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agent:kem: Factor out ECC KEM operation from composite KEM.

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* agent/pkdecrypt.c (ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt): New.
(composite_pgp_kem_decrypt): Use ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt.

--

Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka 2024-04-24 15:08:41 +09:00
parent d1f8caafb4
commit a45243548e
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 640114AF89DE6054
1 changed files with 136 additions and 107 deletions
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243
agent/pkdecrypt.c
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@ -244,26 +244,11 @@ reverse_buffer (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
}
/* For composite PGP KEM (ECC+ML-KEM), decrypt CIPHERTEXT using KEM API.
First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
should follow the format of:
(enc-val(pqc(c%d)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&)))
c: cipher identifier (symmetric)
e: ECDH ciphertext
k: ML-KEM ciphertext
s: encrypted session key
fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info.
FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcard are not supported.
*/
static gpg_error_t
composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf)
ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_skey0,
const unsigned char *ecc_ct, size_t ecc_ct_len,
unsigned char *ecc_ss, size_t *r_shared_len, size_t *r_point_len)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
const struct ecc_params *ecc;
@ -271,92 +256,23 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
int algo;
gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
gcry_mpi_t ecc_sk_mpi = NULL;
unsigned char ecc_sk[ECC_SCALAR_LEN_MAX];
gcry_mpi_t ecc_pk_mpi = NULL;
unsigned char ecc_pk[ECC_POINT_LEN_MAX];
gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *ecc_ct;
unsigned char ecc_ecdh[ECC_POINT_LEN_MAX];
unsigned char ecc_ss[ECC_HASH_LEN_MAX];
enum gcry_kem_algos mlkem_kem_algo;
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *mlkem_sk;
size_t mlkem_sk_len;
const unsigned char *mlkem_ct;
size_t mlkem_ct_len;
unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM1024_SHARED_LEN];
size_t mlkem_ss_len;
unsigned char kek[32];
size_t kek_len = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
unsigned char sessionkey[256];
size_t sessionkey_len;
gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
char *curve_name = NULL;
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
(void)ctrl;
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
ctrl->keygrip1, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the another secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
/* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%dc/eks&'fixed-info'",
&algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi,
&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: extracting parameters failed\n", __func__);
goto leave;
}
len = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo);
encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
if (len == 0 || encrypted_sessionkey_len != len + 8)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: encrypted session key length %zu"
" does not match the length for algo %d\n",
__func__, encrypted_sessionkey_len, algo);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Firstly, ECC part. */
curve = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey0, "curve", 0);
if (!curve)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: no curve given\n", __func__);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto leave;
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
}
curve_name = gcry_sexp_nth_string (curve, 1);
@ -369,6 +285,18 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
goto leave;
}
*r_shared_len = ecc->shared_len;
*r_point_len = ecc->point_len;
if (ecc->point_len != ecc_ct_len)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: ECC cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n",
__func__, ecc->point_len);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/qd",
&ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL);
if (err)
@ -417,16 +345,6 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
ecc_sk_mpi = NULL;
ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits);
if (ecc->point_len != (nbits+7)/8)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: ECC cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n",
__func__, ecc->point_len);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_debug ("ECC curve: %s\n", curve_name);
@ -460,6 +378,123 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (ecc_ss, ecc->shared_len, "ECC shared:");
leave:
wipememory (ecc_sk, sizeof ecc_sk);
wipememory (ecc_ecdh, sizeof ecc_ecdh);
mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
xfree (curve_name);
gcry_sexp_release (curve);
return err;
}
/* For composite PGP KEM (ECC+ML-KEM), decrypt CIPHERTEXT using KEM API.
First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
should follow the format of:
(enc-val(pqc(c%d)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&)))
c: cipher identifier (symmetric)
e: ECDH ciphertext
k: ML-KEM ciphertext
s: encrypted session key
fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info.
FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcard are not supported.
*/
static gpg_error_t
composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned int nbits;
size_t len;
int algo;
gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *ecc_ct;
size_t ecc_ct_len;
unsigned char ecc_ss[ECC_HASH_LEN_MAX];
size_t ecc_shared_len, ecc_point_len;
enum gcry_kem_algos mlkem_kem_algo;
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL;
const unsigned char *mlkem_sk;
size_t mlkem_sk_len;
const unsigned char *mlkem_ct;
size_t mlkem_ct_len;
unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM1024_SHARED_LEN];
size_t mlkem_ss_len;
unsigned char kek[32];
size_t kek_len = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
unsigned char sessionkey[256];
size_t sessionkey_len;
gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
ctrl->keygrip1, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the another secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
/* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%dc/eks&'fixed-info'",
&algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi,
&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: extracting parameters failed\n", __func__);
goto leave;
}
ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits);
ecc_ct_len = (nbits+7)/8;
len = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo);
encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
if (len == 0 || encrypted_sessionkey_len != len + 8)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: encrypted session key length %zu"
" does not match the length for algo %d\n",
__func__, encrypted_sessionkey_len, algo);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Firstly, ECC part. */
err = ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl, s_skey0, ecc_ct, ecc_ct_len,
ecc_ss, &ecc_shared_len, &ecc_point_len);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Secondly, PQC part. For now, we assume ML-KEM. */
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey1, NULL, "/s", &mlkem_sk_mpi, NULL);
if (err)
@ -521,7 +556,7 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
/* Then, combine two shared secrets and ciphertexts into one KEK */
err = gnupg_kem_combiner (kek, kek_len,
ecc_ss, ecc->shared_len, ecc_ct, ecc->point_len,
ecc_ss, ecc_shared_len, ecc_ct, ecc_point_len,
mlkem_ss, mlkem_ss_len, mlkem_ct, mlkem_ct_len,
fixed_info.data, fixed_info.size);
if (err)
@ -573,22 +608,16 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
leave:
wipememory (ecc_sk, sizeof ecc_sk);
wipememory (ecc_ecdh, sizeof ecc_ecdh);
wipememory (ecc_ss, sizeof ecc_ss);
wipememory (mlkem_ss, sizeof mlkem_ss);
wipememory (kek, sizeof kek);
wipememory (sessionkey, sizeof sessionkey);
mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_ct_mpi);
mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (mlkem_ct_mpi);
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
gcry_free (fixed_info.data);
gcry_sexp_release (curve);
xfree (curve_name);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1);
return err;