 /* import.c
  *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
- * This file is part of GNUPG.
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
- * GNUPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
- * GNUPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
@@ -64,8 +64,12 @@ static int merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig,
 			 int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk );
 static int append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
 			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+static int append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
 static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
 			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+static int merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
 
 
 /****************
@@ -683,7 +687,7 @@ chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
 
 		unode->flag |= 2; /* mark as invalid */
 	    }
-	    unode->flag |= 1; /* mark that user-id checked */
+	    unode->flag |= 1; /* mark that signature checked */
 	}
     }
     return 0;
@@ -759,8 +763,6 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid )
  *
  * o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
  *   that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
- *   FIXME: add the check that we don't have duplicate signatures and the
- *   warning in cases where the old/new signatures don't match.
  * o Simply add the signature.	Can't verify here because we may not have
  *   the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
  *   into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
@@ -799,20 +801,18 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
 		KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
 		insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
 		n2->flag |= 1;
-		node->flag |= 1;
 		log_info_f(fname, _("key %08lX: revocation certificate added\n"),
 					 (ulong)keyid[1]);
 	    }
 	}
     }
 
-    /* 2nd: try to merge new ones in */
+    /* 2nd: try to merge new certificates in */
     for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
 	if( !(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
 	    /* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
 	    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
-		if( !(node->flag & 1)
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
-		    && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
 		    && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
 					  node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
 		    break;
@@ -826,15 +826,14 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
 
     /* 3rd: add new user-ids */
     for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
-	if( !(node->flag & 1) && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
 	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock */
 	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
-		if( !(onode->flag & 1)
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
-		    && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		    && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
-		    && cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
 				      node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
 		    break;
-	    if( !node ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
 		rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
 		if( rc )
 		    return rc;
@@ -843,8 +842,62 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
 	}
     }
 
-    /* 4th: add new subkeys */
+    /* merge subkey certifcates */
-    /* FIXME */
+    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+	if( !(onode->flag & 1)
+	    &&	(   onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 || onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
+	    /* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
+	    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+					  node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
+		    break;
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
+					  node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( node ) { /* found: merge */
+		rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*	add new subkeys */
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+	onode = NULL;
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+					 node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
+		rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		++*n_subk;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
+					 node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
+		rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		++*n_subk;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
 
     return 0;
 }
@@ -858,25 +911,43 @@ static int
 append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
 					  const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
 {
-    KBNODE n;
+    KBNODE n, n_where=NULL;
 
     assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
-    /* at lease a self signature comes next to the user-id */
     if( node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
 	log_error_f(fname, _("key %08lX: our copy has no self-signature\n"),
 						  (ulong)keyid[1]);
 	return G10ERR_GENERAL;
     }
 
-    for( ;node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; node = node->next ) {
+    /* find the position */
+    for( n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+	    break;
+    }
+    if( !n )
+	n_where = NULL;
+
+    /* and append/insert */
+    while( node ) {
 	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
 	 * one is released first */
 	n = clone_kbnode(node);
+	if( n_where ) {
+	    insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
+	    n_where = n;
+	}
+	else
 	    add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
-	node->flag |= 1;
 	n->flag |= 1;
+	node->flag |= 1;
 	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
 	    ++*n_sigs;
+
+	node = node->next;
+	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    break;
     }
 
     return 0;
@@ -909,26 +980,22 @@ merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
 	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
 	    continue;
 	found = 0;
-	for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
+	for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next){
 	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
 		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
 		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
 		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
-		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] ) {
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		   <= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
 		found++;
 		break;
 	    }
-
-	if( found ) { /* we already have this signature */
-	    /* Hmmm: should we compare the timestamp etc?
-	     * but then we have first to see whether this signature is valid
-	     * - or simply add it in such a case and let trustdb logic
-	     * decide whether to remove the old one
-	     */
-	    continue;
 	}
-
+	if( !found ) {
-	/* This signature is new, append N to DST it.
+	    /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
 	     * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
 	     * one is released first */
 	    n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
@@ -937,6 +1004,90 @@ merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
 	    n->flag |= 1;
 	    ++*n_sigs;
 	}
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
+ */
+static int
+merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+				    const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n, n2;
+    int found=0;
+
+    assert(   dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	   || dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+
+    for(n=src->next; n ; n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	    break;
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    continue;
+	found = 0;
+	for(n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next){
+	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		break;
+	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		   <= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
+		found++;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !found ) {
+	    /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
+	     * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	     * one is released first */
+	    n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
+	    insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
+	    n2->flag |= 1;
+	    n->flag |= 1;
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
+ * Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
+ */
+static int
+append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+					  const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	   || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+
+    while(  node ) {
+	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	 * one is released first */
+	n = clone_kbnode(node);
+	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
+	n->flag |= 1;
+	node->flag |= 1;
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+
+	node = node->next;
+	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    break;
+    }
 
     return 0;
 }

g10/keyedit.c

@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr, STRLIST commands )
 		if( !stricmp( answer, cmds[i].name ) )
 		    break;
 	    if( cmds[i].need_sk && !sec_keyblock ) {
-		tty_printf(_("Need the secret key to to this.\n"));
+		tty_printf(_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
 		cmd = cmdNOP;
 	    }
 	    else

g10/packet.h

@@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ PKT_public_key *copy_public_key_new_namehash( PKT_public_key *d,
 PKT_secret_key *copy_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *d, PKT_secret_key *s );
 PKT_signature *copy_signature( PKT_signature *d, PKT_signature *s );
 PKT_user_id *copy_user_id( PKT_user_id *d, PKT_user_id *s );
-int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *d, PKT_public_key *s );
+int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b );
+int cmp_secret_keys( PKT_secret_key *a, PKT_secret_key *b );
 int cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b );
 int cmp_public_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk );
 int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b );

g10/passphrase.c

@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ hash_passphrase( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k, int create )
 	    if( create && !pass ) {
 		randomize_buffer(s2k->salt, 8, 1);
 		if( s2k->mode == 3 )
-		    s2k->count = 96; /* = 56536 */
+		    s2k->count = 96; /* 65536 iterations */
 	    }
 
 	    if( s2k->mode == 3 ) {

g10/trustdb.c

@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
   #error Must change structure of trustdb
 #endif
 
+struct keyid_list {
+    struct keyid_list *next;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+};
+
 struct local_id_item {
     struct local_id_item *next;
     ulong lid;
@@ -102,9 +107,10 @@ static void upd_cert_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE signode, u32 *keyid,
 		 TRUSTREC *drec, RECNO_LIST *recno_list, int recheck,
 		 TRUSTREC *urec, const byte *uidhash, int revoke );
 
+static struct keyid_list *trusted_key_list;
 
 /* a table used to keep track of ultimately trusted keys
- * which are the ones from our secrings */
+ * which are the ones from our secrings and the trusted keys */
 static LOCAL_ID_TABLE ultikey_table;
 
 /* list of unused lid items and tables */
@@ -438,8 +444,30 @@ trust_letter( unsigned value )
     }
 }
 
+
+void
+register_trusted_key( const char *string )
+{
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    struct keyid_list *r;
+
+    if( classify_user_id( string, keyid, NULL, NULL, NULL ) != 11 ) {
+	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
+	return;
+    }
+
+    for( r = trusted_key_list; r; r = r->next )
+	if( r->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && r->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
+	    return;
+    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+    r->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+    r->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+    r->next = trusted_key_list;
+    trusted_key_list = r;
+}
+
 /****************
- * Verify that all our public keys are in the trustDB.
+ * Verify that all our public keys are in the trustdb.
  */
 static int
 verify_own_keys()
@@ -449,8 +477,48 @@ verify_own_keys()
     PKT_secret_key *sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
     PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
     u32 keyid[2];
+    struct keyid_list *kl;
+
+    /* put the trusted keys into the trusted key table */
+    for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
+	keyid[0] = kl->keyid[0];
+	keyid[1] = kl->keyid[1];
+	/* get the public key */
+	memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
+	rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
+							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
+	}
+	else {
+	    /* make sure that the pubkey is in the trustdb */
+	    rc = query_trust_record( pk );
+	    if( rc == -1 ) { /* put it into the trustdb */
+		rc = insert_trust_record( pk );
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error(_("key %08lX: can't put it into the trustdb\n"),
+							(ulong)keyid[1] );
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if( rc ) {
+		log_error(_("key %08lX: query record failed\n"),
+							(ulong)keyid[1] );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		if( ins_lid_table_item( ultikey_table, pk->local_id, 0 ) )
+		    log_error(_("key %08lX: already in trusted key table\n"),
+							  (ulong)keyid[1]);
+		else if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+		    log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key.\n"),
+							  (ulong)keyid[1]);
+	    }
+	}
+	release_public_key_parts( pk );
+    }
 
     while( !(rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 0 ) ) ) {
+	int have_pk = 0;
+
 	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
 
 	if( DBG_TRUST )
@@ -460,6 +528,11 @@ verify_own_keys()
 	    log_info(_("NOTE: secret key %08lX is NOT protected.\n"),
 							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
 
+	for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
+	    if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
+		goto skip; /* already in trusted key table */
+	}
+
 	/* see whether we can access the public key of this secret key */
 	memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
 	rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
@@ -468,6 +541,7 @@ verify_own_keys()
 							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
 	    goto skip;
 	}
+	have_pk=1;
 
 	if( cmp_public_secret_key( pk, sk ) ) {
 	    log_info(_("key %08lX: secret and public key don't match\n"),
@@ -495,13 +569,14 @@ verify_own_keys()
 	    log_debug("key %08lX.%lu: stored into ultikey_table\n",
 				    (ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
 	if( ins_lid_table_item( ultikey_table, pk->local_id, 0 ) )
-	    log_error(_("key %08lX: already in secret key table\n"),
+	    log_error(_("key %08lX: already in trusted key table\n"),
 							(ulong)keyid[1]);
 	else if( opt.verbose > 1 )
-	    log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as secret key.\n"),
+	    log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key.\n"),
 							(ulong)keyid[1]);
       skip:
 	release_secret_key_parts( sk );
+	if( have_pk )
 	    release_public_key_parts( pk );
     }
     if( rc != -1 )
@@ -509,6 +584,15 @@ verify_own_keys()
     else
 	rc = 0;
 
+    /* release the trusted keyid table */
+    {	struct keyid_list *kl2;
+	for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl2 ) {
+	    kl2 = kl->next;
+	    m_free( kl );
+	}
+	trusted_key_list = NULL;
+    }
+
     enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0 ); /* free context */
     free_secret_key( sk );
     free_public_key( pk );
@@ -1727,7 +1811,7 @@ get_dir_record( PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec )
 
 /****************
  * This function simply looks for the key in the trustdb
- * and makes sure that pk->local_id is set to the coreect value.
+ * and makes sure that pk->local_id is set to the correct value.
  * Return: 0 = found
  *	   -1 = not found
  *	  other = error
@@ -2282,6 +2366,9 @@ upd_uid_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode, u32 *keyid,
 		    urec.r.uid.uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED | UIDF_VALID;
 		    if( !selfsig )
 			selfsig = sig; /* use the first valid sig */
+		    else if( sig->timestamp > selfsig->timestamp
+			     && sig->sig_class >= selfsig->sig_class )
+			selfsig = sig; /* but this one is newer */
 		}
 		else {
 		    log_info( "uid %08lX/%02X%02X: %s: %s\n",
@@ -2293,7 +2380,13 @@ upd_uid_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode, u32 *keyid,
 	    }
 	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* cert revocation */
 		rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-		if( !rc ) {
+		if( !rc && selfsig && selfsig->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) {
+		    log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu/%02X%02X: %s\n",
+			   (ulong)keyid[1], lid, uidhash[18], uidhash[19],
+			   _("Valid user ID revocation skipped "
+			     "due to a newer self signature\n") );
+		}
+		else if( !rc ) {
 		    if( opt.verbose )
 			log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu/%02X%02X: %s\n",
 			   (ulong)keyid[1], lid, uidhash[18], uidhash[19],
@@ -2569,11 +2662,13 @@ upd_cert_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE signode, u32 *keyid,
 			rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
 		}
 		else if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
+		  #if 0 /* fixme: For some reason this really happens? */
 		    if( (rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_CHECKED) )
 			log_info("sig %08lX.%lu/%02X%02X/%08lX: %s\n",
 				  (ulong)keyid[1], lid, uidhash[18],
 				 uidhash[19], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
 				 _("Hmmm, public key lost?") );
+		  #endif
 		    rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag = SIGF_NOPUBKEY;
 		    if( revoke )
 			rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
@@ -2918,7 +3013,7 @@ insert_trust_record( PKT_public_key *pk )
     }
 
     /* and put all the other stuff into the keydb */
-    rc = update_trust_record( keyblock, 0, NULL );
+    rc = update_trust_record( keyblock, 1, NULL );
     if( !rc )
 	process_hintlist( hintlist, dirrec.r.dir.lid );
 

g10/trustdb.h

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ void list_trustdb(const char *username);
 void list_trust_path( const char *username );
 void export_ownertrust(void);
 void import_ownertrust(const char *fname);
+void register_trusted_key( const char *string );
 void check_trustdb( const char *username );
 void update_trustdb( void );
 int init_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname );

include/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Tue Dec  8 13:15:16 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* mpi.h (MPI): Changed the structure name to gcry_mpi and
+	changed all users.
+
 Tue Oct 20 11:40:00 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
 
 	* iobuf.h (iobuf_get_temp_buffer): New.

include/mpi.h

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int mpi_debug_mode;
 typedef unsigned long int mpi_limb_t;
 typedef   signed long int mpi_limb_signed_t;
 
-typedef struct mpi_struct {
+struct gcry_mpi {
     int alloced;    /* array size (# of allocated limbs) */
     int nlimbs;     /* number of valid limbs */
     int nbits;	    /* the real number of valid bits (info only) */
@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ typedef struct mpi_struct {
 		    /* bit 1: the mpi is encrypted */
 		    /* bit 2: the limb is a pointer to some m_alloced data */
     mpi_limb_t *d;  /* array with the limbs */
-} *MPI;
+};
+
+typedef struct gcry_mpi *MPI;
 
 #define MPI_NULL NULL
 

mpi/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Tue Dec  8 13:15:16 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* config.links: Moved the case for powerpc*linux
+	* powerpcp32/*.S: Removed some underscores.
+
 Thu Nov 26 07:27:52 1998  Werner Koch  <werner.koch@guug.de>
 
 	* config.links: Support for ppc with ELF

mpi/config.links

@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ case "${target}" in
 	path="m68k/mc68020 m68k"
 	;;
 
+    powerpc*-*-linux*)
+	echo '/* configured for powerpc/ELF */' >>./mpi/asm-syntax.h
+	echo '#define ELF_SYNTAX'               >>./mpi/asm-syntax.h
+	cat   $srcdir/mpi/powerpc32/syntax.h	>>./mpi/asm-syntax.h
+	path="powerpc32"
+	;;
     rs6000-*-aix[456789]* | rs6000-*-aix3.2.[456789])
 	mpi_sflags="-Wa,-mpwr"
 	path="power"
@@ -146,12 +152,6 @@ case "${target}" in
 	mpi_sflags="-Wa,-mppc"
 	path="powerpc64"
 	;;
-    powerpc*-*-linux*)
-	echo '/* configured for powerpc/ELF */' >>./mpi/asm-syntax.h
-	echo '#define ELF_SYNTAX'               >>asm-syntax.h
-	cat   $srcdir/powerpc32/syntax.h	>>./mpi/asm-syntax.h
-	path="powerpc32"
-	;;
 
     *)
 	echo '/* No assembler modules configured */' >>./mpi/asm-syntax.h

mpi/mpiutil.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* mpiutilac  -  Utility functions for MPI
+/* mpiutil.ac  -  Utility functions for MPI
  *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GNUPG.
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u)
 void
 mpi_swap( MPI a, MPI b)
 {
-    struct mpi_struct tmp;
+    struct gcry_mpi tmp;
 
     tmp = *a; *a = *b; *b = tmp;
 }

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-add1.S

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ mpihelp_add_n:
 	mtctr	6		# copy size into CTR
 	lwz	8,0(4)		# load least significant s1 limb
 	lwz	0,0(5)		# load least significant s2 limb
-	addi	3,3,-4		# offset res_ptr, it's updated before used
+	addi	3,3,-4		# offset res_ptr, it is updated before used
 	addc	7,0,8		# add least significant limbs, set cy
 	bdz	Lend		# If done, skip loop
 Loop:	lwzu	8,4(4)		# load s1 limb and update s1_ptr
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Lend:	stw	7,4(3)		# store ultimate result limb
    possible 2-unrolled inner loop will not be.	Also, watch out for the
    alignment...  */
 
-EALIGN(_mpihelp_add_n,3,0)
+EALIGN(mpihelp_add_n,3,0)
 /* Set up for loop below.  */
        mtcrf 0x01,%r6
        srwi. %r7,%r6,1
@@ -131,6 +131,6 @@ EALIGN(_mpihelp_add_n,3,0)
 /* Return the carry.  */
 1:     addze %r3,%r10
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_add_n)
+END(mpihelp_add_n)
 #endif
 

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-lshift.S

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Lend2:	slw	0,10,6
 /* mp_limb_t mpn_lshift (mp_ptr wp, mp_srcptr up, mp_size_t usize,
 			unsigned int cnt)  */
 
-EALIGN(_mpihelp_lshift,3,0)
+EALIGN(mpihelp_lshift,3,0)
        mtctr   %r5	       # copy size into CTR
        cmplwi  %cr0,%r5,16     # is size < 16
        slwi    %r0,%r5,2
@@ -194,5 +194,5 @@ L(end2):slw    %r0,%r10,%r6
        DO_LSHIFT(30)
        DO_LSHIFT(31)
 
-END(_mpihelp_lshift)
+END(mpihelp_lshift)
 #endif

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-mul1.S

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Lend:	stw	7,4(3)
 			mp_size_t s1_size, mp_limb_t s2_limb)
    Calculate s1*s2 and put result in res_ptr; return carry.  */
 
-ENTRY(_mpihelp_mul_1)
+ENTRY(mpihelp_mul_1)
        mtctr   %r5
 
        lwz     %r0,0(%r4)
@@ -115,5 +115,5 @@ ENTRY(_mpihelp_mul_1)
 1:     stw     %r7,4(%r3)
        addze   %r3,%r10
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_mul_1)
+END(mpihelp_mul_1)
 #endif

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-mul2.S

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Lend:	stw	8,4(3)
 /* mp_limb_t mpn_addmul_1 (mp_ptr res_ptr, mp_srcptr s1_ptr,
 			   mp_size_t s1_size, mp_limb_t s2_limb)
    Calculate res+s1*s2 and put result back in res; return carry.  */
-ENTRY(_mpihelp_addmul_1)
+ENTRY(mpihelp_addmul_1)
        mtctr   %r5
 
        lwz     %r0,0(%r4)
@@ -123,5 +123,5 @@ ENTRY(_mpihelp_addmul_1)
 1:     stw     %r8,4(%r3)
        addze   %r3,%r10
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_addmul_1)
+END(mpihelp_addmul_1)
 #endif

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-mul3.S

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Lend:	stw	8,4(3)
 			   mp_size_t s1_size, mp_limb_t s2_limb)
    Calculate res-s1*s2 and put result back in res; return carry.  */
 
-ENTRY(_mpihelp_submul_1)
+ENTRY(mpihelp_submul_1)
        mtctr   %r5
 
        lwz     %r0,0(%r4)
@@ -126,5 +126,5 @@ ENTRY(_mpihelp_submul_1)
 1:     stw     %r8,4(%r3)
        addze   %r3,%r10
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_submul_1)
+END(mpihelp_submul_1)
 #endif

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-rshift.S

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Lend2:	srw	0,10,6
    size 	       r5
    cnt	       r6  */
 
-ENTRY(_mpihelp_rshift)
+ENTRY(mpihelp_rshift)
        mtctr   5	       # copy size into CTR
        addi    7,3,-4	       # move adjusted res_ptr to free return reg
        subfic  8,6,32
@@ -127,5 +127,5 @@ ENTRY(_mpihelp_rshift)
 2:     srw     0,10,6
        stw     0,4(7)
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_rshift)
+END(mpihelp_rshift)
 #endif

mpi/powerpc32/mpih-sub1.S

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ mpihelp_sub_n:
 	mtctr	6		# copy size into CTR
 	lwz	8,0(4)		# load least significant s1 limb
 	lwz	0,0(5)		# load least significant s2 limb
-	addi	3,3,-4		# offset res_ptr, it's updated before used
+	addi	3,3,-4		# offset res_ptr, it is updated before used
 	subfc	7,0,8		# add least significant limbs, set cy
 	bdz	Lend		# If done, skip loop
 Loop:	lwzu	8,4(4)		# load s1 limb and update s1_ptr
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Lend:	stw	7,4(3)		# store ultimate result limb
    possible 2-unrolled inner loop will not be.	Also, watch out for the
    alignment...  */
 
-EALIGN(_mpihelp_sub_n,3,1)
+EALIGN(mpihelp_sub_n,3,1)
 /* Set up for loop below.  */
        mtcrf 0x01,%r6
        srwi. %r7,%r6,1
@@ -128,5 +128,5 @@ EALIGN(_mpihelp_sub_n,3,1)
 1:     subfe %r3,%r3,%r3
        neg   %r3,%r3
        blr
-END(_mpihelp_sub_n)
+END(mpihelp_sub_n)
 #endif

po/de.po

@@ -1964,7 +1964,7 @@ msgid "Command> "
 msgstr "Befehl> "
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:617
-msgid "Need the secret key to to this.\n"
+msgid "Need the secret key to do this.\n"
 msgstr "Hierzu wird der geheime Schlüssel benötigt.\n"
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:638

po/es_ES.po

@@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ msgid "Command> "
 msgstr "Comando> "
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:617
-msgid "Need the secret key to to this.\n"
+msgid "Need the secret key to do this.\n"
 msgstr "Se necesita la clave secreta para hacer esto\n"
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:638

po/fr.po

@@ -1959,7 +1959,7 @@ msgid "Command> "
 msgstr "Commande> "
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:617
-msgid "Need the secret key to to this.\n"
+msgid "Need the secret key to do this.\n"
 msgstr "Il faut la clé secrète pour faire cela.\n"
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:638

po/it.po

@@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ msgid "Command> "
 msgstr "Comando> "
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:617
-msgid "Need the secret key to to this.\n"
+msgid "Need the secret key to do this.\n"
 msgstr "Per fare questo serve la chiave segreta.\n"
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:638

po/ru.po

@@ -1988,7 +1988,7 @@ msgstr "
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:617
 #, fuzzy
-msgid "Need the secret key to to this.\n"
+msgid "Need the secret key to do this.\n"
 msgstr "Чтобы это сделать, нужен секретный ключ.\n"
 
 #: g10/keyedit.c:638

util/miscutil.c

@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ asctimestamp( u32 stamp )
 
     tp = localtime( &atime );
   #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+    /* fixme: we should check whether the locale apppends a " %Z"
+     * These locales from glibc don't put the " %Z":
+     * fi_FI hr_HR ja_JP lt_LT lv_LV POSIX ru_RU ru_SU sv_FI sv_SE zh_CN
+     */
     strftime( buffer, DIM(buffer)-1, "%c %Z", tp );
     buffer[DIM(buffer)-1] = 0;
   #else