See ChangeLog: Fri Jan 14 18:32:01 CET 2000 Werner Koch

ChangeLog

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
 
-	* configure.in: Do set development version when the version has
+	* configure.in: Do not set development version when the version has
 	a dash in it.  Suggested by Dave Dykstra.
 
 Thu Dec 16 10:07:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>

NEWS

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+Noteworthy changes in the current test release
+----------------------------------------------
 
     * Some fixes for the W32 version
 
@@ -7,6 +9,14 @@
     * New encryption keys are generated in way which allows a much
       faster decryption.
 
+    * New command --export-secret-subkeys which outputs the
+      the _primary_ key with is's secret parts deleted.  This is
+      useful for automated decryption/signature creation as it
+      allows to keep the real secret primary key offline and
+      thereby protecting the key certificates and allowing to
+      create revocations for the subkeys.  See the FAQ for a
+      procedure to install such secret keys.
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.1 (1999-12-16)
 -----------------------------------

cipher/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+Fri Jan 14 18:32:01 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* rmd160.c (rmd160_get_info): Moved casting to the left side due to a
+	problem with UTS4.3.  Suggested by Dave Dykstra.
+	* sha1.c (sha1_get_info): Ditto.
+	* tiger.c (tiger_get_info): Ditto.
+	* md5.c (md5_get_info): Ditto
+	* des.c (des_get_info): Ditto.
+	* blowfish.c (blowfish_get_info): Ditto.
+	* cast5.c (cast5_get_info): Ditto.
+	* twofish.c (twofish_get_info): Ditto.
+
 Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
 
 	* elgamal.c (wiener_map): New.
@@ -5,7 +17,7 @@ Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
 	(generate): Calculate the qbits using the wiener map and
 	choose an x at a size comparable to the one choosen in gen_k
 
-	* random.c (read_pool): Print a more friendly erro message in
+	* random.c (read_pool): Print a more friendly error message in
 	cases when too much random is requested in one call.
 
 	* Makefile.am (tiger): Replaced -O1 by -O. Suggested by Alec Habig.

cipher/blowfish.c

@@ -43,9 +43,6 @@
 
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH	 4  /* blowfish 128 bit key */
 
-#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f)  (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f)
-#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f)   (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f)
-
 #define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8
 #define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16
 
@@ -584,9 +581,12 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
     *keylen = 128;
     *blocksize = BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;
     *contextsize = sizeof(BLOWFISH_context);
-    *r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(bf_setkey);
+    *(int  (**)(BLOWFISH_context*, byte*, unsigned))r_setkey
-    *r_encrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(encrypt_block);
+							= bf_setkey;
-    *r_decrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(decrypt_block);
+    *(void (**)(BLOWFISH_context*, byte*, byte*))r_encrypt
+							= encrypt_block;
+    *(void (**)(BLOWFISH_context*, byte*, byte*))r_decrypt
+							= decrypt_block;
 
     if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
 	return "BLOWFISH";

cipher/cast5.c

@@ -46,9 +46,6 @@
 
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5	 3
 
-#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f)  (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f)
-#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f)   (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f)
-
 #define CAST5_BLOCKSIZE 8
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -610,9 +607,13 @@ cast5_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
     *keylen = 128;
     *blocksize = CAST5_BLOCKSIZE;
     *contextsize = sizeof(CAST5_context);
-    *r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(cast_setkey);
+    *(int  (**)(CAST5_context*, byte*, unsigned))r_setkey
-    *r_encrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(encrypt_block);
+							= cast_setkey;
-    *r_decrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(decrypt_block);
+    *(void (**)(CAST5_context*, byte*, byte*))r_encrypt
+							= encrypt_block;
+    *(void (**)(CAST5_context*, byte*, byte*))r_decrypt
+							= decrypt_block;
+
 
     if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5 )
 	return "CAST5";

cipher/des.c

@@ -147,9 +147,6 @@ working_memcmp( const char *a, const char *b, size_t n )
 #endif
 
 
-/* Macros used by the info function. */
-#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f)  ((int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f))
-#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f)   ((void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f))
 
 
 /*
@@ -996,14 +993,16 @@ des_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
 	}
     }
 
-
     if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES ) {
 	*keylen = 192;
 	*blocksize = 8;
 	*contextsize = sizeof(struct _tripledes_ctx);
-	*r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(do_tripledes_setkey);
+	*(int  (**)(struct _tripledes_ctx*, byte*, unsigned))r_setkey
-	*r_encrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(do_tripledes_encrypt);
+							= do_tripledes_setkey;
-	*r_decrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT(do_tripledes_decrypt);
+	*(void (**)(struct _tripledes_ctx*, byte*, byte*))r_encrypt
+							= do_tripledes_encrypt;
+	*(void (**)(struct _tripledes_ctx*, byte*, byte*))r_decrypt
+							= do_tripledes_decrypt;
 	return "3DES";
     }
     return NULL;

cipher/md5.c

@@ -344,10 +344,10 @@ md5_get_info( int algo, size_t *contextsize,
     *r_asnoid = asn;
     *r_asnlen = DIM(asn);
     *r_mdlen = 16;
-    *r_init  = (void (*)(void *))md5_init;
+    *(void  (**)(MD5_CONTEXT *))r_init		       = md5_init;
-    *r_write = (void (*)(void *, byte*, size_t))md5_write;
+    *(void  (**)(MD5_CONTEXT *, byte*, size_t))r_write = md5_write;
-    *r_final = (void (*)(void *))md5_final;
+    *(void  (**)(MD5_CONTEXT *))r_final 	       = md5_final;
-    *r_read  = (byte *(*)(void *))md5_read;
+    *(byte *(**)(MD5_CONTEXT *))r_read		       = md5_read;
 
     return "MD5";
 }

cipher/rmd160.c

@@ -562,10 +562,10 @@ rmd160_get_info( int algo, size_t *contextsize,
     *r_asnoid = asn;
     *r_asnlen = DIM(asn);
     *r_mdlen = 20;
-    *r_init  = (void (*)(void *))rmd160_init;
+    *(void  (**)(RMD160_CONTEXT *))r_init		  = rmd160_init;
-    *r_write = (void (*)(void *, byte*, size_t))rmd160_write;
+    *(void  (**)(RMD160_CONTEXT *, byte*, size_t))r_write = rmd160_write;
-    *r_final = (void (*)(void *))rmd160_final;
+    *(void  (**)(RMD160_CONTEXT *))r_final		  = rmd160_final;
-    *r_read  = (byte *(*)(void *))rmd160_read;
+    *(byte *(**)(RMD160_CONTEXT *))r_read		  = rmd160_read;
 
     return "RIPEMD160";
 }

cipher/sha1.c

@@ -341,6 +341,10 @@ sha1_get_info( int algo, size_t *contextsize,
     *r_write = (void (*)(void *, byte*, size_t))sha1_write;
     *r_final = (void (*)(void *))sha1_final;
     *r_read  = (byte *(*)(void *))sha1_read;
+    *(void  (**)(SHA1_CONTEXT *))r_init 		= sha1_init;
+    *(void  (**)(SHA1_CONTEXT *, byte*, size_t))r_write = sha1_write;
+    *(void  (**)(SHA1_CONTEXT *))r_final		= sha1_final;
+    *(byte *(**)(SHA1_CONTEXT *))r_read 		= sha1_read;
 
     return "SHA1";
 }

cipher/tiger.c

@@ -899,10 +899,10 @@ tiger_get_info( int algo, size_t *contextsize,
     *r_asnoid = asn;
     *r_asnlen = DIM(asn);
     *r_mdlen = 24;
-    *r_init  = (void (*)(void *))tiger_init;
+    *(void  (**)(TIGER_CONTEXT *))r_init		 = tiger_init;
-    *r_write = (void (*)(void *, byte*, size_t))tiger_write;
+    *(void  (**)(TIGER_CONTEXT *, byte*, size_t))r_write = tiger_write;
-    *r_final = (void (*)(void *))tiger_final;
+    *(void  (**)(TIGER_CONTEXT *))r_final		 = tiger_final;
-    *r_read  = (byte *(*)(void *))tiger_read;
+    *(byte *(**)(TIGER_CONTEXT *))r_read		 = tiger_read;
 
     return "TIGER";
 }

cipher/twofish.c

@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@
 /* Prototype for the self-test function. */
 static const char *selftest(void);
 
-/* Macros used by the info function. */
-#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f)  ((int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f))
-#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f)   ((void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f))
-
 /* Structure for an expanded Twofish key.  s contains the key-dependent
  * S-boxes composed with the MDS matrix; w contains the eight "whitening"
  * subkeys, K[0] through K[7].	k holds the remaining, "round" subkeys.  Note
@@ -991,9 +987,12 @@ twofish_get_info (int algo, size_t *keylen,
     *keylen = algo==10? 256 : 128;
     *blocksize = 16;
     *contextsize = sizeof (TWOFISH_context);
-    *r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY (twofish_setkey);
+    *(int  (**)(const TWOFISH_context*, byte*, unsigned))r_setkey
-    *r_encrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT (twofish_encrypt);
+							= twofish_setkey;
-    *r_decrypt= FNCCAST_CRYPT (twofish_decrypt);
+    *(void (**)(const TWOFISH_context*, byte*, byte*))r_encrypt
+							= twofish_encrypt;
+    *(void (**)(const TWOFISH_context*, byte*, byte*))r_decrypt
+							= twofish_decrypt;
 
     if( algo == 10 )
 	return "TWOFISH";

doc/DETAILS

@@ -494,6 +494,15 @@ There is one enhancement used with the old style packet headers:
 +  that this is the last packet.
 
 
+GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
+===================================
+S2K mode 101 is used to identify these extensions.
+After the hash algorithm the 3 bytes "GNU" are used to make
+clear that these are extensions for GNU, the next bytes gives the
+GNU protection mode - 1000.  Defined modes are:
+  1001 - do not store the secret part at all
+
+
 Usage of gdbm files for keyrings
 ================================
     The key to store the keyblock is it's fingerprint, other records

doc/FAQ

@@ -372,3 +372,30 @@
      message and encrypt it again without this option.	The option will
      be removed in 1.1, so better re-encrypt your message now.
 
+  Q: How can I used GnuPG in an automated environment?
+  A: You should use the option --batch and don't use passphrases as
+     there is usually no way to store it more secure than the secret
+     keyring itself.  The suggested way to create the keys for the
+     automated envirionment ist:
+	On a secure machine:
+	1. If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey
+	   for your key (edit menu, choose "addkey" and the DSA).
+	2. Make sure that you use a passphrase (Needed by the current
+	   implementation)
+	3. gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo >secring.auto
+	4. Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a test directory.
+	5. Cd to this diectory
+	6. gpg --homedir . --edit foo
+	   and use "passwd" to remove the passphrase from the subkeys.
+	   You may also want to remove all unused subkeys.
+	7. copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the
+	   target box
+	On the target machine:
+	8. Install secring.auto as secret keyring.
+	9. Now you can start your new service.	It is a good idea to
+	   install some intrusion detection system so that you hopefully
+	   get a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in turn can
+	   revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and install new
+	   subkeys.
+
+

doc/OpenPGP

@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@
    which can be considered to be in compliance with RFC1991;  this
    format is only created if a special option is active.
 
+   GnuPG uses a S2K mode of 101 for GNU extensions to the secret key
+   protection algorithms.  This number is not defined in OpenPGP, but
+   given the fact that this number is in a range which used at many
+   other places in OpenPGP for private/experimenat algorithm identifiers,
+   this should be not a so bad choice.	The 3 bytes "GNU" are used
+   to identify this as a GNU extension - see the file DETAILS for a
+   definition of the used data formats.
+
+
 
   Some Notes on OpenPGP / PGP Compatibility:
   ==========================================

doc/gpg.sgml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 -->
 
 
-<!DOCTYPE RefEntry PUBLIC "-//Davenport//DTD DocBook V3.0//EN" [
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//Davenport//DTD DocBook V3.0//EN" [
 <!entity ParmDir "<parameter>directory</parameter>">
 <!entity ParmFile "<parameter>file</parameter>">
 <!entity OptParmFile "<optional>&ParmFile;</optional>">
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ and the remaining files are the signed stuff.
 </para></listitem></varlistentry>
 
 <varlistentry>
-<term>--verify-files <optional><optional><parameter/files/</optional>
+<term>--verify-files <optional><parameter/files/</optional></term>
 <listitem><para>
 This is a special version of the --verify command which does not work with
 detached signatures.  The command expects the files to bee verified either
@@ -431,9 +431,14 @@ are not compatible to OpenPGP.
 
 <varlistentry>
 <term>--export-secret-keys &OptParmNames;</term>
+<term>--export-secret-subkeys &OptParmNames;</term>
 <listitem><para>
 Same as --export, but does export the secret keys.
 This is normally not very useful and a security risk.
+the second form of the command has the special property to
+render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is
+a GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can
+not be expected to successful import such a key.
 </para></listitem></varlistentry>
 
 
@@ -1418,6 +1423,7 @@ constructed by cutting off the extension (".asc" or ".sig") of
 <term>GNUPGHOME</term>
 <listitem><para>If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".</para></listitem>
 </varlistentry>
+<varlistentry>
 <term>http_proxy</term>
 <listitem><para>Only honored when the option --honor-http-proxy is set.</para></listitem>
 </varlistentry>

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+Fri Jan 14 18:32:01 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* packet.h (STRING2KEY): Changed mode from byte to int.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Add the special GNU protection stuff
+	* build-packet.c (so_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Ditto.
+	* export.c (export_secsubkeys): New.
+	(do_export_stream): Hack to export the primary key using mode 1001.
+	* g10.c: New command --export-secret-subkeys
+
 Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
 
 	* armor.c (is_armored): Check for 1-pass-sig packets. Reported by

g10/build-packet.c

@@ -371,19 +371,30 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
 	else {
 	    iobuf_put(a, 0xff );
 	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.algo );
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode >= 1000 ) {
+		iobuf_put(a, 101 );
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+		iobuf_write(a, "GNU", 3 );
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.mode - 1000 );
+	    }
+	    else {
 		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.mode );
 		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+	    }
 	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1
 		|| sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 )
 		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.s2k.salt, 8 );
 	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 )
 		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.count );
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1001 )
 		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
 	}
     }
     else
 	iobuf_put(a, 0 );
-    if( sk->is_protected && sk->version >= 4 ) {
+    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
+	;
+    else if( sk->is_protected && sk->version >= 4 ) {
 	byte *p;
 	assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[npkey] ) );
 	p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[npkey], &i );

g10/export.c

@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@ export_seckeys( STRLIST users )
     return do_export( users, 1, 0 );
 }
 
+int
+export_secsubkeys( STRLIST users )
+{
+    return do_export( users, 2, 0 );
+}
+
 static int
 do_export( STRLIST users, int secret, int onlyrfc )
 {
@@ -168,6 +174,16 @@ do_export_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int secret, int onlyrfc, int *any )
 	    }
 	}
 
+	/* we can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key */
+	if( secret == 2
+	    && (node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY ))
+	    && !node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->is_protected )
+	{
+	    log_info(_("key %08lX: not protected - skipped\n"),
+		  (ulong)keyid_from_sk( node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, NULL) );
+	    continue;
+	}
+
 	/* and write it */
 	for( kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0 )); ) {
 	    /* don't export any comment packets but those in the
@@ -183,7 +199,20 @@ do_export_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int secret, int onlyrfc, int *any )
 		    continue; /* not exportable */
 	    }
 
-	    if( (rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt )) ) {
+	    if( secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+		/* we don't want to export the secret parts of the
+		 * primary key, this is doen by using GNU protection mode 1001
+		 */
+		int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode;
+		node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;
+		rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt );
+		node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = save_mode;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt );
+	    }
+
+	    if( rc ) {
 		log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
 			    node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
 		rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;

g10/g10.c

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
     aExport,
     aExportAll,
     aExportSecret,
+    aExportSecretSub,
     aCheckKeys,
     aGenRevoke,
     aPrimegen,
@@ -217,6 +218,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
     { aRecvKeys, "recv-keys"     , 256, N_("import keys from a key server") },
     { aExportAll, "export-all"    , 256, "@" },
     { aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , 256, "@" },
+    { aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , 256, "@" },
     { aImport, "import",      256     , N_("import/merge keys")},
     { aFastImport, "fast-import",  256 , "@"},
     { aListPackets, "list-packets",256,N_("list only the sequence of packets")},
@@ -697,6 +699,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case aListKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListKeys); break;
 	  case aListSigs: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSigs); break;
 	  case aExportSecret: set_cmd( &cmd, aExportSecret); break;
+	  case aExportSecretSub: set_cmd( &cmd, aExportSecretSub); break;
 	  case aDeleteSecretKey: set_cmd( &cmd, aDeleteSecretKey);
 							greeting=1; break;
 	  case aDeleteKey: set_cmd( &cmd, aDeleteKey); greeting=1; break;
@@ -1271,6 +1274,14 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	free_strlist(sl);
 	break;
 
+      case aExportSecretSub:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	export_secsubkeys( sl );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
       case aGenRevoke:
 	if( argc != 1 )
 	    wrong_args("--gen-revoke user-id");

g10/keyedit.c

@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
     KBNODE node;
     PKT_secret_key *sk;
     char *passphrase = NULL;
+    int no_primary_secrets = 0;
 
     node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
     if( !node ) {
@@ -423,10 +424,16 @@ change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
 	tty_printf(_("This key is not protected.\n"));
 	break;
       default:
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n"));
+	    no_primary_secrets = 1;
+	}
+	else {
 	    tty_printf(_("Key is protected.\n"));
 	    rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
 	    if( !rc )
 		passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
+	}
 	break;
     }
 
@@ -436,6 +443,8 @@ change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
 	    PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
 	    set_next_passphrase( passphrase );
 	    rc = check_secret_key( subsk, 0 );
+	    if( !rc && !passphrase )
+		passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
 	}
     }
 
@@ -465,9 +474,12 @@ change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
 		break;
 	    }
 	    else { /* okay */
+		rc = 0;
+		if( !no_primary_secrets ) {
 		    sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
 		    sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
 		    rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
+		}
 		for(node=keyblock; !rc && node; node = node->next ) {
 		    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
 			PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;

g10/main.h

@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock );
 int export_pubkeys( STRLIST users, int onlyrfc );
 int export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int onlyrfc );
 int export_seckeys( STRLIST users );
+int export_secsubkeys( STRLIST users );
 
 /* dearmor.c --*/
 int dearmor_file( const char *fname );

g10/packet.h

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct packet_struct PACKET;
 
 typedef struct {
-    byte mode;
+    int  mode;
     byte hash_algo;
     byte salt[8];
     u32  count;

g10/parse-packet.c

@@ -1324,6 +1324,24 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 		sk->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
 		sk->protect.s2k.mode  = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
 		sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+		/* check for the special GNU extension */
+		if( is_v4 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 101 ) {
+		    for(i=0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+			temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+		    if( i < 4 || memcmp( temp, "GNU", 3 ) ) {
+			if( list_mode )
+			    printf(  "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
+						sk->protect.s2k.mode );
+			rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+			goto leave;
+		    }
+		    /* here we know that it is a gnu extension
+		     * What follows is the GNU protection mode:
+		     * All values have special meanings
+		     * and they are mapped in the mode with a base of 1000.
+		     */
+		    sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3];
+		}
 		switch( sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
 		  case 1:
 		  case 3:
@@ -1339,9 +1357,12 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 		    break;
 		  case 3: if( list_mode ) printf(  "\titer+salt S2K" );
 		    break;
+		  case 1001: if( list_mode ) printf(  "\tgnu-dummy S2K" );
+		    break;
 		  default:
 		    if( list_mode )
-			printf(  "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
+			printf(  "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n",
+				 sk->protect.s2k.mode < 1000? "":"GNU ",
 						   sk->protect.s2k.mode );
 		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
 		    goto leave;
@@ -1395,6 +1416,9 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	      default:
 		sk->protect.ivlen = 8;
 	    }
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
+		sk->protect.ivlen = 0;
+
 	    if( pktlen < sk->protect.ivlen ) {
 		rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
 		goto leave;
@@ -1415,7 +1439,12 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	 * If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
 	 * we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
 	 * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
-	if( is_v4 && sk->is_protected ) {
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+	    /* better set some dummy stuff here */
+	    sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, m_strdup("dummydata"), 10);
+	    pktlen = 0;
+	}
+	else if( is_v4 && sk->is_protected ) {
 	    /* ugly; the length is encrypted too, so we read all
 	     * stuff up to the end of the packet into the first
 	     * skey element */

g10/seckey-cert.c

@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
 	CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
 	PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
 
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+	    log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
+	    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	}
 	if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
 	    BUG();
 	if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {

mpi/ChangeLog

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
 	(mpihelp_mul_karatsuba_case): New.
 	(mpihelp_mul): Splitted to make use of the new functions.
 	* mpi-pow.c (mpi_powm): Make use of the new splitted function
-	to avoid multiple allocation of temorary memory during the
+	to avoid multiple allocation of temporary memory during the
 	karatsuba operations.
 
 	* mpi_mpow.c: Removed the unused Barrett code.