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Signing using Netkey 3 cards does now work.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch
parent
6e63e54b00
commit
990585ad7d
14 changed files with 153 additions and 49 deletions
107
scd/app-nks.c
107
scd/app-nks.c
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@ -19,10 +19,11 @@
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/* Notes:
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- This is still work in progress. We are now targeting TCOS 3 cards
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but try to keep compatibility to TCOS 2. Both are not fully
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working as of now. TCOS 3 PIN management seems to work. Use GPA
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from SVN trunk to test it.
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- We are now targeting TCOS 3 cards and it may happen that there is
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a regression towards TCOS 2 cards. Please report.
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- The TKS3 AUT key is not used by our authentication command but
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accessible via the decrypt command.
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- If required, we automagically switch between the NKS application
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and the SigG application. This avoids to use the DINSIG
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@ -63,25 +64,26 @@ static struct
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int fid; /* File ID. */
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int nks_ver; /* 0 for NKS version 2, 3 for version 3. */
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int certtype; /* Type of certificate or 0 if it is not a certificate. */
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int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the correspoding certificate. */
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int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate. */
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int issignkey; /* True if file is a key usable for signing. */
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int isenckey; /* True if file is a key usable for decryption. */
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unsigned char kid; /* Corresponding key references. */
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} filelist[] = {
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{ 0, 0x4531, 0, 0, 0xC000, 1, 0 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.SIG */
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{ 1, 0x4531, 3, 0, 0x0000, 1, 1 }, /* EF_PK.CH.SIG */
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{ 0, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.SIG */
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{ 1, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.CH.SIG */
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{ 0, 0x4531, 0, 0, 0xC000, 1, 0, 0x80 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.SIG */
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{ 1, 0x4531, 3, 0, 0x0000, 1, 1, 0x84 }, /* EF_PK.CH.SIG */
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{ 0, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.SIG */
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{ 1, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.CH.SIG */
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{ 0, 0x4331, 0, 100 },
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{ 0, 0x4332, 0, 100 },
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{ 0, 0xB000, 0, 110 }, /* EF_PK.RCA.NKS */
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{ 0, 0x45B1, 0, 0, 0xC200, 0, 1 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC */
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{ 0, 0xC200, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC */
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{ 0, 0xB000, 0, 110 }, /* EF_PK.RCA.NKS */
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{ 0, 0x45B1, 0, 0, 0xC200, 0, 1, 0x81 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC */
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{ 0, 0xC200, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC */
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{ 0, 0x43B1, 0, 100 },
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{ 0, 0x43B2, 0, 100 },
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{ 0, 0x4571, 3, 0, 0xc500, 0, 0 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.AUT */
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{ 0, 0xC500, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.AUT */
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{ 0, 0x45B2, 3, 0, 0xC201, 0, 1 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC1024 */
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{ 0, 0xC201, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC1024 */
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{ 0, 0x4571, 3, 0, 0xc500, 0, 0, 0x82 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.AUT */
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{ 0, 0xC500, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.AUT */
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{ 0, 0x45B2, 3, 0, 0xC201, 0, 1, 0x83 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC1024 */
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{ 0, 0xC201, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC1024 */
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/* { 1, 0xB000, 3, ... */
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{ 0, 0 }
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};
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@ -303,10 +305,12 @@ do_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name)
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{
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case 1: /* $AUTHKEYID */
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{
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/* NetKey 3.0 cards define this key for authentication.
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FIXME: We don't have the readkey command, so this
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information is pretty useless. */
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char const tmp[] = "NKS-NKS3.4571";
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/* NetKey 3.0 cards define an authentication key but according
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to the specs this key is only usable for encryption and not
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signing. it might work anyway but it has not yet been
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tested - fixme. Thus for now we use the NKS signature key
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for authentication. */
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char const tmp[] = "NKS-NKS3.4531";
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send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0);
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}
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break;
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@ -685,13 +689,18 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
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int rc, i;
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int is_sigg = 0;
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int fid;
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unsigned char data[35]; /* Must be large enough for a SHA-1 digest
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+ the largest OID _prefix above. */
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unsigned char kid;
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unsigned char data[83]; /* Must be large enough for a SHA-1 digest
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+ the largest OID prefix. */
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size_t datalen;
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if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
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if (indatalen != 20 && indatalen != 16 && indatalen != 35)
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
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switch (indatalen)
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{
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case 16: case 20: case 35: case 47: case 51: case 67: case 83: break;
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default: return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
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}
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/* Check that the provided ID is valid. This is not really needed
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but we do it to enforce correct usage by the caller. */
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@ -721,22 +730,35 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
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if (!filelist[i].issignkey)
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
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kid = filelist[i].kid;
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/* Prepare the DER object from INDATA. */
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if (indatalen == 35)
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/* Prepare the DER object from INDATA. */
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if (app->app_local->nks_version > 2 && (indatalen == 35
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|| indatalen == 47
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|| indatalen == 51
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|| indatalen == 67
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|| indatalen == 83))
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{
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/* The caller send data matching the length of the ASN.1 encoded
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hash for SHA-{1,224,256,384,512}. Assume that is okay. */
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assert (indatalen <= sizeof data);
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memcpy (data, indata, indatalen);
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datalen = indatalen;
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}
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else if (indatalen == 35)
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{
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/* Alright, the caller was so kind to send us an already
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prepared DER object. Check that it is waht we want and that
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it matches the hash algorithm. */
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prepared DER object. This is for TCOS 2. */
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if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1 && !memcmp (indata, sha1_prefix, 15))
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;
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else if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160 && !memcmp (indata, rmd160_prefix,15))
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else if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160 && !memcmp (indata,rmd160_prefix,15))
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;
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else
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
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memcpy (data, indata, indatalen);
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datalen = 35;
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}
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else
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else if (indatalen == 20)
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{
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if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1)
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memcpy (data, sha1_prefix, 15);
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@ -745,11 +767,32 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
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else
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
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memcpy (data+15, indata, indatalen);
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datalen = 35;
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}
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else
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
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rc = verify_pin (app, 0, NULL, pincb, pincb_arg);
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/* Send an MSE for PSO:Computer_Signature. */
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if (app->app_local->nks_version > 2)
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{
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unsigned char mse[6];
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mse[0] = 0x80; /* Algorithm reference. */
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mse[1] = 1;
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mse[2] = 2; /* RSA, card does pkcs#1 v1.5 padding, no ASN.1 check. */
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mse[3] = 0x84; /* Private key reference. */
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mse[4] = 1;
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mse[5] = kid;
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rc = iso7816_manage_security_env (app->slot, 0x41, 0xB6,
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mse, sizeof mse);
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}
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/* Verify using PW1.CH. */
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if (!rc)
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rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, data, 35, outdata, outdatalen);
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rc = verify_pin (app, 0, NULL, pincb, pincb_arg);
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/* Compute the signature. */
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if (!rc)
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rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, data, datalen, outdata, outdatalen);
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return rc;
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}
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