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gpg: Implement AEAD for SKESK packets.

Browse Source 
* g10/packet.h (PKT_symkey_enc): Add field aead_algo.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_symkey_enc): Support version 5 packets.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Ditto.
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_symmetric): Force using a random session
key in AEAD mode.
(encrypt_seskey): Add and support arg aead_algo.
(write_symkey_enc): Ditto.
(encrypt_simple): Adjust accordingly.
(encrypt_filter): Ditto.
* g10/gpgcompose.c (sk_esk): For now call encrypt_seskey without AEAD
support.
* g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Support AEAD.  Nver call BUG
but return an error.
(proc_symkey_enc): Call symkey_decrypt_seskey in a bug compatible way.

* g10/import.c (check_prefs): Check AEAD preferences.
* g10/keyedit.c (show_prefs): Print AEAD preferences.
--

For easier debugging this patch also changes some diagnostics to also
print the encryption mode with the cipher algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2018-01-23 12:07:25 +01:00
parent da3015e3c0
commit 9aab9167bc
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
11 changed files with 300 additions and 104 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

36
g10/build-packet.c
View File

@ -617,11 +617,8 @@ do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
log_assert (ctb_pkttype (ctb) == PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
log_assert (enc->version == 4 || enc->version == 5);
/* The only acceptable version. */
log_assert( enc->version == 4 );
/* RFC 4880, Section 3.7. */
switch (enc->s2k.mode)
{
case 0: /* Simple S2K. */
@ -632,23 +629,26 @@ do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
default:
log_bug ("do_symkey_enc: s2k=%d\n", enc->s2k.mode);
}
iobuf_put( a, enc->version );
iobuf_put( a, enc->cipher_algo );
iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.mode );
iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.hash_algo );
if( enc->s2k.mode == 1 || enc->s2k.mode == 3 ) {
iobuf_write(a, enc->s2k.salt, 8 );
if( enc->s2k.mode == 3 )
iobuf_put(a, enc->s2k.count);
iobuf_put (a, enc->version);
iobuf_put (a, enc->cipher_algo);
if (enc->version == 5)
iobuf_put (a, enc->aead_algo);
iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.mode);
iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.hash_algo);
if (enc->s2k.mode == 1 || enc->s2k.mode == 3)
{
iobuf_write (a, enc->s2k.salt, 8);
if (enc->s2k.mode == 3)
iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.count);
}
if( enc->seskeylen )
iobuf_write(a, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen );
if (enc->seskeylen)
iobuf_write (a, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
rc = iobuf_write_temp( out, a );
write_header (out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a));
rc = iobuf_write_temp (out, a);
iobuf_close(a);
return rc;
iobuf_close (a);
return rc;
}

6
g10/decrypt-data.c
View File

@ -212,8 +212,10 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
if ( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed )
{
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo))
log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo));
log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo),
ed->aead_algo? openpgp_aead_algo_name (ed->aead_algo)
/**/ : "CFB");
else
log_info (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo );
dek->algo_info_printed = 1;

151
g10/encrypt.c
View File

@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list (ctrl_t ctrl,
/****************
* Encrypt FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher. Take input from
* stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
* stdin if FILENAME is NULL. If --force-aead is used we use an SKESK.
*/
int
encrypt_symmetric (const char *filename)
{
return encrypt_simple( filename, 1, 0 );
return encrypt_simple( filename, 1, opt.force_aead);
}
@ -70,14 +70,16 @@ encrypt_store (const char *filename)
/* Encrypt a session key using DEK and store a pointer to the result
* at R_ENCKEY and its length at R_ENCKEYLEN.
*
* R_SESKEY points to the unencrypted session key (.KEY, >KEYLEN) and
* R_SESKEY points to the unencrypted session key (.KEY, .KEYLEN) and
* the algorithm that will be used to encrypt the contents of the
* SKESK packet (.ALGO). If R_SESKEY points to NULL, then a random
* session key that is appropriate for DEK->ALGO is generated and
* stored at R_SESKEY.
* stored at R_SESKEY. If AEAD_ALGO is not 0 the given AEAD algorithm
* is used for encryption.
*/
gpg_error_t
encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, aead_algo_t aead_algo,
DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = NULL;
@ -102,30 +104,84 @@ encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", c->key, c->keylen );*/
}
buf = xtrymalloc_secure (1 + seskey->keylen);
if (!buf)
if (aead_algo)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
unsigned int noncelen;
enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
byte ad[4];
err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (aead_algo, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Allocate space for the nonce, the key, and the authentication
* tag (16). */
buf = xtrymalloc_secure (noncelen + seskey->keylen + 16);
if (!buf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
gcry_randomize (buf, noncelen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo,
ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, buf, noncelen);
if (err)
goto leave;
ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
ad[1] = 5;
ad[2] = dek->algo;
ad[3] = aead_algo;
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
if (err)
goto leave;
memcpy (buf + noncelen, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
gcry_cipher_final (hd);
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf + noncelen, seskey->keylen, NULL,0);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_gettag (hd, buf + noncelen + seskey->keylen, 16);
if (err)
goto leave;
*r_enckeylen = noncelen + seskey->keylen + 16;
*r_enckey = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
else
{
/* In the old version 4 SKESK the encrypted session key is
* prefixed with a one-octet algorithm id. */
buf = xtrymalloc_secure (1 + seskey->keylen);
if (!buf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
buf[0] = seskey->algo;
memcpy (buf + 1, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, NULL, 0);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf, seskey->keylen + 1, NULL, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
*r_enckeylen = seskey->keylen + 1;
*r_enckey = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
/* The encrypted session key is prefixed with a one-octet algorithm id. */
buf[0] = seskey->algo;
memcpy (buf + 1, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, NULL, 0);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf, seskey->keylen + 1, NULL, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
*r_enckey = buf;
buf = NULL;
*r_enckeylen = seskey->keylen + 1;
/* Return the session key in case we allocated it. */
*r_seskey = seskey;
seskey = NULL;
@ -332,7 +388,7 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
{
DEK *dek = NULL;
rc = encrypt_seskey (cfx.dek, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
rc = encrypt_seskey (cfx.dek, aead_algo, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
if (rc)
{
xfree (cfx.dek);
@ -346,14 +402,16 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
cfx.dek = dek;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info(_("using cipher %s\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (cfx.dek->algo));
if (aead_algo)
cfx.dek->use_aead = aead_algo;
else
cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info(_("using cipher %s.%s\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (cfx.dek->algo),
cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
/**/ : "CFB");
}
if (do_compress
@ -385,8 +443,9 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
{
/* Fixme: This is quite similar to write_symkey_enc. */
PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *enc + enckeylen);
enc->version = 4;
enc->version = cfx.dek->use_aead ? 5 : 4;
enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
enc->aead_algo = cfx.dek->use_aead;
enc->s2k = *s2k;
if (enckeylen)
{
@ -535,8 +594,8 @@ setup_symkey (STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek)
static int
write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
iobuf_t out)
write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, aead_algo_t aead_algo,
DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek, iobuf_t out)
{
int rc;
void *enckey;
@ -544,7 +603,7 @@ write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
PACKET pkt;
rc = encrypt_seskey (symkey_dek, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
rc = encrypt_seskey (symkey_dek, aead_algo, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
if (rc)
return rc;
enc = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof (PKT_symkey_enc) + enckeylen);
@ -555,8 +614,9 @@ write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
return rc;
}
enc->version = 4;
enc->version = aead_algo? 5 : 4;
enc->cipher_algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
enc->aead_algo = aead_algo;
enc->s2k = *symkey_s2k;
enc->seskeylen = enckeylen;
memcpy (enc->seskey, enckey, enckeylen);
@ -813,10 +873,11 @@ encrypt_crypt (ctrl_t ctrl, int filefd, const char *filename,
goto leave;
/* We put the passphrase (if any) after any public keys as this
seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
secret key needed to decrypt. */
if(use_symkey && (rc = write_symkey_enc(symkey_s2k,symkey_dek,cfx.dek,out)))
* seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
* point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
* secret key needed to decrypt. */
if (use_symkey && (rc = write_symkey_enc (symkey_s2k, cfx.dek->use_aead,
symkey_dek, cfx.dek, out)))
goto leave;
if (!opt.no_literal)
@ -1014,9 +1075,9 @@ encrypt_filter (void *opaque, int control,
if(efx->symkey_s2k && efx->symkey_dek)
{
rc=write_symkey_enc(efx->symkey_s2k,efx->symkey_dek,
efx->cfx.dek,a);
if(rc)
rc = write_symkey_enc (efx->symkey_s2k, efx->cfx.dek->use_aead,
efx->symkey_dek, efx->cfx.dek, a);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@ -1084,9 +1145,11 @@ write_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl,
if ( opt.verbose )
{
char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, enc->keyid);
log_info (_("%s/%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
log_info (_("%s/%s.%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
openpgp_pk_algo_name (enc->pubkey_algo),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo),
dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (dek->use_aead)
/**/ : "CFB",
ustr );
xfree (ustr);
}

2
g10/gpgcompose.c
View File

@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ sk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie)
/* Now encrypt the session key (or rather, the algorithm used to
encrypt the SKESK plus the session key) using ENCKEY. */
err = encrypt_seskey (&s2kdek, &sesdekp,
err = encrypt_seskey (&s2kdek, 0, &sesdekp,
(void**)&ske->seskey, (size_t *)&ske->seskeylen);
if (err)
log_fatal ("encrypt_seskey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));

19
g10/import.c
View File

@ -1113,6 +1113,24 @@ check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
problem=1;
}
}
else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_AEAD)
{
if (openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value))
{
/* FIXME: The test below is wrong. We should
* check if ...algo_name yields a "?" and
* only in that case use NUM. */
const char *algo =
(openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value)
? num
: openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs->value));
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for AEAD"
" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
problem=1;
}
}
else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
{
if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
@ -2255,6 +2273,7 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats,
{
char countbuf[35];
/* FIXME: Support AEAD */
/* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
thus we send dummy data for the IV. */

18
g10/keyedit.c
View File

@ -3064,6 +3064,23 @@ show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("AEAD: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (!openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
&& prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
}
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
@ -3172,6 +3189,7 @@ show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD ? 'A' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[i].value);

2
g10/main.h
View File

@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ void display_online_help( const char *keyword );
/*-- encode.c --*/
int setup_symkey (STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek);
gpg_error_t encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey,
gpg_error_t encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, aead_algo_t aead_algo, DEK **r_seskey,
void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen);
aead_algo_t use_aead (pk_list_t pk_list, int algo);
int use_mdc (pk_list_t pk_list,int algo);

116
g10/mainproc.c
View File

@ -245,46 +245,102 @@ add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
return 1;
}
static int
static gpg_error_t
symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
byte ad[4];
if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
if (dek->use_aead)
{
err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (dek->use_aead, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
if (err)
return err;
}
else
{
ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
noncelen = 0;
}
/* Check that the session key has a size of 16 to 32 bytes. */
if ((dek->use_aead && (slen < (noncelen + 16 + 16)
|| slen > (noncelen + 32 + 16)))
|| (!dek->use_aead && (slen < 17 || slen > 33)))
{
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
(int)slen);
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
}
if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
BUG ();
if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
BUG ();
gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, noncelen? seskey : NULL, noncelen);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
if (dek->use_aead)
{
byte ad[4];
dek->keylen=slen-1;
dek->algo=seskey[0];
if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
BUG ();
memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
ad[1] = 5;
ad[2] = dek->algo;
ad[3] = dek->use_aead;
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
if (err)
goto leave;
gcry_cipher_final (hd);
keylen = slen - noncelen - 16;
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey+noncelen, keylen, NULL, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_checktag (hd, seskey+noncelen+keylen, 16);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
* decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
goto leave;
}
dek->keylen = keylen;
memcpy (dek->key, seskey + noncelen, dek->keylen);
}
else
{
gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
* decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
keylen = slen-1;
if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
goto leave;
}
dek->algo = seskey[0];
dek->keylen = keylen;
memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
}
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
return 0;
leave:
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
return err;
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
gpg_error_t err;
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
@ -294,19 +350,21 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
const char *a = (enc->aead_algo ? openpgp_aead_algo_name (enc->aead_algo)
/**/ : "CFB");
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
if (enc->seskeylen)
log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted session key\n"), s, a );
else
log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"), s, a );
}
}
else
log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d.%s\n"), algo, a);
if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
{
@ -334,6 +392,7 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
if (c->dek)
{
c->dek->symmetric = 1;
c->dek->use_aead = enc->aead_algo;
/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
comes before a public key in the message - if the
@ -344,9 +403,16 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
come later. */
if (enc->seskeylen)
{
if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
err = symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
if (err)
{
log_info ("decryption of the symmetrically encrypted"
" session key failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY)
log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible"
" with GnuPG <= 2.2\n");
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}

13
g10/packet.h
View File

@ -94,12 +94,14 @@ typedef struct
/* A symmetric-key encrypted session key packet as defined in RFC
4880, Section 5.3. All fields are serialized. */
typedef struct {
/* RFC 4880: this must be 4. */
/* We support version 4 (rfc4880) and 5 (rfc4880bis). */
byte version;
/* The cipher algorithm used to encrypt the session key. (This may
be different from the algorithm that is used to encrypt the SED
packet.) */
/* The cipher algorithm used to encrypt the session key. Note that
* this may be different from the algorithm that is used to encrypt
* bulk data. */
byte cipher_algo;
/* The AEAD algorithm or 0 for CFB encryption. */
byte aead_algo;
/* The string-to-key specifier. */
STRING2KEY s2k;
/* The length of SESKEY in bytes or 0 if this packet does not
@ -107,7 +109,8 @@ typedef struct {
S2K function on the password is the session key. See RFC 4880,
Section 5.3.) */
byte seskeylen;
/* The session key as encrypted by the S2K specifier. */
/* The session key as encrypted by the S2K specifier. For AEAD this
* includes the nonce and the authentication tag. */
byte seskey[1];
} PKT_symkey_enc;

32
g10/parse-packet.c
View File

@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
{
PKT_symkey_enc *k;
int rc = 0;
int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, aead_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
if (pktlen < 4)
{
@ -1117,7 +1117,11 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (version != 4)
if (version == 4)
;
else if (version == 5)
;
else
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
if (list_mode)
@ -1135,6 +1139,13 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (version == 5)
{
aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
}
else
aead_algo = 0;
s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
@ -1169,6 +1180,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+ seskeylen - 1);
k->version = version;
k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
k->aead_algo = aead_algo;
k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
@ -1199,10 +1211,20 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp,
":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, s2k %d, hash %d",
version, cipher_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, aead %d,"
" s2k %d, hash %d",
version, cipher_algo, aead_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
if (seskeylen)
es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
{
/* To compute the size of the session key we need to know
* the size of the AEAD nonce which we may not know. Thus
* we show only the seize of the entire encrypted session
* key. */
if (aead_algo)
es_fprintf (listfp, ", encrypted seskey %d bytes", seskeylen);
else
es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
{

9
g10/sign.c
View File

@ -1326,9 +1326,6 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
algo = default_cipher_algo();
if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo) );
cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 1, 1, NULL, &canceled);
if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
@ -1341,6 +1338,12 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
if (!cfx.dek->use_aead)
cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);
if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
log_info (_("%s.%s encryption will be used\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo),
cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
/**/ : "CFB");
/* now create the outfile */
rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1:0, 0, &out);
if (rc)