Use blinding for the RSA secret operation.

* cipher/random.c (randomize_mpi): New.
* g10/gpgv.c (randomize_mpi): New stub.
* cipher/rsa.c (USE_BLINDING): Define macro.
(secret): Implement blinding.
--

GPG 1.x has never used any protection against timing attacks on the
RSA secret operation.  The rationale for this has been that there was
no way to mount a remote timing attack on GnuPG.  With the turning up
of Acoustic Cryptanalysis (http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic) this
assumption no longer holds true and thus we need to do do something
about it.  Blinding seems to be a suitable mitigation to the threat of
key extraction.  It does not help against distinguishing used keys,
though.

Note that GPG 2.x uses Libgcrypt which does blinding by default.

The performance penalty is negligible: Modifying the core pubkey_sign
or pubkey_decrypt function to run 100 times in a loop, the entire
execution times for signing or decrypting a small message using a 4K
RSA key on a Thinkpad X220 are

  Without blinding:  5.2s  (8.9s)
  With blinding:     5.6s  (9.3s)

The numbers in parentheses give the values without the recently
implemented k-ary exponentiation code.  Thus for the next release the
user will actually experience faster signing and decryption.  A
drawback of blinding is that we need random numbers even for
decryption (albeit at low quality).

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>

CVE-id: CVE-2013-4576

g10/gpgv.c

@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ void cipher_sync( CIPHER_HANDLE c ) {}
 void random_dump_stats(void) {}
 int quick_random_gen( int onoff ) { return -1;}
 void randomize_buffer( byte *buffer, size_t length, int level ) {}
+void randomize_mpi (MPI mpi, size_t nbits, int level) {}
 int random_is_faked() { return -1;}
 byte *get_random_bits( size_t nbits, int level, int secure ) { return NULL;}
 void set_random_seed_file( const char *name ) {}