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* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Handle case when checksum was okay but

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passphrase still wrong.  Roman Pavlik found such a case.

* mpicoder.c (mpi_read_from_buffer): Don't abort in case of an
invalid MPI but print a message and return NULL.  Use log_info and
not log_error.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2004-12-20 10:05:20 +00:00
parent be4bb5a88b
commit 9e3526f236
6 changed files with 49 additions and 8 deletions
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21
mpi/mpicoder.c
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@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ mpi_read(IOBUF inp, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
MPI
mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure)
{
int i, j;
unsigned nbits, nbytes, nlimbs, nread=0;
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
goto leave;
nbits = buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1];
if( nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS ) {
log_error("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
log_info ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
goto leave;
}
buffer += 2;
@ -154,10 +154,19 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
for( ; j > 0; j-- ) {
a = 0;
for(; i < BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; i++ ) {
if( ++nread > *ret_nread )
log_bug("mpi larger than buffer\n");
a <<= 8;
a |= *buffer++;
if( ++nread > *ret_nread ) {
/* This (as well as the above error condition) may
happen if we use this function to parse a decrypted
MPI which didn't turn out to be a real MPI - possible
because the supplied key was wrong but the OpenPGP
checksum didn't caught it. */
log_info ("mpi larger than buffer\n");
mpi_free (val);
val = MPI_NULL;
goto leave;
}
a <<= 8;
a |= *buffer++;
}
i = 0;
val->d[j-1] = a;