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More changes on the way to remove secring.gpg.

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2010-04-21 16:26:17 +00:00
parent 00f8eafbef
commit a1412b05de
31 changed files with 843 additions and 936 deletions
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38
g10/import.c
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@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
stats->skipped_new_keys++;
}
else if( rc ) { /* insert this key */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (0);
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new ();
rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
if (rc) {
@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
}
/* now read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new (0);
hd = keydb_new ();
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
@ -1012,17 +1012,17 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */
if(mod_key)
if (mod_key)
{
revocation_present(keyblock_orig);
if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
check_prefs(keyblock_orig);
revocation_present (keyblock_orig);
if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
check_prefs (keyblock_orig);
}
else if(new_key)
else if (new_key)
{
revocation_present(keyblock);
if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
check_prefs(keyblock);
revocation_present (keyblock);
if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
check_prefs (keyblock);
}
release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
@ -1160,11 +1160,16 @@ import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
/* do we have this key already in one of our secrings ? */
rc = seckey_available( keyid );
rc = -1 /* fixme seckey_available( keyid ) is not anymore
available and has been replaced by
have_secret_key_with_kid. We need to rework the entire
secret key import code. The solution I am currently
thinking about is to move that code into a helper
program. */;
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY && !(opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
{
/* simply insert this key */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (); /* FIXME*/
/* get default resource */
rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
@ -1265,7 +1270,7 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s *stats )
}
/* read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new (0);
hd = keydb_new ();
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
@ -1594,7 +1599,7 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable &&
!(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS) &&
seckey_available( node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) )
!have_secret_key_with_kid (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
{
/* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
* to import non-exportable signature when we have the
@ -2395,8 +2400,9 @@ auto_create_card_key_stub ( const char *serialnostr,
;
else
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
hd = keydb_new (1);
log_debug ("FIXME: Do we need the stub at all?\n");
hd = keydb_new (); /* FIXME. */
/* Now check whether there is a secret keyring. */
{