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Flush keyserver search output.

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Add trustdb chnages from 1.4.
Check algo usage for batch key generation.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2008-12-09 10:46:29 +00:00
parent 382d2f8efb
commit 9874c62a10
4 changed files with 119 additions and 57 deletions
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14
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
2008-12-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Check that key and subkey usages
are allowed.
2008-12-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> (wk)
* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Fix the trust signature
calculations so that we lower the trust depth of signatures to fit
within the current chain, rather than discarding any signature
that does not fit within the trust depth.
2008-12-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* keyserver.c (show_prompt): Flush stdout.
* gpg.c (open_info_file): Add arg BINARY and adjust callers.
* gpg.c (main): Call i18n_init before init_common_subsystems.

64
g10/keygen.c
View File

@ -2287,7 +2287,8 @@ get_parameter_algo( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
}
/*
* parse the usage parameter and set the keyflags. Return true on error.
* Parse the usage parameter and set the keyflags. Returns -1 on
* error, 0 for no usage given or 1 for usage available.
*/
static int
parse_parameter_usage (const char *fname,
@ -2435,54 +2436,75 @@ proc_parameter_file( struct para_data_s *para, const char *fname,
algo=get_parameter_algo(para,pKEYTYPE);
if (openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
{
log_error("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
return -1;
}
}
else
{
log_error("%s: no Key-Type specified\n",fname);
log_error ("%s: no Key-Type specified\n",fname);
return -1;
}
err=parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pKEYUSAGE);
if(err==0)
err = parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pKEYUSAGE);
if (!err)
{
/* Default to algo capabilities if key-usage is not provided */
r=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r));
r->key=pKEYUSAGE;
r->u.usage=openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
r->next=para;
para=r;
r = xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r));
r->key = pKEYUSAGE;
r->u.usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
r->next = para;
para = r;
}
else if(err==-1)
else if (err == -1)
return -1;
else
{
r = get_parameter (para, pKEYUSAGE);
if (r && (r->u.usage & ~openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo)))
{
log_error ("%s:%d: specified Key-Usage not allowed for algo %d\n",
fname, r->lnr, algo);
return -1;
}
}
r = get_parameter( para, pSUBKEYTYPE );
if(r)
{
algo=get_parameter_algo( para, pSUBKEYTYPE);
algo = get_parameter_algo (para, pSUBKEYTYPE);
if (openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo))
{
log_error("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
return -1;
}
err=parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pSUBKEYUSAGE);
if(err==0)
err = parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pSUBKEYUSAGE);
if (!err)
{
/* Default to algo capabilities if subkey-usage is not
provided */
r=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r));
r->key=pSUBKEYUSAGE;
r->u.usage=openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
r->next=para;
para=r;
r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof(*r));
r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE;
r->u.usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo);
r->next = para;
para = r;
}
else if(err==-1)
else if (err == -1)
return -1;
else
{
r = get_parameter (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE);
if (r && (r->u.usage & ~openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo)))
{
log_error ("%s:%d: specified Subkey-Usage not allowed"
" for algo %d\n", fname, r->lnr, algo);
return -1;
}
}
}
if( get_parameter_value( para, pUSERID ) )
have_user_id=1;
else

2
g10/keyserver.c
View File

@ -731,6 +731,8 @@ show_prompt(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,int numdesc,int count,const char *search)
{
char *answer;
fflush (stdout);
if(count && opt.command_fd==-1)
{
static int from=1;

96
g10/trustdb.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* trustdb.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
* 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -1935,54 +1935,78 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
did not exist. This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
trust sig. */
if (kr && (kr->trust_regexp==NULL || opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP ||
(uidnode && check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
if (kr && (!kr->trust_regexp
|| opt.trust_model != TM_PGP
|| (uidnode
&& check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
{
if(DBG_TRUST && opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth)
log_debug("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d, kr depth is %d\n",
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,sig->trust_depth,
kr->trust_depth);
/* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor
the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent
argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth
&& pk->trust_timestamp<=sig->timestamp
&& (sig->trust_depth<=kr->trust_depth
|| kr->ownertrust==TRUST_ULTIMATE))
if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
&& sig->trust_depth
&& pk->trust_timestamp <= sig->timestamp)
{
/* If we got here, we know that:
unsigned char depth;
this is a trust sig.
/* If the depth on the signature is less than the
chain currently has, then use the signature depth
so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
signer wanted. If the depth on the signature is
more than the chain currently has, then use the
chain depth so we use as much of the signature
depth as the chain will permit. An ultimately
trusted signature can restart the depth to
whatever level it likes. */
it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
sig on this key (not uid).
if (sig->trust_depth < kr->trust_depth
|| kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
depth = sig->trust_depth;
else
depth = kr->trust_depth;
it is legal in that it was either generated by an
ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
chain, and the depth does not violate the
original trust sig.
if (depth)
{
if(DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
" kr depth is %d\n",
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
sig->trust_depth,
kr->trust_depth);
if there is a regexp attached, it matched
successfully.
*/
/* If we got here, we know that:
if(DBG_TRUST)
log_debug("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
"depth %d with %d\n",
pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
pk->trust_depth,sig->trust_depth);
this is a trust sig.
pk->trust_value=sig->trust_value;
pk->trust_depth=sig->trust_depth-1;
it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
sig on this key (not uid).
/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
on the pk for the next round. */
if(sig->trust_regexp)
pk->trust_regexp=sig->trust_regexp;
it is legal in that it was either generated by an
ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
chain, and the depth does not violate the
original trust sig.
if there is a regexp attached, it matched
successfully.
*/
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
"depth %d with %d\n",
pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
pk->trust_depth,depth);
pk->trust_value = sig->trust_value;
pk->trust_depth = depth-1;
/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
on the pk for the next round. */
if (sig->trust_regexp)
pk->trust_regexp = sig->trust_regexp;
}
}
if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)