1
0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2024-12-22 10:19:57 +01:00

Implemented -cs and some fixes to the rfc1991 symmetric only mode

This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2001-08-20 19:10:34 +00:00
parent 23589ae0a2
commit 98a8843e28
17 changed files with 522 additions and 64 deletions

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@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* acinclude.m4: Add check for plock if mlock is broken.
* configure.ac: Use regular tests for -lsocket and -lnsl,
more thorough test for gethrtime, allow specifying the path to
the zlib library if it is not in the default compiler/linker
search path, use ${datadir}. All these test enhancements are by
Albert Chin.
* configure.ac: Set some compiler flags for dec-osf and hpux. By
Tim Mooney.
* configure.ac: Create g10defs.h with EXTSEP_S et al.
2001-08-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>

1
NEWS
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@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
* Merged Stefan's patches for RISCOS in. See comments in
scripts/build-riscos.
* It is now possible to sign an convenional encrypt a message (-cs).
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.6 (2001-05-29)
------------------------------------------------

4
TODO
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@ -7,8 +7,6 @@
* Put a note into readme.w32 that there is a man page and a options
file; write the registry stuff in regedit format.
* Allow "gpg -cs"
* Show more info does not work from edit->trust
* keyedit_menu: We first look for a secret key and then for a public
@ -77,6 +75,8 @@
* Using --list-only to check for recipients while decrypting may
yield an error about an unknown packet.
* Check that the way we select cipher and digest algorithms w/o
preferences is okay and make AES the default.
Scheduled for 1.1
-----------------

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@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ define(GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK,1,
[Defined if the mlock() call does not work])
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(plock)
else
if test "$gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock" = "no"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)

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@ -239,6 +239,15 @@ case "${target}" in
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -w"
fi
;;
*-dec-osf5*)
if test -z "$GCC" ; then
# Use the newer compiler `-msg_disable ptrmismatch' to
# get rid of the unsigned/signed char mismatch warnings.
# Using this may hide other pointer mismatch warnings, but
# it at least lets other warning classes through
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -msg_disable ptrmismatch"
fi
;;
m68k-atari-mint)
;;
*)
@ -279,7 +288,13 @@ esac
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRINTABLE_OS_NAME, "$PRINTABLE_OS_NAME",
[A human readable text with the name of the OS])
dnl Fixme: Are these the best flags for OpenBSD????
#
# 1. Set flags to be used for the extension modules
# 2. Set names of random devices
#
NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
case "${target}" in
*-openbsd* | *-netbsd*)
NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/srandom"
@ -287,15 +302,39 @@ case "${target}" in
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic $CFLAGS_PIC -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
;;
hpux*)
# if using the vendor (ANSI) compiler, arrange to have `-b' passed
# to the linker. If using gcc, it supports `-shared' to do the same.
if test -n "$GCC" ; then
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
else
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS='-Wl,-b'
fi
;;
*-irix6.5*)
# Irix 6.5 (and probably a lot earlier, but I only still have
# access to 6.5.x) doesn't require any additional flags, as `-KPIC'
# is the default. Also, `-shared' works with the vendor compiler
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared"
;;
alpha*-dec-osf*)
# osf (i.e. OSF/1, Digital UNIX, or Tru64 UNIX, pick any one...)
# on alpha doesn't require any PIC flags, everything is PIC.
# This may not be the case for osf ports to other machines, so
# hence the more specific match for target.
#
# Also, `-shared' works with the vendor compiler or gcc.
# -expect_unresolved turns off warnings about unresolved symbols.
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS='-shared -Wl,-expect_unresolved,\*'
;;
*-solaris* | *-irix* | *-dec-osf* )
NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
;;
*)
NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
# -shared is a gcc-ism. Find pic flags from GNUPG_CHECK_PIC.
if test -n "$GCC" ; then
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
@ -335,28 +374,33 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_gdbm_h" = yes ; then
fi
fi
dnl This old test is here just for reference tin case it fails:
dnl
dnl Solaris needs -lsocket and -lnsl. Unisys system includes
dnl gethostbyname in libsocket but needs libnsl for socket.
dnl The test does not workfor all system, so some are hardcoded here.
case "${target}" in
i386-univel-sysv4*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket -lnsl"
;;
*)
AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)
AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, socket, ac_need_libsocket=1, ac_try_nsl=1)
if test x$ac_need_libsocket = x1; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket"
fi
if test x$ac_try_nsl = x1; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname, ac_need_libnsl=1)
if test x$ac_need_libnsl = x1
then
LIBS="$LIBS -lnsl"
fi
fi
;;
esac
dnl case "${target}" in
dnl i386-univel-sysv4*)
dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket -lnsl"
dnl ;;
dnl *)
dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)
dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, socket, ac_need_libsocket=1, ac_try_nsl=1)
dnl if test x$ac_need_libsocket = x1; then
dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket"
dnl fi
dnl if test x$ac_try_nsl = x1; then
dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname, ac_need_libnsl=1)
dnl if test x$ac_need_libnsl = x1
dnl then
dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lnsl"
dnl fi
dnl fi
dnl ;;
dnl esac
AC_CHECK_FUNC(gethostbyname, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname))
AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt))
if test "$try_dynload" = yes ; then
@ -446,10 +490,17 @@ fi
dnl Checks for library functions.
AC_FUNC_VPRINTF
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strerror stpcpy strlwr stricmp tcgetattr rand strtoul mmap)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memmove gettimeofday getrusage gethrtime setrlimit clock_gettime)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memmove gettimeofday getrusage setrlimit clock_gettime)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memicmp atexit raise getpagesize strftime nl_langinfo)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(waitpid wait4 sigaction sigprocmask fseeko)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gethrtime)
AC_TRY_LINK([#include <sys/times.h>],[
hrtime_t tv;
tv = gethrtime();
],[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETHRTIME)], AC_MSG_RESULT(no))
GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK
GNUPG_FUNC_MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG
@ -696,10 +747,23 @@ use_local_zlib=yes
if test "$g10_force_zlib" = "yes"; then
:
else
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(zlib.h)
if test "$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(z,deflateInit2_,use_local_zlib=no,:)
fi
_cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
_ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
AC_ARG_WITH(zlib,
[ --with-zlib=DIR use libz in DIR],[
if test -d "$withval"; then
CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
fi
])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(zlib.h,
AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflateInit2_,
use_local_zlib=no
LIBS="$LIBS -lz",
CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}),
CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags})
fi
if test "$use_local_zlib" = yes ; then
@ -709,7 +773,6 @@ if test "$use_local_zlib" = yes ; then
else
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB, false)
ZLIBS=
LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
fi
AC_SUBST(ZLIBS)
@ -757,7 +820,7 @@ cat >g10defs.tmp <<G10EOF
#define GNUPG_DATADIR "c:/lib/gnupg"
#define GNUPG_HOMEDIR "c:/gnupg"
#else
#define G10_LOCALEDIR "${prefix}/${DATADIRNAME}/locale"
#define G10_LOCALEDIR "${datadir}/locale"
#define GNUPG_LIBDIR "${libdir}/gnupg"
#define GNUPG_DATADIR "${datadir}/gnupg"
#ifdef __VMS
@ -806,14 +869,15 @@ checks/Makefile
AC_OUTPUT
# Give some feedback
echo "Configured for: $PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ($target)"
echo
echo " Configured for: $PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ($target)"
if test -n "$show_dynlink"; then
echo "Dynamically linked modules:$show_dynlink"
echo " Dynamically linked modules:$show_dynlink"
fi
if test -n "$show_statlink"; then
echo "Statically linked modules:$show_statlink"
echo " Statically linked modules:$show_statlink"
fi
if test -n "$show_extraasm"; then
echo "Extra cpu specific functions:$show_extraasm"
echo " Extra cpu specific functions:$show_extraasm"
fi

View File

@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Keep track on whether we already
printed information about the used algorithm.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Removed the non-working IDEA hack
and print a message about the assumed algorithm.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use the same algorithm as above.
(proc_symkey_enc): Print the algorithm, so that the user knows it
before entering the passphrase.
(proc_pubkey_enc, proc_pubkey_enc): Zero the DEK out.
* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Ditto.
* g10.c: Allow for --sign --symmetric.
* sign.c (sign_and_symencrypt): New.
Applied patches from Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de> to support
the RISCOS. Nearly all of these patches are identified by the
__riscos__ macro.

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@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr )
}
#endif
/* create a session key */
cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *cfx.dek );
cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear (sizeof *cfx.dek);
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
cfx.dek->algo = select_algo_from_prefs( pk_list, PREFTYPE_SYM );
if( cfx.dek->algo == -1 )
@ -415,13 +415,16 @@ encrypt_filter( void *opaque, int control,
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
if( !efx->header_okay ) {
efx->cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
efx->cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
efx->cfx.dek->algo =
select_algo_from_prefs( efx->pk_list, PREFTYPE_SYM );
if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 )
if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
/* because 3DES is implicitly in the prefs, this can only
* happen if we do not have any public keys in the list */
efx->cfx.dek->algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
}
}
else
efx->cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;

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@ -60,12 +60,13 @@ decrypt_data( void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
unsigned nprefix;
memset( &dfx, 0, sizeof dfx );
if( opt.verbose ) {
if( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed ) {
const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string( dek->algo );
if( s )
log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
else
log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo );
dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
if( (rc=check_cipher_algo(dek->algo)) )
goto leave;

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@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
aStore,
aKeygen,
aSignEncr,
aSignSym,
aSignKey,
aLSignKey,
aListPackets,
@ -607,6 +608,10 @@ set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
cmd = aSignSym;
else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignSym;
else if( cmd == aKMode && new_cmd == aSym )
cmd = aKModeC;
else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
@ -1316,11 +1321,21 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
if (argc > 1)
wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]"));
rc = sign_symencrypt_file (fname, locusr);
if (rc)
log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
break;
case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]"));
if( (rc = clearsign_file(fname, locusr, NULL)) )
log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
break;
case aVerify:

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@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ int complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_key *sk, MD_HANDLE md );
int sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
int do_encrypt, STRLIST remusr, const char *outfile );
int clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile );
int sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr);
/*-- sig-check.c --*/
int check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig );

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@ -247,8 +247,19 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if (enc->seskeylen)
log_error ("symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
else {
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s;
s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
if( s )
log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
else
log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
free_packet(pkt);
}
@ -276,10 +287,10 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
/* It does not make nuch sense to store the session key in
/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it */
c->dek = m_alloc( sizeof *c->dek );
c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
if ( result ) {
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
@ -293,7 +304,7 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else {
c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
c->dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
/* error: delete the DEK */
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
@ -409,14 +420,14 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
int def_algo;
/* assume this is old conventional encrypted data
* We use IDEA here if it is installed */
def_algo = check_cipher_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)?
DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO : CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0,
opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo
: DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO, NULL, 0 );
int algo = opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo
: opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
/* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
log_info(_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string (algo) );
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, NULL, 0);
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;

View File

@ -513,16 +513,14 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
STRING2KEY help_s2k;
if( !s2k ) {
int def_algo;
/* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
* Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
int algo = opt.def_digest_algo ? opt.def_digest_algo
: opt.s2k_digest_algo;
s2k = &help_s2k;
s2k->mode = 0;
/* If we have IDEA installed we use MD5 otherwise the default
* hash algorithm. This can always be overriden from the
* commandline */
def_algo = check_cipher_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)?
DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo? opt.def_digest_algo : def_algo;
s2k->hash_algo = algo;
}
if( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() ) {
@ -632,7 +630,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
dek = m_alloc_secure_clear ( sizeof *dek );
dek->algo = cipher_algo;
if( !*pw && mode == 2 )
dek->keylen = 0;

View File

@ -797,6 +797,328 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
return rc;
}
/*
* Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
* FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
*/
int
sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr)
{
armor_filter_context_t afx;
compress_filter_context_t zfx;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
text_filter_context_t tfx;
cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
PACKET pkt;
PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
u32 filesize;
int rc = 0;
SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
int old_style = opt.rfc1991;
int compr_algo = -1; /* unknown */
int algo;
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
init_packet( &pkt );
rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if( !old_style )
old_style = only_old_style( sk_list );
/* prepare iobufs */
inp = iobuf_open(fname);
if( !inp ) {
log_error("can't open %s: %s\n", fname? fname: "[stdin]",
strerror(errno) );
rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
goto leave;
}
/* prepare key */
s2k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
s2k->mode = opt.rfc1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo ? opt.def_digest_algo
: opt.s2k_digest_algo;
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo : opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo) );
cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 2 );
if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
/* now create the outfile */
rc = open_outfile (fname, opt.armor? 1:0, &out);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
if (opt.textmode)
iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version ));
}
iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
/* Push armor output filter */
if (opt.armor)
iobuf_push_filter (out, armor_filter, &afx);
/* Write the symmetric key packet */
/*(current filters: armor)*/
if (!opt.rfc1991) {
PKT_symkey_enc *enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
enc->version = 4;
enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
enc->s2k = *s2k;
pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
m_free(enc);
}
/* Push the encryption filter */
iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
/* Push the Zip filter */
if (opt.compress) {
if (!compr_algo)
; /* don't use compression */
else {
if( old_style || compr_algo == 1 )
zfx.algo = 1; /* use the non optional algorithm */
iobuf_push_filter( out, compress_filter, &zfx );
}
}
/* Write the one-pass signature packets */
/*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
if (!old_style) {
int skcount=0;
/* loop over the secret certificates and build headers
* The specs now say that the data should be bracket by
* the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we must build it
* here in reverse order */
for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
skcount++;
for( ; skcount; skcount-- ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk;
PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
int i = 0;
for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
if( ++i == skcount )
break;
sk = sk_rover->sk;
ops = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *ops );
ops->sig_class = opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00;
ops->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
ops->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
keyid_from_sk( sk, ops->keyid );
ops->last = skcount == 1;
init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
free_packet( &pkt );
if( rc ) {
log_error("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
}
}
/* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff */
/*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
if (!opt.no_literal) {
if (fname || opt.set_filename) {
char *s = make_basename (opt.set_filename? opt.set_filename
: fname );
pt = m_alloc (sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
pt->namelen = strlen (s);
memcpy (pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
m_free (s);
}
else { /* no filename */
pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
pt->namelen = 0;
}
}
/* try to calculate the length of the data */
if (fname) {
if( !(filesize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
log_info(_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), fname );
/* we can't yet encode the length of very large files,
* so we switch to partial length encoding in this case */
if (filesize >= IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT)
filesize = 0;
/* because the text_filter modifies the length of the
* data, it is not possible to know the used length
* without a double read of the file - to avoid that
* we simple use partial length packets.
*/
if (opt.textmode)
filesize = 0;
}
else {
filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
}
if (!opt.no_literal) {
pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
pt->mode = opt.textmode? 't':'b';
pt->len = filesize;
pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !opt.rfc1991;
pt->buf = inp; /* take data from this iobuf */
pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
/* build packet automagically write all the data */
if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
log_error("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
pt->buf = NULL;
}
else {
byte copy_buffer[4096];
int bytes_copied;
while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
break;
}
memset(copy_buffer, 0, 4096); /* burn buffer */
}
/* catch errors from above */
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Write the signature by looping over the secret certificates */
/*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk;
PKT_signature *sig;
MD_HANDLE md;
sk = sk_rover->sk;
/* build the signature packet */
/* fixme: this code is partly duplicated in make_keysig_packet */
sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
sig->version = old_style || opt.force_v3_sigs ? 3 : sk->version;
keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
sig->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
sig->sig_class = opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00;
md = md_copy( mfx.md );
if( sig->version >= 4 ) {
build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
md_putc( md, sig->version );
}
mk_notation_and_policy( sig );
md_putc( md, sig->sig_class );
if( sig->version < 4 ) {
u32 a = sig->timestamp;
md_putc( md, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
md_putc( md, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
md_putc( md, (a >> 8) & 0xff );
md_putc( md, a & 0xff );
}
else {
byte buf[6];
size_t n;
md_putc( md, sig->pubkey_algo );
md_putc( md, sig->digest_algo );
if( sig->hashed ) {
n = sig->hashed->len;
md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
md_putc (md, n );
md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
n += 6;
}
else {
md_putc( md, 0 ); /* always hash the length of the subpacket*/
md_putc( md, 0 );
n = 6;
}
/* add some magic */
buf[0] = sig->version;
buf[1] = 0xff;
buf[2] = n >> 24; /* hmmm, n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0 */
buf[3] = n >> 16;
buf[4] = n >> 8;
buf[5] = n;
md_write( md, buf, 6 );
}
md_final( md );
rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, hash_for(sig->pubkey_algo, sk->version) );
md_close( md );
if( !rc ) { /* and write it */
init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
print_status_sig_created ( sk, sig, 'S');
}
free_packet( &pkt );
if( rc )
log_error("build signature packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
}
if( rc )
goto leave;
}
leave:
if( rc )
iobuf_cancel(out);
else {
iobuf_close(out);
write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
}
iobuf_close(inp);
release_sk_list( sk_list );
md_close( mfx.md );
m_free(cfx.dek);
m_free(s2k);
return rc;
}
/****************
* Create a signature packet for the given public key certificate and

View File

@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher.h (DEK): Added algo_info_printed;
* util.h [__riscos__]: Added prototypes and made sure that we
never use __attribute__.
* cipher.h, iobuf.h, memory.h, mpi.h [__riscos__]: extern hack.

View File

@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
typedef struct {
int algo;
int keylen;
int algo_info_printed;
byte key[32]; /* this is the largest used keylen (256 bit) */
} DEK;

View File

@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
* memory.c [__riscos__]: Minor patches
* riscos.c (set_filetype): New.
* secmem.c (lock_pool): Under HPUX mlock is broken but we might
have plock, so we use this to lock the entire process. By Albert
Chin.
2001-07-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* strgutil.c (utf8_to_native): Fixed printing of invalid utf-8

View File

@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
#include <sys/capability.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PLOCK
#include <sys/lock.h>
#endif
#endif
#include "types.h"
@ -120,6 +123,13 @@ lock_pool( void *p, size_t n )
uid = getuid();
#ifdef HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK
/* ick. but at least we get secured memory. about to lock
entire data segment. */
#ifdef HAVE_PLOCK
err = plock( DATLOCK );
if( err && errno )
err = errno;
#else /*!HAVE_PLOCK*/
if( uid ) {
errno = EPERM;
err = errno;
@ -129,6 +139,7 @@ lock_pool( void *p, size_t n )
if( err && errno )
err = errno;
}
#endif /*!HAVE_PLOCK*/
#else
err = mlock( p, n );
if( err && errno )