security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-04-17 15:44:34 +02:00
Code Activity

* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Fix the trust signature

Browse Source 
calculations so that we lower the trust depth of signatures to fit
within the current chain, rather than discarding any signature that
does not fit within the trust depth.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2008-11-18 17:15:07 +00:00
parent 9e0919fad1
commit 9d76ee5147
2 changed files with 62 additions and 33 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

7
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
2008-11-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Fix the trust signature
calculations so that we lower the trust depth of signatures to fit
within the current chain, rather than discarding any signature
that does not fit within the trust depth.
2008-10-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print),

48
g10/trustdb.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* trustdb.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
* 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -1933,21 +1933,42 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
(uidnode && check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
{
if(DBG_TRUST && opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth)
log_debug("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d, kr depth is %d\n",
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,sig->trust_depth,
kr->trust_depth);
/* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor
the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent
argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth
&& pk->trust_timestamp<=sig->timestamp
&& (sig->trust_depth<=kr->trust_depth
|| kr->ownertrust==TRUST_ULTIMATE))
if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP
&& sig->trust_depth
&& pk->trust_timestamp<=sig->timestamp)
{
byte depth;
/* If the depth on the signature is less than the
chain currently has, then use the signature depth
so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
signer wanted. If the depth on the signature is
more than the chain currently has, then use the
chain depth so we use as much of the signature
depth as the chain will permit. An ultimately
trusted signature can restart the depth to
whatever level it likes. */
if(sig->trust_depth<kr->trust_depth
|| kr->ownertrust==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
depth=sig->trust_depth;
else
depth=kr->trust_depth;
if(depth)
{
if(DBG_TRUST)
log_debug("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
" kr depth is %d\n",
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
sig->trust_depth,
kr->trust_depth);
/* If we got here, we know that:
this is a trust sig.
@ -1968,16 +1989,17 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
log_debug("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
"depth %d with %d\n",
pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
pk->trust_depth,sig->trust_depth);
pk->trust_depth,depth);
pk->trust_value=sig->trust_value;
pk->trust_depth=sig->trust_depth-1;
pk->trust_depth=depth-1;
/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
on the pk for the next round. */
if(sig->trust_regexp)
pk->trust_regexp=sig->trust_regexp;
}
}
if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;