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See ChangeLog: Fri Jul 14 19:38:23 CEST 2000 Werner Koch

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2000-07-14 17:34:53 +00:00
parent d1648b4d7a
commit 92cd255508
104 changed files with 5871 additions and 1540 deletions
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35
g10/seckey-cert.c
View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "i18n.h"
#include "status.h"
/****************
* Emulate our old PK interface here - sometime in the future we might
* change the internal design to directly fit to libgcrypt.
@ -82,9 +83,11 @@ pk_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
return rc;
}
static int
do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
{
byte *buffer;
u16 csum=0;
int i, res;
unsigned nbytes;
@ -95,6 +98,10 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
return GPGERR_GENERAL;
}
if( sk->protect.algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE )
BUG();
if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
@ -112,6 +119,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
}
dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
&sk->protect.s2k, 0 );
/* Hmmm: Do we use sync mode here even for Twofish? */
if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
@ -198,7 +206,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
free_secret_key( save_sk );
return GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
}
/* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
/* the checksum may be correct in some cases,
* so we also check the key itself */
res = pk_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
if( res ) {
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
@ -300,8 +309,6 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
) {
BUG();
}
rc = gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
if( rc == GCRYERR_WEAK_KEY ) {
log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
@ -316,18 +323,19 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
if( blocksize != 8 && blocksize != 16 )
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %d\n", blocksize );
sk->protect.ivlen = blocksize;
assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
}
assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
gcry_randomize(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen,
GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
#warning FIXME: replace set/get buffer
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
#define NMPIS (GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY - GNUPG_MAX_NPKEY)
byte *bufarr[NMPIS];
unsigned narr[NMPIS];
unsigned nbits[NMPIS];
/* FIXME: There is a bug in this function for all algorithms
* where the secret MPIs are more than 1 */
byte *bufarr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned narr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned nbits[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
int ndata=0;
byte *p, *data;
@ -342,13 +350,13 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
nbits[j] = gcry_mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
ndata += narr[j] + 2;
}
for( ; j < NMPIS; j++ )
for( ; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
bufarr[j] = NULL;
ndata += 2; /* for checksum */
data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
p = data;
for(j=0; j < NMPIS && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
for(j=0; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
p[1] = nbits[j];
p += 2;
@ -356,7 +364,6 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
p += narr[j];
gcry_free(bufarr[j]);
}
#undef NMPIS
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = csum;
*p++ = csum >> 8;